



# Embracing Democracy: The Development of Arend Lijphart's Consociational Model in Burundi

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**Abstract.** Burundi was mired in domestic conflicts when it gained independence in the 1960s. Now, though still poverty-stricken, Burundi has engineered a democratic political institution that ensures general stability within its borders. Beginning in the late 1980s, the country underwent a series of reforms in order to resolve its complicated and intense conflicts. The peacebuilding process culminated in the signing of the Arusha Accords in 2000, when Lijphart's consociational democracy was applied to bring peace. Albeit small-scale turmoil during national elections, Burundi experienced a period of relatively stable development in this century compared to the pre-Arusha period. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of consociational democracy remains controversial. Certain scholars believe that the consociational model did not eliminate the root causes of conflicts. This paper, on the other hand, justifies the effectiveness of consociational democracy as a peacebuilding mechanism. Denying common beliefs, this paper also recognizes that Burundi's conflicts involve not only the ethnic cleavage but also political actors such as parties, government, rebels etc., and proves that consociationalism eliminated factors that cause unharmony in domestic political arena. Finally, the paper identifies economic development as a crucial complement to institutional reform and the ultimate goal of consociationalism.

**Keywords:** consociational democracy · Burundi · domestic conflicts · the Arusha Accords

## 1 Introduction

Is democracy possible in poor nations? As one of the least developed African countries, Burundi still struggles with poverty. However, Burundi's democratic political institution is interestingly complex. How did Burundi construct its sophisticated government structure that is almost incompatible with the country's economic level? What is the effect of this complex political institution on economic development? In its sixty-year history after independence, Burundi experienced intense armed conflicts. After many decades of trial and error, Burundi discovered a path out of this plight: democratic reform. During the rounds of negotiations which gave birth to the Arusha Accords, Burundi engineered a mature institution that brought relative peace to the country we see today.

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Through this paper, I hope to provide a useful reference to those who wish to understand Burundi's conflicts and democratization process. Existing literature often identify ethnicity as the only culprit of conflicts; this paper proposes a more comprehensive explanation that includes other factors such as political parties, government and rebels, and foreign interference. This paper also analyzes the relevance of Lijphart's consociational democracy. The value of this paper lies in the potential adaptability of the Burundian path to democracy. If the consociational model is proven effective in Burundi, then it can possibly be applied to other underdeveloped states or regions.

## 2 Burundi's Conflicts

### (1) History of Burundi's Conflicts

Burundi's domestic conflicts began in the colonial period. On June 6, 1903, Burundi became a German colony. The colonists adopted the *diviser pour régner* (divide to rule) strategy, promoting the Tutsis (minority, around 15% of the total population) as the local ruling class and suppressing the Hutus (majority, around 84% of the total population) [1]. After World War I, Burundi was transferred to the Belgian administration. The Belgians continued with the social division, aggravating tensions between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups.

Burundi gained independence in 1962. Between 1962 and 1966, Burundi experienced intense conflicts between armed groups. In 1966, Micombero from the Union for National Progress (UPRONA) party seized power. Conflicts were rampant under Micombero's rule. As a Tutsi, Micombero pursued a policy that suppressed the Hutus. This led to the Burundi genocide in 1972. In 1976, Bagaza succeeded Micombero in a coup. Bagaza was also from the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA party, but he learned the lesson of the 1972 massacre and pursued a liberal racial policy.

In 1987, Buyoya (still a Tutsi from UPRONA) overthrew the Bagaza government. Buyoya adopted a moderate, inclusive ethnic policy, electing Hutu officials into office. Under pressure from the international community, Buyoya organized Burundi's first democratic election in 1993. To his surprise, Ndadaye, the leader of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU, a Hutu-dominated political party), won. Buyoya was forced to abdicate. Later, Buyoya's army attempted to assassinate Ndadaye to regain power. Ndadaye was murdered three months after taking office, but Buyoya failed to return to power. Thus began the 12-year Burundi Civil War.

In 1996, domestic political situation in Burundi deteriorated quickly. Buyoya's comeback provoked the dissatisfaction of Western states and other African countries in the Great Lakes region. Under the joint sanctions of the international community, Buyoya gave up dictatorship and participated in democratic peacebuilding conferences. In 2000, Buyoya signed the Arusha Accords.

