

reasonably share the function of disclosure. This point has been echoed by Heidegger's claim: "Disclosedness is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse, and pertains equiprimordially to the world, to Being-in, and to the Self" (BT, 263).

Then understanding as disclosure, as has been discussed, should follow the form of as-structure in the very way in which state-of-mind functions as disclosure. If state-of-mind discloses Dasein's being-there by reification of it into various moods, then understanding discloses Dasein's being-there by its empirical interpretations. Now, it is time for the form of as-structure to be made clearer: *Dasein (the human being) understands something as something. This is a process which gets understanding explicit, we call this process an interpretation.* Obviously, the relationship between understanding and interpretation is not equiprimordial or co-original, but is derivative. Understanding is always prior to interpretation, and interpretation always follows the trail of the act of understanding in so far as there is the act of interpretation. In other words, understanding founds² interpretation, and interpretation is founded by understanding, but not vice versa. So, to explain Heideggerian sense of interpretation inevitably demands going back to his sense of understanding time and again.

So far the question of the meaning of the as-structure as disclosure or being disclosedness should have been made explicit: *understanding and state-of-mind are the equiprimordial modes of disclosing Dasein's being-there, in disclosing, they abide by the interpretative as-structure.* As has been discussed, disclosure means to **understand something as something**; it also means that, in the process of understanding of something as something, the ontological symbolic structure (the worldhood of the world), or the system of significance (the primary understanding of being), actualizes itself into particulars, and its function of guidance finds its way into what is sought rather than what is not sought. *In sum, the process of understanding of something as something is the process of disclosing the inherent relationships between being and a being, or beings.* Only through the interpretative as-structure as disclosure (disclosedness), can the understanding of being be reified through its beings, therefore beings can serve as a clue to trace back to their source of being which lets them come into their being as such.

5. Conclusion

Finally, the unfinished list of **terminology-pairs** at the end of the second paragraph (page 66) in this section can be illumined in the light of the as-structure as disclosure (disclosedness). The first term of each terminology-pairs signifies the entirety of a symbolic structure (the ontological understanding of being) which guidingly or understandingly

assigns or refers Dasein to beings, and the second term of each terminology-pairs indicates the ontical particulars of those beings upon which our understanding of being illumines. The former is always a sort of guidance for us to comport towards our being; the latter refers to the particular beings thus made or gained under the guidance of the former. The former is always already being there before our concrete doings. In this sense, the primary understanding is always already prior to an interpreting, and the interpreting is always undertaken under the guidance from its understanding. Such relations are remindful of Kant's famous saying "Intuition is blind without concepts, concepts without intuition are empty". In the following section, we are going to come near intuition in a way in which we try to let the meaning of "the as-structure of interpretation" show itself in itself.

Acknowledgment

The paper is the initial accomplishment of the program assigned by Henan Science and Technology Department in 2013: A Study on the Translators in Phenomenological Perspective in Henan. No: 132400410300; also sponsored by Social Science Program issued by Educational Bureau of Henan.

References

- [1] Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (trans.) China Social Sciences Publishing House Chengcheng Books Ltd., 1999.
- [2] Culler, Jonathan. *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism*. Beijing: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, 2004.
- [3] Gadamer, Gorg. *Truth and Method*. Garpett Barden & John Cimming (trans.) Beijing: China Social Sciences Publishing House Chengch Books Ltd., 1999.

² We say, "A founds B", this means that A provides the ground upon which B is set up; when we say, "B is founded by A", we mean that B is provided with a ground by A. A is original, B is derivative. In this sense, only A founds B, but not vice versa.