

THE CONSTRUCTION OF RADICALISM NARRATIONS: A STUDY OF HIJRA HADITH QUOTATION

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Abstract

This article was aimed at exploring the construction of radicalism narrations by using prophetic traditions, which appeared in radical groups namely Islamic State (IS). The data of radicalism narrations were taken from three documents of IS propaganda. This study was a critical discourse analysis (CDA) to reveal the construction of radicalism narrations used by IS. The result of the research showed that IS has quoted some prophetic traditions of hijra and framed it into three main narrations; 1) the narration of establishing caliphate's state, 2) the narrations of classical concept of Muslims' religious territories divided to *Dar al-Kufr* (Infidel Territory) and *Dar al-Islam* (Islamic territory), and 3) the narrations of apocalyptic fears. The study concluded that IS had quoted some prophetic traditions to make IS' own narrations to strengthen their ideological mission. Then, these narrations became certain discourse to dominate and alienate others who contradict with IS. Furthermore, this research also included Sara Zeiger's findings about the important of ideological approach to understand and avoid the development of extreme radicalism movements through contrary-narration. In contrast, Ali Ashgar tended to ignore the importance of text/narration/ideological approach to counter the development of extreme radicalism movements.

Keywords: Construction, narration, radicalism

Introduction

One of the most important sacred-texts in the Islamic religion is *hadith*. Talking about *Hadith*, there are usually three main aspects to be discussed, such as: text, interpretation and implementation. Every aspect could influence someone's understanding to social relation. As results, text, interpretation, and implementation of *hadiths* become important problems in Islamic studies. Futhermore, the "implementation" aspect is as the implication of the two other aspects ("text" and "interpretation"), it has currently emerged as interesting phenomena in the discourse of Indonesian moslems scholarship. Because of the implementation of someone's intrepretation from text, it could be harmful to other. It can be seen from the discourse of "the living Quran or hadith" which appears recently. Moreover, this idea tries to shift quranic/hadith studies from textual areas to its implementation. At worst, its implementation problem has primarily cristalyzed and become social phenomena (Alfatih, 2007: pp. 114-115).

In inter dicipline study about the relation between religion and politics of violence, there are well known three main theories trying to explain this. Firstly, ideational theory believes that religious language is inspired by extreme religious thought (read: the ideology of violence). It shows that this ideology has become a crucial aspect to bring the emergence of violence sources in the name of religion. Secondly, psycho-social theory emphasizes that ideology is not strong enough to encourage people to engage in violence in the name of religion. The psycho-social experience only has the role of creating extreme interpretations of religious texts. Thirdly, the social movement theory sees that the radical interpretations of religious texts are only as an instrument to support the emergence of social movements which have political objectives. Political violence in

the name of religion will occur if radical thinking could not tolerate the political and social situation. This is called the theory of political tolerance limits. Moreover, Ali Asghar even considered the more relevant was third theory used to photograph the development of radical groups. (Ali Asghar, 2015). In contrast with Asghar's view in refusing ideology theory, Hayat Alvi as one of the scholars argued that the spread of the Wahhabism ideology was in line with the development of radicalism (Hayat Alvi, 2014). In the context of religious radicalism, radical ideology is constructed through a literal interpretation of sacred texts, such as: the Qur'an and hadith (Budi Hardiman, 2015). The literal interpretation is closely related to extreme behavior. Also, Sarah Zeiger found that extreme violence groups radicalize using some narrations. There are four narrative models, such as: (1) religious or ideological narratives, (2) political narratives, (3) social-heroic narratives, and (4) economic narratives. Religious or ideological narratives use two main concepts, namely: the first, *jihad-qital* as a personal obligation (*fardu 'ayn*) and the second, *al-wala' wa al-bara* which has implications in seeing and dividing the world to become Muslims and non-Muslims (Sara Zeiger, 2016).

The use of hadith in the radicalism narratives has included a religious or ideological narrative. Therefore, in this paper, the author will try to elaborate how the patterns of hadith citation create propaganda narratives used by extreme violence groups, What narratives are used by them in framing the Prophet's hadiths, What narratives are intentionally hidden (exclusion) and what narratives are displayed (inclusion). Overall, the author tried to answer how the citations of hadith in the structures of propaganda narratives were used by extreme violence groups.

