

Sharing the Cake towards Sustainability: Power-sharing in Wastewater Governance (The Case of IPAL Kartamantul)

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Abstract— Encouraged by resources differences or problems similarities, welfare disparity or larger area interests, interlocal collaboration links to numerous concepts brought by planning theorists. As collaboration means multi-party involvement on certain development subject, the term of power-sharing may well associated to the governance model used in the collaboration. This paper aims to explore the anomaly in Sekber Kartamantul governance, a well-known best practise of interlocal collaboration in Indonesia, by its well-known case of regional wastewater treatment plant. This paper argue that the anomaly in the governance brought a better sustainability index, based on the concept of Sustainable Governance Index. Early part of this paper resumes the theories of governance, sustainability and the index of Sustainable Governance Indicators. As theoretical foundation of the discussion laid out, the next part is centered on the decision making process, highlighting the powersharing model used in the decision making process. The discussion follows revealed the anomaly of the governance on the powersharing model used. Further discussion led to uncover that the collaboration performed hegemony powersharing in formal arrangement and simultaneously performed balanced of power powersharing model in informal arrangement. This anomaly affected the governance index in better efficiency and better domestic adaptability. The twist on the governance model in regional wastewater treatment project is a local innovation to ensure better service delivery towards sustainable greater urban infrastructure in Indonesia.

Keywords— *interlocal collaboration, wastewater governance, powersharing*

I. GOVERNANCE, SUSTAINABILITY AND SUSTAINABLE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS

As [1] stated governance these days have shifted into something more adaptive and reflexive. Governance deals with processes, describes the entails of power interplay and produces institution arrangement. Reference [2] stressed the importance of adapting and transforming capability as the main outcome of governance. In two decades, we have seen the rise of good governance as mainstream in governance studies. Although various best practise were published (eg. in [3], [4], [5] and [6]), critics to good governance remain on the discussion. Reference [7] noted that the concept of good governance demands output that lacks on priority setting, while [8] stated that such global numbers should be embedded in a cultural context, allowing some adjustment in local context to be made. For the discussion in this paper, we

argue that governance, differ from government, focus on the process of how decision being made.

Sustainability has been defined in various ways, [9] classified sustainable definitions into two major mainstreams i.e. the macroeconomic totality and the 3E. The first group of scholars defined sustainability as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising those of the future” [10]. This mainstream focused on the macro level, top-down perspective as stated on its criteria. The last one came from a bottom-up perspective which focused on the micro level. 3E describes a broader concept of sustainability encompasses three major themes; economic prosperity, environmental quality, and social equality. The algorithm of those three is then considered as the formula of sustainable development. However, Wiener identified the existing gap between the two mainstream. The first perspective emphasizes too much on the aspect of meeting economic needs and is calculated on a macro scale. This perspective then gives rise to macro-interventions. In the last perspective, the intervention is expected to be comprehensive in all three aspects (economic, environmental and social). Interventions then are technical in nature which is difficult to see their impact in an integrated manner.

Reference [9] found that governance is a middle tier that binds interventions on the scale of macro policies and technical projects supporting sustainable development. Reference [11] define the role of governance in sustainable development is to determine the rules of the game in development actions carried out by development stakeholders. Reference [12] stated a more important role that is as a key element in the implementation of sustainable development. In this understanding, governance is no longer known as an element beyond the concept of sustainability. Governance is an internal element in the framework of sustainable development. Reference [9] also emphasized that unsustainable governance can cause more severe impacts than unsustainable actions taken by stakeholders of sustainable development. The scale of damage caused by unsustainable governance is systemic with widespread damage.

Sustainable governance is defined as a set of rules that assert the use of shared resources by various actors in order to ensure equal and efficient distribution of resources [1]. Some other literature confirms that sustainable governance is a continuous learning process in managing shared resources [13]. This learning process influences the interaction

between actors in governance which eventually forms a certain powersharing pattern. The Sustainable Governance Indicator is a measurement tool for governance sustainability. Initially, this indicator was formed on the needs of the OECD to assess the commitment of governance in the implementation of sustainable development. First published in 2001 and revised in 2017, this indicator focuses on the ability of the government and the resource governance system to adapt to change. SGI is basically a measuring tool that assesses the readiness of policies and governance in facing changes in the external environment in order to ensure the sustainability of the country in the future. SGI consists of two main elements, namely governance change needs (known as the Status Index) and the system's ability to make changes (known as the Management Index).