After the signing of the Arusha Accords, the initial conflicts were largely resolved, and Burundi experienced a relatively stable period. Armed groups successively became legal political parties, signifying the end of Burundi Civil War. During the 2010 elections, however, new partisan conflicts emerged. The Forces for Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) declared that if it failed to win the presidential election, it would again

resort to armed rebellion to gain political power [2]. In the end, the incumbent president Nkurunziza (from CNDD-FDD) won the election, but the party's success had a negative impact in Burundi. During the 2015 elections, riots resurfaced as president Nkurunziza sought re-election through a loophole in the national constitution. The constitution stipulated that a president can only serve two consecutive terms, both times elected in general elections. However, Nkurunziza was elected by the national assembly for his first term in 2005, giving him the right to run for a third term. The situation was quickly brought under control, and Nkurunziza won another five years in office. The 2020 election went relatively smoothly, without large-scale bloodshed. Finally, Ndayishimiye from CNDD-FDD was elected president.

## (2) The Cause of Burundi's Conflicts

Different from the common belief that Burundi's conflicts are engrained in the ethnic cleavage, the nature of its never-ending conflicts is in fact a vehement fight for political power. Even though severe hatred exists between the Hutus and the Tutsis, and massacres after independence have been ethnic-based, the reason for this antipathy is rooted in Tutsis' rule over the Hutus during the colonial period. The Tutsis initiated massacres in fear of losing a majority in government office, while the Hutus rebelled in order to wield political power. Other than that, these two ethnic groups share a common culture, language, and religion. It is not fallacious to characterize Burundi's conflicts as ethnic ones, as competition for political power is a characteristic of ethnic conflicts, but it is not the most suitable explanation.

What this paper attempts to do is to propose a more comprehensive theory from the perspective of a political power fight that accounts for Burundi's unsettlement. Burundi's complex and never-ending domestic turbulence makes a single source of conflicts unlikely, and in truth there were many factors other than ethnicity at play, which are often ignored. The political-power-based perspective acknowledges the continuity and extensiveness of Burundi's conflicts. The major sources of conflicts are listed as follows:

### a. Ethnicity

Originally, the Hutus and the Tutsis were two native ethnic groups that lived in harmony with each other. The colonists deliberately re-classified the locals into "Hutus" and "Tutsis", turning the "Hutus" against the "Tutsis" by letting the latter rule the former. Ethnic conflicts thus arose and continued to the post-colonial period. Mass killings of Hutus and Tutsis alternated. During the Burundi Civil War, it was estimated that about 50,000 to 100,000 people died every year in ethnicity-based massacres [3].

### b. Political parties

Before Buyoya's abdication after the 1993 election, UPRONA consistently controlled the government. After the Arusha, Burundi adopted a new constitution in 2005, which stipulated that political parties must not be established on the basis of ethnic or regional

exclusivity [4]. Multiple political parties appeared, along with disputes between them. Parties that were previously rebel groups took an aggressive posture, which led to strained relationships between parties. Past elections (2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020) almost always brought different levels of turbulence to the country.

#### c. Government army and rebel groups

Before 1996, the government army and the rebel groups clashed frequently. The rebels were mainly Hutus seeking for political power, and the government army was Tutsi-dominated. In 2005, all previous rebel groups laid down their arms and became legal parties in seek of representation in the government. However, in recent elections, the CNDD-FDD threatened to go back to armed protests if they do not win power in the democratic system [2].

#### d. Foreign powers and Burundian citizens

Foreign powers have always influenced Burundi's politics. Just before Burundi's independence, the Belgium colonists wished to elect a president that could protect their commercial interests in the future. To achieve this goal, they assassinated several nationalists who championed the interests of Burundian citizens. Occidental powers were also at play in the 1993 election: Buyoya held the first democratic election under the pressure from The Washington Consensus. Burundian citizens, however, did not express strong interests in elections.

#### e. Geographical region

Geographical lines could be drawn in the pre-Arusha conflicts. The three authoritarians – Micombero, Bagaza, and Buyoya – were all from the relatively rich and influential Rutovu region in the south, and the north seldom received political representation. The Arusha Accords did not stipulate that every geographical region be represented in the government and the legislature, but the national leader usually takes this factor into account in the spirit of consociationalism.