Methods

This research attempted to analyze some propaganda documents owned by extreme violence group, namely *Islamic State* (IS). The documents were (1) the first edition of *Dabiq Magazine*, (2) an essay, "*Wujub al-Hijrah li Dar al-Nur wa al-Islam wa Tarki Dar al-Kufr wa al-Zalam*", written by Abu 'Abdillah al-Ghazzi al-Muhajir, and (3) *Tuba li al-Sham* written by Salihal-Munajjid, a prominent salafi scholar from Saudi Arabia. In addition, some other documents were taken from hadith books, Islamic laws books (*fiqh*), and mass media informations related to Indonesian citizens who migrated to join IS's radical group.

Those documents were analyzed by CDA approach. This approach showed that a discourse activity was as an effort to dominate a certain approved discourse/power and to alienate another disapproved discourse. Therefore, citing hadith and spreading discourse was considered as a domination process. It could involve directly both two processes, namely inclusion and exclusion. The first process was an effort to collect all appropriate texts or narrations related with someone's/groups' politics, ideologies, or dominance to support their interests. The second process was an effort to eliminate another different and incompatible narrations with the structure of someone's/groups' discourses to be developed. By using CDA approach, there were five objects of analysis (1) acting (discoursing), (2) context, (3) historical aspects (texts), (4) dominance, and (5) ideology. (Ahmad Fauzan, 2014).

Findings and Discussion: Three Hijra Hadiths Frames in Narration Structures used by Radical Groups

Based on my research, there were three narrations used to frame prophetic hadiths. Firstly, the narration of founding Islamic Government, in this case, the idea to build Islamic caliphate (*Dabiq*, 1435). Secondly, the narration of infidelity/unfaithstate (*Dar al-Kufr* read: infidel area) and claim of region governed by Muslims as Islamic

State (*Dar al-islam* read: Islamic area). By this narration understanding, they campaign all of the moslems in the world to live and join authorized areas which they have been controlled (al-Muhajir, 2016). Thirdly, the narration of “the Sham’s country superiority” and “the fear of the end of the world” will come (al-Munajjid, 2015).

Framing Prophet Muhammad’s hadiths in the narration of founding caliphate could be found in IS’ propaganda media, such as: in the first edition of *Dabiq magazine*. *Dabiq* explained the urgency of *Hijrah* as one way to found the Islamic caliphate revival. In “feature” heading, *Dabiq Magazine* displayed the article using big font format entitled “*From Hijra to Khilafah*.” This article quoted three hadiths:

No.	Hadith	Reference
1.	<i>Al-sam’ wa al-ta’ah wa al-hijrah wa al-jihad</i>	al-Tirmidzi, 1975: v. V, p. 148, number of hadith 2863
2.	<i>Khilafah ‘ala minhaj al-Nubuwwah</i>	Ahmad bin Hanbal, 2001: v. XXX, p. 355 number of hadith 18406
3.	<i>La tanqati’ al-hijrah hatta hatta tanqati’ al-tawbah</i>	Ahmad bin Hanbal, 2001: v. XXVIII, p. 111 number of hadith 16906

The quoted hadith (narrated by al-Tirmidzi) talking about prophet Muhammad message of emerging ummah for not leaving group (*jamaah*), hearing and obeying leaders, emigrating and doing concrete jihad (al-Tirmidzi, 1975: vol. 5, p. 148, n. 2863) becomes the introduction and is entailed to the heading of article “from Hijrah to Khilafah”. The first paragraph states that caliphate revival is the goal of jihad. This orientation –based on IS opinion– is absent from global project of jihad. IS attempts to answer that crisis by reviving caliphate state as the primary goal of Jihad. “Reviving caliphate is the major purpose which always fulfills the heart of mujahidin since the awakening of consciousness on jihad’s duty in this century.” some quoted hadiths explain the revival idea of caliphate near to the end of time inspired by the governance in prophet era (*Khilafah ‘ala Minhaj al-Nubuwwah*). This hadith was narrated by Ahmad bin Hanbal in his Musnad (Ahmad bin Hanbal, 2001: vol. XXX, p. 355 number of hadith 8406). The article wants to reach the readers’ interest by convincing them to follow their ideologized caliphate which was predicted by prophet Muhammad. It is strongly indicated that IS deliberately did not quote hadith completely because the completion of quoting hadith potentially can dissolve discourse solidity which is being built. In CDA, discoursing is a conscious activity and orient to support such idea. Based on this tenet, discoursing activity always executes exclusion and inclusion by eliminating other narrations that can dissolve its discourse solidity and adopt some narrations to support their idea.