In the case of crossborder area, crossborder infrastructure characterized by constant changes and multi-party multi-interest involvement, never ending negotiation and conflict management makes governing through powersharing a viable option [14][15][16]. Habermas' communicative planning which brought collaborative planning practice, requires evenly distributed power without any domination, while Foucault believe that planning works with asymmetrically owned power among stakeholders [17]. Even under those two different situations, planning is undoubtedly a power playing, taking resources ownership and allocation as hostages. In Indonesia, as the democracy becomes the political belief, powersharing in decision making is a virtue. Powersharing in planning were viewed from several perspectives. Realist believes that local governments are basically distrustful of each other, hence, the regional collaboration come as a bandwagoning act on the part of the weaker [18][19]. In the other hand, rationalist thinks that regional collaboration is an instrument to relative-gains behavior to minimize the cost of regional public goods [20][21][22]. Meanwhile, the pluralist perspectives to regional collaboration believe that the collaboration may exist as an outsider to the normative structure in regional planning. Being informal, the collaboration may not be pretty much accountable as the power distribution among them is not formally formed [23][24]. In Indonesia, collaboration works in rationalist logic, with formally arranged institution, strict procedures, and normative power structure.

This paper intends to review powersharing that occurs in the management of IPAL Sewon through changes that occur in the decision making process. Changes to the decision making process are believed to affect the sustainability of governance as part of SGI. This change is a form of local wisdom that arises because of the sociohistorical aspects of the Kartamantul region.

II. DNA-LIKE POWERSHARING IN IPAL KARTAMANTUL GOVERNANCE

In Indonesia, government regulations and technical regulations governing inter-regional collaboration suggest that collaboration is based on shared activities with resources. When combined with powersharing theory, resources can be split into resources that are contributed in collaboration and resources allocated from decisions in collaboration. These three things theoretically interact in powersharing theory. The concept of powersharing believes that permanent democracy may be practiced even in heterogeneous societies. Decision-making in governance that embraces a

powersharing system requires the representation of any group without exception, but still provides autonomy for internal affairs [25]. However, large socio-economic disparities between groups in society can lead to the emergence of an elitist ruling class.

Kartamantul is a regional collaboration, formalized and institutionalized in the form of Joint Secretariat (*Sekretariat Bersama, Sekber*), formed by three local administrative i.e. Kota Yogyakarta, Kabupaten Sleman and Kabupaten Bantul. The initiative came from central government as a response to extensive development of Kota Yogyakarta and its implication to infrastructure needs. Covering the area of 150 km² and the population of 2.4 million, Sekber Kartamantul were initially designed to tackle regional issues in infrastructure service provision by creating a resource sharing system, including financial and personnel sharing [26]. The history was back to 1990 when the grant from SDC in the form of Yogyakarta Urban Development Project was initiated. Provincial government of DI Yogyakarta (where three local administrative reside) facilitated the project. The contact among local governments were intact due to the nature of the project that crossing the borders [27]. By 2001, the format of the collaboration were formalized into Joint Secretariat, a non-governmental body but not independent. The member of Sekber Kartamantul are both professional and government apparatus from each member of collaboration. The Head of Sekber Kartamantul is rotated among the members at two year interval without any clear formal procedures [28]. Sekber Kartamantul has been working on several project during the decade, the prominent ones are IPAL Regional (*Instalasi Pengolahan Air Limbah Regional*, Regional Integrated Domestic Wastewater Treatment Plant) and TPA Regional (*Tempat Pembuangan Akhir Regional*, Final Solid Waste Treatment Plant) and SPAM Regional (Regional Cleanwater Provision System). In 2003, GTZ Urban Quality gave grant to Sekber to improve its organizational capacity towards good governance attitudes. Sekber changed its organizational structure as the output of the project. Now, there is three-tier decision making system in its governance [29].

The first tier in the decision making system is consist of local officer doing early examination on regional issues and the technical works once the project being established. The initiatives on joint activities in the collaboration then brought to the middle tier of strategic decision making. This second tier consists of the heads of the agencies and departments. This senior officers then discussing the project assessment before the initiatives get to the highest tier. After the mutual understanding among senior officers has been reached, the initiatives then listed in the agenda of the mayors discussion. This league of mayors in Kartamantul is the third and highest tier in decision making where the consent is made following the negotiation. The highest tier is responsible for providing common vision and main direction to their senior officers. The decision making process in the highest tier is actually resembling the concept of collegial leadership characterized by the equal sharing of authority.