It would be ineffective to tackle Burundi's problems using typical ethnic conflict resolution approaches. The clashes between different interest groups are rooted in the unreasonable power distribution and the lack of democracy, not in cultural or ideological divergence. The complexity of Burundi's conflicts renders consociationalism necessary.

### 3 Consociational Democracy

Traditional western democratic systems can be classified into two types: the Anglo-American system and the Continental European system [5]. The Anglo-American democracy is consisted of homogeneous political actors and is typically viewed as stable, whereas the Continental European democracy is characterized by fragmentation and is generally unstable. A third democratic system, which is a combination of the two,

was proposed by Gabriel A. Almond in 1956. This system later developed into Arend Lijphart's consociational democracy model [5].

Consociational democracy provides a means to homogenize the political segments and create a coalition to foster cooperation between different political actors. It is a model derived from the observation of democracy in some European countries (Belgium and Swiss for example). It aims to create a fragmented but stable society.

Before investigating the consociational structure, it is appropriate to look at the factors that favor its implementation. There are in total seven of them:

- a. the multipolarity of political segments, each of which is a minority,
- b. a national loyalty that can transcend segmental loyalty,
- c. the existence of crosscutting cleavages instead of coinciding cleavages,
- d. a relatively small population and territory easy for organization,
- e. a traditional tendency to solve disaccords through consensus and compromise,
- f. an economic growth that allows for a "win-win" situation for different segments, and
- g. common external dangers that reinforce the cohesion between segments [1].

As said above, these factors are generalized from the cases of existing countries. It is almost impossible to find a state with all these favorable factors present, waiting for the consociational model to be applied. Nevertheless, by judging the presence of these factors, we can analyze the model's suitability in the target country.

Burundi's conditions are suitable to the application of consociational democracy. There were clearly multiple political segments, including divisions in races, parties, etc. (though not all segments are a minority, for example the Hutu people form a majority). In history, a common language, religion, and culture existed among the Burundians, creating the potential of national loyalty above segmental loyalty. The country's small population and territory also facilitates organization.

The construction of consociational democracy involves two steps. Initially, there needs to exist a willingness of cooperation at an elite level. Then, this small-scale cooperation must be transformed into a large-scale one [6]. This is achieved by the construction of four institutional pillars, namely grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality (sometimes replaced by overrepresentation), and minority veto [6].

The first of the pillars, the grand coalition, is essentially a participation of political leaders from all segments in governing a plural society. It is an extension of the initial elite cooperation. The second pillar – segmental autonomy – is the different segments' right to self-rule. They need to be given autonomy over certain affairs, education and cultural preservation for instance. Segmental autonomy is best achieved when the different political groups inhabit different geographical areas. Proportionality describes political segments' representation in the government based on their relative population. When all groups are minorities, the proportion of seats it occupies in the government is close to the proportion of their population in the whole population. When a majority group exists, then overrepresentation for the minority (minority receives more representation than their proportion in the whole population) replaces proportionality. The last pillar, the minority veto, is a last weapon that the minorities invoke to prevent the passing of an unfavorable act that threatens them.

## 4 The Development of Consociationalism in Burundi

### (1) Burundi's Democratic Attempts Before the Arusha

Burundi initiated its democratization process under president Pierre Buyoya's rule. What Buyoya did, however, would be best characterized as political liberalization rather than democratization.

Unlike his predecessors, Buyoya was open to power-sharing inside the government. He probably learned his lesson from the 1988 massacre, in which thousands of Hutus died due to conflicts with the Tutsis. Under pressures from the international society, Buyoya started a series of reforms. To heal the damage caused by the colonists' *diviser pour régner* policy, he created a National Commission consisted of 12 Tutsis and 12 Hutus to study the question of national unity [7]. Buyoya also balanced the number of Hutu and Tutsi officials in the cabinet [8]. He went on to appoint a Hutu prime minister. In 1992, he drafted a new constitution that reflected a free and inclusive atmosphere. The constitution forbade "political parties from identifying themselves in their form, action, or any other manner with an *ethnie*, region, religion, sect or gender" [4]. Perhaps his liberalization efforts culminated with the 1993 election, which was generally free and fair. Buyoya and his party UPRONA lost this election, and Ndadaye from FRODEBU became the new president.