Dabiq placed jihad as a strategy, like *Hijrah*. The prior process of jihad is leaving homeland (*Hijrah*) to the IS’s authorized state. *Hijrah* has become mobilization process toward support masses for developing solid military power. Then, it can be concluded that their primary strategy is *hijrah-jihad-khalifah* (leaving homeland to found caliphate). It is closely related to their statement, “This Jihad is based on *Hijrah*, *sam’ wa tha’ah* (hear and obey leader), and *i’dad* (preparation by training) which head to ribat and combat (*qital*), and finally honourable death (*syahid*) or revival of caliphate”(Dabiq. 1st issue, Ramadan 1435 H, p. 31-40). That citation unfortunately does not include some hadiths which have canceled the obligation of *hijra*. Meaning that *hijra* was over (al-Bukhari, 1422 H: vol. V, p. 57, number of hadith 3900; al-Bukhari, 1422 H: vol. IV, p. 75, number of hadith 3077, vol. V, p. 152, number of hadith 4311 dan al-Nasa’i, 1406 H: vol. VII, p. 145 number of hadith 1469), or different opinion between Moslem scholars or prophet’s companion toward *Hijrah* in its political context (*Al-Mawsu’ah al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaytiyyah*, pp. XXXXII, 177-183).

The narration of Hijrah from *dar al-kufr* (infidel area) to *dar al-Islam* (Moslem area) is noted in *Wujub al-Hijrah li Dar al-Nur wa al-Islam wa Tarki Dar al-Kufr wa al-Zalam* written by Abu ‘Abdillah al-Ghazi al-Muhajir.

Al-Muhajir stated that hijra from *dar al-kufr* to *dar al-Islam* is an obligation. Based on his statement on verse 97 from Al-Nisa [4], and hadith narrated by Abu Dawud it is believed that the prophet has no responsibility to the moslems who still live in infidel area (Abu Dawud, 2009: vol. IV, p. 413). Moreover, it is claimed that hadith narrated by Sa’id bin Mansur mentions that hijra never ends when jihad still exists (Sa’id bin Mansur, 1982: vol. II, p. 272). Therefore, the author was explaining the concept of *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-kufr* which is likely recognized by classical moslem scholarship. Namely, that *dar al-Islam* is territory where Islamic law is applied ultimately, and *dar al-kufr* where infidel law is applied. Waves of migration from *dar al-kufr* to *dar al-Islam* is an obligation for each Muslim who has the possibility to make it concrete based on Moslem scholars consensus (*ijma’*) (al-Muhajir, n.y: p. 2). Al-Muhajir interpreted that countries within moslem majorities, like Arab Gulf countries, are part of *dar al-kufr*. He argued that Arab countries today are *dar al-kufr*, because they apply positive law. In contrast, in IS area, they totally implemented Islamic law. IS claimed that IS’area was based on Quran and Sunna. Therefore, it is obligatory for Muslims to leave these countries and to migrate to IS-controlled areas (al-Muhajir, n.t.: p. 3). According to Al-Muhajir, the concept of *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-kufr* was based on some Moslems scholar opinions, such as: Hanafiyyah, Ibn Hazm, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab (al-Muhajir, p. 4).

Finally, al-Muhajir develops a discourse that contains threats against those who refuse/defect from the command of emigrating. The defectors are equated with one of prophet’s companion, Sa’d bin Khawlah who was once denounced by the Prophet Muhammad for defecting after *hijra* and *jihad* (al-Muhajir, n.y.: p. 4).

Quoting some statements from Moslem scholars whose affiliate with multiple schools (*mazhab* like Hanafi, Hanbali, Zahiri) in their narration, is the process of inclusion over the idea which is affirmed by the author. Clearly, the idea of *dar al-Islam* conception is established within applying Islamic law in such territory. This narration denied several different opinions among other classic Moslem scholars, because they stated the status of *dar al-Islam* was based on the ruler/inhabitant of it’s own territorial (see: al-Kasani, 1986: vol. VII, p. 130-131; Ibn ‘Abidin, 1992: vol. III, p 253; al-Sarakhsi, 1993: vol. X, p. 114; al-Bahuti, tt: vol. III, p. 43; al-Bujayrami, 1995: vol. IV, p. 220). In another word, this act of discoursing is part of excluding other opinions to enhance the author’s ideology.