Regional wastewater treatment plant (*Instalasi Pengolahan Air Limbah*, IPAL) Sewon was originally an effort to revive the integrated sanitation network that has been built since the colonial period. As urban development in Yogyakarta, narrow settlement sites made individual sanitation systems almost impossible to be implemented.

Therefore, in addition to developing a communal sanitation system, Yogyakarta City needed an integrated IPAL that can utilize existing sanitation systems. IPAL Sewon was first built in 1996 with funding support from foreign grants, central government budget and provincial budget. It is now fully operational and serves sanitation treatment for the almost 30 % of Kartamantul area. IPAL Sewon was initially managed by a combination of human resources from each member of Sekber Kartamantul and provincial officials. The governing body was directly involved in provincial government through Sekber Kartamantul. Until 2001, the overall operational and maintenance fund of IPAL Sewon came from provincial budget. From 2001 to 2008, the Yogyakarta Provincial APBD covered 85% of operational and maintenance costs, while the rest contributed according to the capabilities of each member. However, in 2009, IPAL Sewon was fully handed to the authority of DIY Province. Since 2009, the member of Sekber Kartamantul no longer contributed to operational and maintenance costs.


Based on the structure of Sekber Kartamantul, normatively, the authority of each party is not equal in a period of time. Daily management is not a representation of all parties working together so that normatively, the existing powerstructure is unipolar in power orders. The absence of coercive power in the use of authority indicates that the type used is hegemonic. This pattern is consistent with the acceptance of other areas without conflicts during the exercise of the authority. Hegemonic in Sekber Kartamantul is a form of governance with a very strong cultural infusion judging from the succession pattern. This method is known as the *arisan* culture in Javanese society. This culture basically allocates resources alternately, with equal contributions from all members. In the end, in the long run, all members will get the same allocation of authority. However, in the case of Kartamantul, the resources contributed to joint activities are not equal and worth. Nevertheless, the appointment of the leader of the organization remain based on the turn in the period of 2 years. The existence of an alternate daily board indicates an unequal power structure. Unipolarity that occurs, coupled with non-conflict responses from other parties within the organization shows a strong hegemony pattern. This non-conflicting attitude is consistent with bandwagoning on hegemony theory.

In the case of Sekber Kartamantul, see Fig. 1, the rational choice approach is shown in the form of power structure as a normative form of organization and the division of authority within regional governance. Meanwhile, the informal form that occurs in daily interactions shown in power relations shows a sociohistorical approach in managing regional governance. The combination of these two things is the key to the smooth running of Sekber Kartamantul in the management of cross-border regional projects. The power structure provides a container for initiating interaction and becomes a legal base for the deal being made, while power relation makes the negotiation process and decision making in a comfort zone for all actors.

III. METHODS AND ARGUMENTS

In the case in this paper, the anomalies that occur in the management of IPAL Sewon in the form of informal interactions in the existing decision-making process are part of the system's ability to make changes in governance.

Management Index is assessed from the aspect of governance that answers the question as best as possible about the existing governance considering long-term development to ensure sustainability.



Source: Analysis, 2018

Fig. 1. DNA-like Powersharing Model in IPAL Sewon Governance

This management index is an assessment of the governance process in SGI which is divided into aspects of Executive Capacity and Executive Accountability. Executive capacity is an index that answers the organization's ability to act in management, while Executive accountability shows how stakeholders outside the decision-making system are given access to assess and influence decisions made.

In this paper, the anomaly in the decision making process at the IPAL Sewon is a difference in the decision making process. Therefore, the aspect that is affected by this is the aspect of Executive Capacity. This Executive Capacity is assessed from eight things, namely (1) strategic capacity, (2) inter-ministrial coordination, (3) evidence-based instruments, (4) societal consultation, (5) policy communication, (6) implementation, (7) adaptability and (8) organizational reform. The characteristics of the IPAL Sewon management with the form of inter-regional cooperation add to the ability to implement waste processing in aspects of implementation and adaptability. Existing cooperation influences the efficiency of implementation by encouraging the achievement of development goals by increasing the capacity to implement development. The efficiency aspect in implementation focuses on assessing how much the development implementer can achieve the development


targets or goals that have been set. This shows the ability to identify internal capacity as part of establishing realistic development goals. In the adaptability aspect, cooperation strengthens internal networks that enhance the adaptive capacity of development managers in responding to the external environment in development. Therefore, this paper is prepared with three arguments, namely:

