

kind of being, for the purpose of achieving self-definition, must engage other being: “Existence in history, the claim to recognizable identity, are based on relations to other articulate constructs” (Steiner, 2004: 317). That is to say, when there is the act of understanding of being as well as the act of translation, there must be the kind of being of entities which in every case *corresponds* with the kind of being of human beings’ understanding of being. To put it simply, it is the understanding of being that determines the kind of being of entities, and therefore entities within the being-discovered world can only be as disclosed as such-and-such in terms of the human being. In this kind of human being, publicness and faithfulness both play the role of attesting to the being.

Although the conception “faithfulness” in the history of translation appeared in China is more than two thousand years later than that in the West, there is still a common suggestion that to this conception was first given rise at the time when the act of translation as a movement came into its boom respectively in China and in the West (Wang Dongfeng, 2004: 3). But no matter wherefrom the act of translation takes place, the being of the translator’s being-alongside that which is to be translated is an irrefutable fact. Being-alongside that which is to be translated means nothing more than the translator’s being is being in **deseverance** with that which is to be translated. **Deseverance presupposes distanciality**. But distanciality which belongs to the being-alongside is that which the translator, as the everyday being-alongside that which is to be translated, stands in subjection to Others (here the “Others” is another term for publicness which is mainly constitutive for the world, and that which is to be translated is undoubtedly the entities ready-to-hand within-the-world to which the translator comports himself/herself). The translator who is in the world of significant relations cannot perform the act of translation completely at his/her own disposal, because such a world in which he/she lives has already been socially constituted, normatively standardized, and historically-traditionally chartered before he/she is thrown and projects the understanding of being. This world, on Heidegger view, mainly plays the role of Others or Publicness. What does the role of Others play in our everyday existence which of course includes the act of translation? The Others, by reason of its definitive character of publicness, has the power or even the responsibility of taking away the right of the translator’s understanding of being. The translator’s possibilities of understanding of being to be projected upon entities are for

the Others to dispose of as it pleases. Those individuals who are the constitutive items of the Others, moreover, are not definite by all means in character. On the contrary, any one of the Others can represent the Others. What is decisive is just the inconspicuous and anonymous domination occupied by the Others which has already taken over unawares from the translator as being-alongside with entities within the world. Any individual translator belongs himself/herself to the Others and hence enhances the power of the Others. The Others to “which” the translator is thus assigned in order to cover up the fact that it has already had the translator into its embrace is essentially the translator himself/herself. Consequently, it is the Others instead of the translator that are those “which” in the Others proximally and for the most part are there in the everyday being-alongside entities within the world. Here, the “which” to which the translator belongs is not this one, not that one, not itself, not the translator, not the sum of them. The “which” is the neuter, the publicness, the shared worldliness (to be continued).

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