Futhermore, Salih al-Munajjid wrote that there were “The Excellence narrations of Sham” and “The Fear narrations of Coming Doomsday” on his book *Tuba li al-Sham*. Salih is a salafi’s prominent scholar from Saudi Arabia. This book is not written by person who tightly affiliates within salafi-jihadi group. Nevertheless, the content of this book claimed that the excellence narrations of Sham were written in several Islamic texts. As result, it significantly attracted the supporters of extreme jihad to use this book as their argument, both al-Qaeda and IS affiliation. *Tuba li al-Sham*’s book contained hadiths. He framed “the narration of apocalypsing ideology”, “the condition of doomsdays”, and “ the signs of doomsdays”. The framings of those narrations on this book produced a new context and created a set of narrations among extrimist groups in Indonesia to support their arguments. The author of this book also included 14 hadiths to strengthen these groups’ ideas. Here are several hadiths used by them:

No.	Content of Hadith	Reference
1.	Angels protect Sham.	<i>Musnad Ahmad, Sunan al-Tirmidzi,</i>
2.	God guarantees that Sham is secured.	<i>Musnad Ahmad, Sunan Abi Dawud,</i>
3.	Citizens of Sham is the chosen people.	<i>Musnad Ahmad, Sunan al-Tirmidzi, Sahih} Ibnu Hibban</i>
4.	Sham is the safe place for protecting faith from chaos and slander.	<i>Mustadrak al-Hakim, Hilyat al- Awliya'</i>
5.	Sham is the safe place for protecting our Islamic profile.	<i>Mustadrak al-Hakim</i>
6.	<i>Thaifah Manshurah</i> (Group of Salvation) will appear in Sham.	<i>Musnad Ahmad, al-Tirmidzi</i>
7.	Sham is the place where the hypocrites cannot defeat the believers.	<i>Musnad Ahmad</i>
8.	Sham is the home of believers.	<i>Musnad Ah}mad</i>
9.	Sham is the strongest fortress from the chaos	<i>Musnad Ah}mad</i>
10.	All human beings will be gathered in Sham before the judgment day	<i>Musnad al-Bazzar</i>
11.	Sham is place for the armageddon (<i>malhamah kubra</i>).	<i>Sunan Abi Dawud</i>
12.	Isa will appear for the first time in Sham.	<i>Sahih Muslim</i>
13.	Dajjal will die in Sham	<i>Sahih Muslim</i>
14.	<i>Ya'juj</i> and <i>Ma'juj</i> will never be able to attack Sham.	<i>Sahih Muslim</i>

From above table, it could be concluded that Suriah became important among supporters of the extreme group, especially IS group. It was caused by the narrations using by IS's group. They only took especially hadith and quran related to the apocalypse issues. In those texts, there are many illustrations of horrible things which will happen soon. Then, the secured place for saving peoples guaranteed by God is Sham. Territory of Sham –in this book– is limited only in the current Syria territory.

In conclusion, those three frameworks were taken from those Prophet's hadiths in determined context. Based on CDA's theory, those frameworks have made "the reader" who receives information from the author feels what are told in those texts must be done today. As result, the readers as the supporters and the sympathizers think immediately leaving their hometowns and going to Sham/Syria as a must. In the fact, those frameworks have been success to influence Indonesian's readers who read this book from translated texts. Therefore, the number of Indonesian's arrested citizens who join IS's group is statistically the second biggest after Russians. (See: <https://news.detik.com/internasional/d-3561440/>, 2017)

Conclusion

The Narrations of propaganda used by extrimists and violent groups were taken from several hadiths. It could be concluded from above explanations that there were three main frameworks of hadiths used by them; (1) the narrations of strategy for establishing caliphate, (2) the narration of religious territory concept of *dar al-kufr* and *dar al-Islam*, and (3) the narration of apocalypse's fears. As result, those frameworks have influenced the people who easily believe in those misinterpretations of hadiths. This study shows the

reasons why many people have some belief and interest to go to the conflict territory, like Syria. This framing has been success to make common people feel fear and guilty if they do not follow those important narrations from holy texts of Quran and hadiths. Unfortunately, the readers could not differentiate the interpretations which have politics and ideologies constructive interests and the texts which have sacred dimensions from holy books to be believed and what is truly revealed from the God and His Messengers. Furthermore, the texts of hadiths which have different contexts and interpretations among classical Moslem scholars are deliberately eliminated for propagating extreme ideology of violence.

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