- 1) Collaboration adds up the executive capacity, in the implementation (in efficiency) and adaptability (in domestic adaptability)
- 2) Powersharing increases the efficiency in achieving project objectives
- 3) Powersharing increases the domestic adaptability in responding to external settings

Identification of the three arguments is done by comparing the two power sharing models, namely the hegemony (as it should occur based on the legal provisions of cooperation in Indonesia) with DNA-like (as empirically shown in the IPAL Sewon management). As shown in Fig. 2, the difference in powersharing patterns shows different patterns of decision making. Differences in the decision-making process then show that the powersharing model that occurs in the governance of the IPAL Sewon provides efficiency in achieving better goals. In the aspect of domestic adaptability, changes in the powersharing model provide the ability to adapt to changes in the external environment better because the decision making structure changes.

IV. THE IMPACTS OF CULTURE-INFUSED POWERSHARING MODEL TO SUSTAINABLE GOVERNANCE INDEX

Based on the regulation of cooperation between regions in PP no. 50/2007, the Sekber Kartamantul organizational structure is a vertical command line structure (see Fig. 3). Decision making is held by the Chairperson of the Joint Secretariat as determined by the arisan method. In the 2016-2018 period, the management is held by Sleman Regency. The Sekber Kartamantul organization in one period was decided to be held by one member only, so that the overall position in the 2016-2018 organizational structure was held by Sleman Regency. Theoretically, this is a form of unipolar hegemony without any anomaly. Sleman Regency has authority in decision making without having to coordinate with Bantul Regency and Yogyakarta City. This form of hegemony is a powersharing in the formal arrangement in Sekber Kartamantul.



Source: Analysis, 2018


Fig. 2. Logical Framework

Meanwhile, decision making in the DNA-like powers that occurred in the management of the IPAL Sewon also involved an informal arrangement process. This informal process involves multi-level and layered coordination in decision making as can be seen in Fig. 4. The informal process shows a completely different decision-making process with the pattern of hegemony. This form is a management innovation that has an impact on the SGI index as described in the methods and arguments section. This innovation brings changes to three things, namely the decision making process, governance efficiency, and governance adaptability (as in Table 1.). The decision-making process changes from a unilateral decision by the authority holder to the organizational structure to the decision of all parties working together through informal arrangements. Efficiency changes better as a result of additional resources obtained from other parties outside the organization but is still a member of cooperation. Governance adaptability is judged to be better with a decision-making structure that changes to be more flexible with input and consideration from other parties.

A. Decision Making Process: Singleparty vs. Multiparty


In the hegemony model, decision making is made by one party of power holder. In this case, the power holder is a party who at that time assumed the position of Chair of the Kartamantul Joint Secretariat. Theoretically, power holders in the unipolar model have no obligation to explain the rationality of decisions taken. The structure of the hegemony also does not show the possibility of negotiation in the decision making process given the large power differences.

In the IPAL Sewon case, the chairman legally had the hegemony authority, but empirically practiced a balanced decision-making process. This is indicated by the existence of informal arrangements that occur throughout decision making at each level (as in Fig. 1). An important difference between the two models of decision making is the difference in acceptance of decisions that ultimately leads to differences in conflicts potential in joint management. The powersharing hegemony model, even though it is theoretically characterized by bandwagoning behavior, still opens the possibility of conflict in the acceptance of decisions. Whereas in the DNA-like model, formal decisions are taken



Source: Sekber Kartamantul, 2018

Fig. 3. Formal Arrangement



Source: Analysis, 2018

Fig. 4. Informal Arrangement

after passing mutual consent from all governance stakeholders. Based on this, the powersharing DNA-like model used in the management of the IPAL Sewon has a better sustainability index in the SGI.

B. Efficiency: Single source vs. Multiple Sources

In the powersharing hegemony model, decision making resources are fully controlled by the authority holder, namely the Secretary of the Joint Secretariat along with his staff. This shows a limited consideration of resources that can be managed in governance. Consideration is only obtained from one party that holds governance authority without formal coordination with other parties who are also members of the collaboration. This closes the possibility of resource input that can only be accessed by other parties outside the structure. In informal settings, there is a coordination process at each level of decision making. This provides space for Sekber members who are not in the organizational structure to provide access to other resources. Resources from more diverse sources will increase the likelihood of achieving the goal of better management of the IPAL Sewon. The combination of formal and informal arrangements on IPAL governance will improve governance efficiency by adding access to other resources. Thus, more diverse sources will ensure better sustainability.