These democratic attempts above, however, were not systematic, and their effects naturally lasted for only a short period. It failed to bring peace to Burundi in the long run. In 1993, the military attempted a coup but was thwarted, resulting in another nationwide massacre. In 1996, Buyoya took office again through military force. By analyzing this quasi-democratization process under the structure of consociational democracy, we can readily recognize several discrepancies which explain the failure of pre-Arusha Burundian democracy.

First, proportionality's absence greatly contributed to this pitfall. There was an inclusion of the Hutus at the elite level in the national government, as described above; nevertheless, Hutu people at a lower level were largely marginalized in the political system. This was especially the case in the military: the Tutsis still formed a majority in the army posts and police forces. On the other hand, in distributing resources, Sullivan noted that Ndadaye's administration invested around 50% of the national resources into the Hutu-dominated primary sector [6]. This harmed the interests of the urban-based Tutsis. To conclude, neither of the two ethnic groups received just representation.

Second, segmental autonomy was not present in the 1993 Burundi; instead, a trend of integration prevailed. The Hutus, the elites in particular, were increasingly included into the previously Tutsis-dominated domains, for example higher education. In fact, it should be pointed out that segmental autonomy would not be useful to deal with the Burundian ethnicity cleavage. The ethnic division was deliberately imposed by colonists. Despite the many inter-ethnic massacres in attempts to seize political power after independence, the Tutsis and the Hutus share a homogeneous culture, religion, and language that pull the two groups together. To note one thing, intermarriage was not uncommon in the Burundian society.

Third, although minority veto did exist, it was not constructed according to Lijphart's principles. Minority veto was intended as a last resort, and should only be occasionally

invoked as a protective measure. Nevertheless, in the 1990s Burundi, Tutsis' veto – the military – was applied in a frequent, aggressive manner to gain power. Their seizure of the army was a manifestation of their unwillingness to include Hutus in the power fight.

## (2) **The Development of Burundi's Consociational Democracy After the Arusha (after 2000)**

Signed on 28 August 2000, the Arusha Accords was a transitional peace treaty that presented a power-sharing mechanism modelled on Lijphart's consociational democracy. To justify the implementation of the consociational model, we have checked in part 2 the presence of favorable factors for consociational democracy. Their general suitability made consociational democracy a potential solution to the domestic conflicts in Burundi. The Arusha Accords formalized the previous democratic attempts and added other measures to balance power.

To illustrate the application of consociationalism requires that we first look at Burundi's political institutions. Burundi's polity may be described as presidential. The president is both the head of state and the head of government. The government wields executive power. A bicameral system was adopted in the legislature. The two chambers of parliament are the senate and the national assembly. The president is directly elected by the public in a two-ballot majority system. The president then appoints the two vice presidents, one Hutu and one Tutsi, and the ministers in the executive branches.

We first examine whether they were willing to cooperate initially. In fact, a need for peace was present in Burundi. This was largely due to "*la fatigue de la guerre*" (fatigue of war) and "*l'isolement international*" (international isolation) [1]. This need transformed into collaboration between the elites. Cooperation between the ethnic-based political parties was demonstrated by the signing of the peace accords between the G7 (a group of 7 Hutu political parties) and the G10 (a group of 10 Tutsi political parties). Cooperation between the militaries was even more crucial for consociationalism. The Hutus and Tutsis reached consensus on a bi-ethnic military and police force. Gradually, the extremists were marginalized while the moderates gained more power.

Next, we will still evaluate the consociational model from three aspects: grand coalition, proportionality, and minority veto. For reasons stated in the previous part, we will ignore segmental autonomy.

Grand coalition was clearly present after the signing of the Arusha. Burundi constructed a coalition government, with any party that wins more than 5% of the votes in the parliamentary elections also winning an according proportion of ministerial posts in the government. In the government, about 60% of the ministers must be Hutu, and the Tutsis occupy the rest 40% posts. The constitution also stipulated that female take at least 30% of all government occupations. In the Burundi administration elected into office in 2005, the 20 ministers represented 6 political parties, and there were 2 ministers without affiliation to any party [1]. In terms of ethnicity, 11 ministers were Hutu and 9 were Tutsi. Clearly, the spirit of cooperation was respected.

