





projection take place” (HW, 48). But, this is not the whole story of understanding. Understanding as a form of projection, as the most basic mode of the human being’s disclosedness, has no reason at all to stop here. We may say that that which constitutes an understanding is not probably and usually got explicit in its empirical interpretation, but we should not say that there is no understanding in the interpretation at all. Understanding, as described, is worldly global; interpretation, as “the development of understanding” (BT, 188), can only develop itself within the global understanding, and accordingly result in localization or thematization of its understanding, and nothing more.

To claim that “the interpretation is local, thematic” means that it signifies that part of the global understanding of world wins the chance of getting explicit, thematic. The relationship between the human being’s understanding and interpretation is constituted and prescribed by the economic law of cost-effectiveness. Whether or not an understanding is needed to be made explicit, what part of an understanding is needed to be made so and so, and how the needed part of an understanding gets explicitly, thematically foregrounded, largely and reasonably depend on the purpose of the “in-order-to-be” and the “for-the-sake-of-which”. Therefore, a global, unthematic understanding of world does not necessarily make itself thematically explicit in an entirety. In fact, it is thoroughly impossible to make a global, unthematic understanding of world thematically explicit in terms of its totality whose character is made up by various significant relations which always exist in various involvements; in addition to the fact that being-global existentially implies that it is always constitutive, contingent, relational, and indeterminative. An interpretation as a thematically local expression of the global, inexplicit understanding thematically foregrounds or lays out part of the primary global understanding on the one hand; while on the other hand it conceals or covers up most part of the primary global understanding by pushing it into a being-backgroundedness. This kind of phenomenon about the primary understanding and its derivative mode of explicit interpretation is captured by Heidegger’s dialectical relationship between unconcealment and concealment in the very act of understanding of being. This phenomenon of thematically coming out of the primary, amorphous, global understanding into a derivative, thematic, local interpretation is the definite process of making the understanding explicit, which is the one theme (among others) that takes up the large part of Heidegger’s investigation of “the question of the meaning of being” (BT, 19) in his phenomenological hermeneutics. By now, the equivalence

appears explicit between the two statements: “understanding is global, interpretation is local” and “understanding is the entire scope of ability, while interpretation is the concrete reification of this ability”. In other words, an interpretation is never free-floating, but is always rooted in the primary global understanding. Finally, let us use a metaphor to explicate this kind of constitutive/constituted relationship.

### 3. Conclusion

It is a metaphor with which we are familiar: that which shows itself is what is exposed above water and that which is kept in darkness is what is covered under water. The exposed is just a small part of the iceberg whose larger part remains submerged; however, it is the small part that tells the rest of the iceberg, and lets us give it a whole picture. So too, although our primary global understanding of being largely keeps itself covered up from our sight and beyond our immediately thematic local interpretative apprehension, that it keeps secret or inconspicuous may well be the very reason that we usually interpret things empirically and explicitly in a certain particular manner. The primary global understanding of being with the ultimate purposiveness of “towards-which” projects itself in a way in which its constitutive ability is reified in the form of thematic local interpretation. Thinking over the problem of the meaning of the thematic local interpretation in terms of its reification of the primary global understanding of being, we have already been delivered over to this question “an interpretation is the explicit understanding”.

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