C. Domestic Adaptability: Rigid vs. Flexible

The decision-making structure of the formal powersharing pattern is a command line pattern that is rigid in the process. A rigid structure shows a great dependence on the ability of the authority holder to manage IPAL. This dependence then causes a reduction in the ability of governance adaptation to changes in the external environment that affect the operation of the IPAL. In the DNA-like powersharing pattern, informal arrangement provides a shadow structure that provides more ability to respond to change. This shadow structure is part of the mitigation of the dynamics of external changes that give consideration before decisions are taken. This adaptive structure is part of governance innovations in the IPAL Sewon case. Adaptation of this structure provides a more flexible form in managing the IPAL Sewon.

In the case of Sekber Kartamantul, the rational choice approach is shown in the form of power structure as a normative form of organization and the division of authority within regional governance. Meanwhile, the informal form that occurs in daily interactions shown in power relations shows a sociohistorical approach in managing regional governance. The combination of these two things is the key to the smooth running of Sekber Kartamantul in the management of cross-border regional projects. The power structure provides a container for initiating interaction and becomes a legal base for the deal being made, while power relation makes the negotiation process and decision making in a comfort zone for all its actors. Sosiohistorical factor, in this case the Javanese culture and shared historical understanding, encourage the formation of trust, solidarity, and a shared vision in the process of collaboration in Sekber Kartamantul. This sociohistorical background is what makes Kartamantul different from other regional governance cases in Indonesia.

V. CONCLUSION: LOCAL WISDOM ENSURES BETTER SUSTAINABILITY

In institutional theory, institutional establishment is difficult to separate from culture as one of the oldest forms of institutions in society. Discussions that developed in the 1970s about the outcome of the political process have concluded that social institutions, one of which is culture, have a significant influence on political behavior [30]. This is in contrast to the subsequent rational approach that based on the wishes or needs of the region to lower the cost of development and make decisions based on measurable variables. Another growing approach, the historical approach, supporting culture as part of an informal institution is something that is embedded in organizational behavior and can last for generations. Cultures provide patterns and measures to take action and understand interaction in cooperation, and this is constantly changing as a result of such interactions [31][30]. Reference [32] states that culture affects fundamentally in shaping the interaction of regional governance. Reference [33] also asserted that culture is a form of shared identity that strengthens the shared vision.

TABLE I. DIFFERENCES MADE BY THE DNA-LIKE POWERSHARING MODEL

Sustainable Governance Indicators		
<i>Using Hegemonic</i>		<i>Using DNA-like</i>
Singleparty Acceptance of the decision made was questionable	Decision making	Multiparty Better acceptance, less conflict potential
Lower probability Depend on the power owner as the resources allocator	Efficiency	Higher probability Mutual consent in resource sharing agreement leads to better responsibility
Lower adaptability Strict structure of decision making system depend solely to the power owner	Domestic Adaptability	Higher adaptability Collegial structure in decision making system creates sort of 'mitigation support system' to external dynamics

Source: Analysis, 2018

The location of Kartamantul as an urban agglomeration is a distinct historical part of Indonesia. The city of Yogyakarta (in its earlier form) was once the capital of Mataram, the biggest kingdom in ancient Indonesia reigning from as early as 17th century. Until today, the kingdom still exists in some way through the establishment of Special Region of Yogyakarta, a province in Indonesia that has a privilege of a non-democratic election for the Governor position. The King of Mataram is automatically claimed the position and become Governor, maintaining its cultural and symbolic influence stay real in formal institution of governance [32]. He owns the legitimation as his base of power, both formal and informal. Normatively, he is the governor of the province where Kartamantul resides. Informally, the King is the guardian of the Mataram people, spiritually, culturally, and historically. This base of power is so strong that it influences the whole day-to-day governance as well as in the power structure. Thus, the region of Kartamantul is a distinct region with cultural richness and historical legacy that affect the interaction of the stakeholder.

In the case of Sekber Kartamantul, there is not only one powersharing pattern, but two powersharing patterns that occur at the same time, and are mutually reinforcing. Formally, powersharing occurs using hegemony patterns with unequal distribution of authority. However, informally, the powersharing that occurs is consociational through the mechanism of collegial decision making on higher tier. Using sociohistorical capital in interaction, Sekber Kartamantul has developed its own mechanism to ensure decision making in regional governance run smoothly but still follow the normative rules of inter-regional cooperation organization in Indonesia.

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