Proportionality, or overrepresentation of the minority in Burundi's case, was respected in the post-Arusha constitution. Same as the ministerial posts, the national assembly also required that 60% of the deputies be Hutu and 40% be Tutsi, with 30%

of the representatives being female. To achieve this result, it is stipulated that the political parties must consider ethnicity and gender when determining their candidate lists. Among every three consecutive candidates on the lists, one should belong to a different ethnic group than the rest two, and one out of every four candidates needs to be female [8].

Minority veto, as the ultimate weapon for the Tutsis, was also established. The national assembly can only adopt a law when it receives two thirds of votes. This blocks the national assembly from issuing laws that threaten the Tutsis' security, because the Tutsis hold 40% of all votes – enough to express dissent. In terms of the political party cleavage, the largest party CNDD-FDD won 64 seats out of a 118 total in the 2005 elections, falling short of the two thirds requirement [9]. Therefore, no party can dominate the national assembly and pass laws without other parties' consent.

### (3) Comparison of the Two Periods

Generally speaking, the post-Arusha democracy was more successful than the one during Buyoya's rule. While minor, regional clashes were still reported during elections in recent years, the Arusha Accords brought two relatively peaceful decades of development to Burundi, and enabled different parties to share power without resorting to armed forces. This never occurred during Buyoya's dictatorship. Viewing from Lijphart's consociational democracy model, we also find that the Arusha Accords was more systematic in its democratic approach. Table 1 gives a point-to-point comparison of the democracy in the two periods:

To conclude, the construction of democracy using the consociational model yielded satisfying results when compared to Buyoya's attempts at liberalizing the country. Immediately after the Arusha, Burundi welcomed peace and development.

## 5 Conclusion

### (1) Characteristics and Evaluation of Burundian Democracy

Burundi is one of the few poorest countries in the world that prioritized the implementation of democracy. It provides a model for other underdeveloped African countries that wish to walk out of domestic conflicts. The characteristics of the Burundian consociationalism can be summarized as the three following points:

#### a. Elections

According to Larry Diamond, the essential requirement for democracy is regular, free, and fair elections [10]. Election also plays a special role in Burundi's consociational democracy. Elections acted as one of the most important centripetal forces that brought people with different political beliefs together in the beginning. Unlike in many developing countries, the major problem with Burundi's elections is not a lack of fairness, but the accompaniment of violent attacks. These riots usually die down after the elections, which somewhat corroborates people's acceptance of the election results.

**Table 1.** Comparison of pre-/post-Arusha democracy in Burundi

	Buyoya era	Post-Arusha era
Initial elite cooperation	This cooperation was partly present. Buyoya cooperated with the Hutu elites, but failed to bring different political parties together to solve Burundi's domestic conflicts.	This cooperation was present. The Hutus and Tutsis elite reached consensus on power sharing in the army. The different political parties were also tired of war, and showed a willingness to seek for peace through cooperation with each other.
Grand coalition	It partly existed as an extension of initial elite cooperation.	It existed as an extension of elite cooperation.
Segmental autonomy	Irrelevant in Burundi's case.	Irrelevant in Burundi's case.
Proportionality	Proportionality was missing. In the military the Tutsis still outnumbered Hutus. At lower, regional levels, the Hutus were still marginalized.	Proportionality was respected. Affiliation to political parties, ethnicity, and gender were all considered.
Minority veto	The Tutsis had minority veto – the military – but it was frequently used as a threat, not as a protection.	Minority veto existed during this period. The Tutsis could block the passing of the law, and no political party in the national assembly could, by itself, get two thirds of the votes.
Enforced elite cooperation	Because of the absence of proportionality and the unsuitable minority veto, elite cooperation was not enforced.	Elite cooperation was enforced as initial cooperation brought peace to Burundi.

## b. Political Parties

For Burundi, the appearance of many political parties immediately after the Arusha signifies that people were willing to seek political power by establishing political parties. This was the maturation sign of its democracy. Political parties are crucial to the success of consociational democracy. They limit the conflicts to inter-party competitions during elections. These new political parties are no longer ethnic-based. They replaced the ethnic-based armed groups as players in domestic political activities. This could be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to eliminate coinciding cleavages in the society, which was one important factor of instability in Burundi.

## c. Proportionality

The Burundian consociational model lays great emphasis on proportionality in political representation. The percentages negotiated in the Arusha were strictly followed. The government and national assembly met the race and gender requirement after each election. Geographical regions play no apparent roles in the Burundian election system. In other democratic countries, though, representation based on constituencies are stressed.

Burundi's consociational democracy achieved many desired effects. It modernized Burundi's government and brought peace to the country by coordinating the interests of different groups. Nevertheless, this consociational model still has limitations, and unanticipated problems arose with time. One of them was the tendency of one-party domination in the legislature. In the 2010 legislature election, the CNDD-FDD party won 81 out of 106 seats, making it possible to pass a law without the consent of other political parties [2]. The party also won by a landslide in the 2015 and 2020 elections. This situation violates the spirit of grand coalition and proportionality, threatening Burundi's democracy and peace. With a single party domination, the interests of some segments may be ignored. Burundi also has a neo-patrimonial political culture that historically concentrates power in the hands of the military oligarchies. Although these oligarchs no longer exist, this culture clearly left a legacy to the post-Arusha Burundi and affected the implementation of consociationalism. Power tends to be concentrated in the hands of the president, who wields extensive power in the executive, legislative, and judicial branch of the government.

## (2) Comparison with Rwanda and Suggestions for Future Development

Burundi remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with a poverty headcount of 74.3% [11]. Consociational democracy failed to fulfill Burundian's expectations in the economic sector: democracy did not transform into fast economic development, which is the ultimate goal of power-sharing. Despite Burundi's efforts to attract foreign investments, few enterprises (corporations) are actually willing to conduct business there. The instability of the Burundian society and lack of security deter investors from going to the country.

A comparison with Burundi's neighboring country Rwanda can further illustrate Burundi's weak economy. Another landlocked small country in central Africa, Rwanda has a lower poverty rate – 54.4% – than Burundi, and is much more developed [11]. Similar to Burundi, it endured severe conflicts in the 1990s. However, after the Rwanda Genocide, the country took a different path to ensure stability within its borders. Instead of constructing a democratic political system to resolve ethnic conflicts, Rwanda saw economic development as a potential solution to political problems. Beginning in this century, its government dedicated efforts to boosting the national economy by actively participating in international trade. Rwanda yielded great success and ranked far higher than its neighboring countries in the World Bank's ease of doing business report [12].

Burundi clearly lags behind Rwanda in terms of economic development. In addition to following the spirit of consociational democracy, Burundians need a strong economy to create a peaceful domestic environment. The paper here puts forward several suggestions that may help improve Burundi's economic development:

#### a. Check Executive Power and Implement Political Supervision

Power checks and political supervision are essential to the success of consociational democracy in the future. This restriction, moreover, needs to be enforced by the Burundians rather than the United Nations or any other foreign powers. The power of the president and the executive branch must be controlled by a legislature that strictly follows consociational principles or another supervisory branch constructed with care. The president should also initiate political dialogues with Burundian citizens regularly, and hear their needs and suggestions. This improved executive branch will promote economic policy making.

#### b. Improve Domestic Security

Improving domestic security is probably the most important factor that transfers democracy into economic development. Only when domestic and international investors deem the country as safe will they conduct business and set up firms in Burundi, and this in turn drives economic development. To further reduce the number of attacks, the national government must eradicate corruption in the police forces. It should also recruit more men and dispatch more of them to areas other than the capital Bujumbura.

#### c. Participate in Regional Economic Cooperation

Burundi is currently a member state of the East African Community (EAC). This is a good start for economic development. In the future, it needs to depend less on foreign aids and cooperate more closely with other members in the EAC, such as Kenya and Rwanda, and attract their investment in the agricultural and industrial sector.

#### d. Improve Education

Burundi has now made primary and secondary education compulsory. This is a good sign: the government realizes the importance of education. In order to prevent future conflicts, Burundi needs to enhance its education on peace in the obligatory educational system. More than that, it should better connect and collaborate with institutions worldwide to provide higher education to Burundians. This education provides a path for citizens to get rid of poverty.

There is still a long way to go for Burundi to transform democracy into fast economic development. While we acknowledge the accomplishments of consociationalism in creating a generally peaceful domestic political environment, we should also understand from Rwanda's case that economy is the panacea to Burundi's conflicts. The pieces of advice above may be useful to achieve this goal.

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