The Decline of Ideology in Indonesia: Parliamentary Threshold and Cleavage among Political Parties in coping with the 2019 Election

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Abstract—This paper examines the response of Indonesia’s parties in dealing with the parliamentary threshold in the 2019 election. It has a twofold objective: to discern the development of political ideology in Indonesia’s post-New Order regime and to identify the current political cleavage among political parties particularly between Islam and secular parties or major and small parties. Methodologically, it is qualitative research by applying the in-depth interview and online news collection as data-gathering technique. The research finding demonstrates that the political ideology in recent Indonesia is waning and towards the end of ideology. If it is so, it can harm the party system in Indonesia and will be what so-called as “depoliticization of party” because of the lack of people trust. Some evidence can show it. First, the party’s response to the parliamentary threshold issue is no longer considering ideological and organizational motives, but due to pragmatic goals. Second, several Islamist parties are in one coalition with secular parties in term of responding to the parliamentary threshold. Likewise, small parties have the same position as major parties in coping with such an issue. It indicates that the ideological contestation is waning and submerged.

Keywords: Parliamentary threshold; political parties; the 2019 election; ideology; Indonesia

I. INTRODUCTION

The electoral system in Indonesia is always changing from time to time, whether the change for electoral threshold, voting method, seat allocation or district magnitude. In the recent Indonesian political debate, the electoral threshold is one of the fascinating issues which can be examined further.

According to Reynolds & Reilly (1997: 88), the threshold is the minimum level of support which a party has to earn representation, either legally imposed (formal) or only mathematically de-facto (effective). In terms of the parliamentary threshold, Indonesia adopts the effective parliamentary threshold in the 1999 and 2004 elections. Since 2009, it applies the formal parliamentary threshold with 2.5 percent. In 2014, it transformed into 3.5 percent and, in turn, moves to 4 percent in 2019.

Although the parliamentary threshold has already legalized by the House of Representative, the political cleavage in responding to this issue still occurs amongst political parties. Some of them concur while others reject the parliamentary threshold. Therefore, it is essential to be analyzed on the political cleavage among political parties based on their ideology and organizational degree: Islam vs. secular parties or major vs. small and medium parties.

Though to government system in Indonesian has similarity with other country are Philippines and America, the candidate classified depends the higher votes until threshold of votes (Nasruallah, et al, 2018)

The urgency of this study is mapping the political cleavage among Indonesian political parties in responding to the 2019 parliamentary threshold. With such a map, it can be known the difference of positions each party. Based on this consideration, the paper aims to find out the political cleavage among Islam and secular parties or major, small, and medium parties in responding to the 2019 parliamentary threshold.

The election of the 2014 introduced the impact of issues neither positive nor negative creates problems for implementation election included the procedural and threshold of political election (R Sarofah, BEC Widodo, et all, 2016). The result could be utilized as the consideration and suggestion for policymakers, House of Representative, especially the Special Committee of the electoral bill or so-called as “Pansus RUU Pemilu” in order to pay deep attention to the electoral justice approach in deciding the parliamentary threshold. With this approach, all parties obtain fair treatment.

II. RESEARCH METHOD

This paper applies the qualitative research method (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011: 3-4; Glesne & Peshkin, 1992: 6; Silverman, 2001: 32; Devine, 2002: 197-215; Patton, 2002: 14). Among five kinds of qualitative research, namely narrative, phenomenological, grounded theory, ethnographic and case study, this paper prefers to adopt the case study due to its relevance. Drawing on Creswell (2013: 97), Gerring (2004: 352), Schramm (in Yin, 1994: 12) and Flyvbjerg (2011: 301-302), this study defines a case study as intensive research which explores one or more cases or a decision or a set of decisions for particular objectives within a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time through detailed and in-depth data gathering by involving multiple sources of information. In doing so, the case study is a correct choice and a standard method in social science.
Data are gathered from political parties which compete in the 2019 election in order to gain a completed perspective related to this issue. There are two different types of data. First is empirical data which come from interviews with elites of 16 political parties who have important positions at national and local boards. In other hand, noted, the election needs clear strategic to support good election in Indonesia. Due to, the election has important role for created good government in future (Widodo, Darumurti & Nurjadi, 2016).

Second is news data which taken from reputable online media spreading on the internet such as Detik, Republika, Kompas, Tempo, Vivamedia, Merdeka, Sindonews, Okezone, CNN Indonesia, Beritasatu, Tribunnews, and television news. Selecting the parliamentary threshold is because such issue is exciting to be investigated further in the current discourse of Indonesian election.

In-depth interview and documentary were employed as data-gathering techniques (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992: 63; Patton, 2002: 4, 293, 343-44; Manheim & Rich, 1986: 132-38; Silverman, 2001: 83-114; Yin, 1994: 96). For the in-depth interview, it was conducted approximately eight months between November 2017 and June 2018. Even, one informant can be interviewed twice. Meanwhile, the documentary was carried out before, during, and after the field research. Supporting data coming from credible online news and appropriate scholarly references will also be utilized in this study.

The given data will be analyzed into a fourfold step. First is reducing data. The data which appear in written field notes are selected, simplified and, transformed into the data display. As the second step, displaying data is compressing a set of information which allows depicting concluding remarks. Third is drawing and verification. Since the commencement, the author should decide what things mean – noting regularities, patterns, explanations, possible configurations, causal flows, and propositions. Final concluding remarks may not appear until data collecting is done, although the author argues to have been proceeding "inductively". The concluding remark is also validated as the author proceeds (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 10-2; Creswell, 2013: 179-80).

III. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

A. Party Position towards the Parliamentary Threshold

Since Indonesia adopted the formal parliamentary threshold in 2009, the threshold percentage continuously increases from 2.5 percent in 2009, to 3.5 percent in 2014, and 4 percent in 2019. This paper is going to assess the party position with three different indicators as displayed in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>• The simplification of parties has a worthy goal to strengthen the cohesive and robust party system, the presidential system, and the consolidated democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Refusal</td>
<td>• It harms small parties. • The restriction of parties is a regression. • The increase in threshold violates the constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>• The is a different policy between central and local boards.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are 11 parties which categorized in the nationalist-secular group. Among them are major, middle, and small parties. According to Picture 1, three major parties have an approval position while the rest is in the refusal side. In the middle category, one party is in the approval while the rest is in the refusal. In the small category, three parties have the approval position while two parties have refusal and ambiguous positions respectively. For more detail, it can be examined further.

PDIP proposes the increase of threshold between 5 and 6 percent. The big percentage is better because each party has a chance to create its fraction in the parliament (Republika, 16 January 2017). Idham Samawi, senior politician of PDIP, argues that one of the Indonesian problems is the weaknesses of the constitutional system mainly related to the party system so that the increase of parliamentary threshold is positive in making a robust party system. Idham states that the threshold is not profitable whether for major or small parties because each party has a different view in dealing with this issue. Likewise, Bambang Praswanto and Yuni Satia Rahayu, PDIP cadres in Yogyakarta, argue that the increase of threshold has a prime objective to simplify the number of political parties because the number of Indonesian parties is too many. For them, the threshold stabilizes the presidential system and restricts the emergence of new parties. It is good progress for Indonesian democracy.

Previously, back to the year of 2014 the important showed democratic system in Indonesia has role of the age groups engage in political and young voters to supporting election and control several factors neither positive nor negative effect to improve quality of the election (Al-hamdi, Widodo, Sulaksono & Darumurti, 2014).

The Golkar Party takes the approval side to the increase of the parliamentary threshold. It proposes that the threshold is between 3.5 and 10 percent (Detik, 18 January 2017). According to John S. Keban, vice chair of Golkar in Yogyakarta, the Golkar motive to support the increase of threshold is the desire to reach a consolidated democratic state and to have a moderate number of political parties. Keban further said that the Indonesian problem right now is applying the presidential system, but it adopts an extreme-multiparty system so that it affects the ineffective government performance. Keban believes that the victim of this problem is people. Thus, he believes that the increase of threshold does not prosper major parties and harm middle-

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1 Interviewed on 08 April 2018.
2 Praswanto was interviewed on 20 March 2018 while Rahayu was on 04 December 2017.
small parties. Each party has to fight powerfully to earn people supports so that it can govern the government.3

The Democrat Party supports the increase of the threshold of four percent because it has two benefits: simplifying the number of political parties and strengthening the presidential government system (Viva, 11 January 2017). According to Abdul Rozak dan Ahmad Mufaris, the Democrat cadres in Yogyakarta, if two parties are adequate to fight for people aspirations, why we need three, four, and more parties. In other words, if four parties can represent people desires, why we should have five, six, and more parties? If Indonesia has many parties, the lobby and negotiation among them are quite challenging to find a consensus.4 Thus, the Democrat proposed some ideas: zero percent for the presidential election, four percent for the parliamentary threshold, open-list PR for the voting system, between three and ten seats for the district magnitude, and bare quote for the seat allocation technique.

Different from PDIP, Golkar and Democrat, Gerinda is the only major party which rejects the increase of four percent of parliamentary threshold. Principally, Gerinda has no problem with the four percent. Nevertheless, it argues that four percent is more profitable for major parties and affecting the terrible fate for middle and small parties because the latter cannot achieve that four percent (Detik, 18 January 2017).

The Gerinda’s position is encouraged by the Hanura Party. It argues that the threshold percentage should be decided by scholarly, empirical, and responsible considerations because the crucial problem is not in the threshold but the electoral system, the integrity of electoral organizers, and the political participation of society (CNN Indonesia, 22 July 2016). Oesman Sapta Odang, the general chairperson of Hanura, states that the restriction of political parties is part of the democratic regression. Thus, the Election Act should provide a good chance for small and new parties to participate in the 2019 election (Kompas, 12 January 2017). Hasnanto and Abe Nindito Radite, Hanura’s cadres in Yogyakarta put forward that the threshold is more gainful for major parties and harming the fate of small parties particularly.5

The Nasdem Party supports the threshold rise even it proposes not only four percent but also seven percents due to considering the simplification of the number of political parties and strengthening of presidential-based government system (Viva, 19 January 2017; Metro TV, 25 January 2018). Nasdem cadres in Yogyakarta state that if Indonesia has many parties, the state provides the high budget. For them, it is not efficient. According to Cornus Dwisaptha Hekseko and Tomi Nurbansu, Nasdem cadres in Yogyakarta, by applying the threshold, elected legislators are expected representatives for people.6

Most small parties excluding PSI support the threshold. They are Perindo, Garuda, and Berkarya while PKPI is in an ambiguous position. The Perindo Party proposes the threshold percentage between five and ten percent (Detik, 09 February 2017). Perindo cadres in Yogyakarta confirm that although their party is the new participant in the 2019 election, they are ready to fight for achieving the threshold. For Perindo, the four percent is part of the critical line for each party to prove that they are the real fighter or not.

Afterward, the Garuda Party believes that the increase of threshold is better for the democratic growth in Indonesia. According to Waljo Budi Prayitno Sunu Tri Waluyo, Garuda’s cadres in Yogyakarta, the threshold is aimed to have dependable and professional parties and to generate political parties which have robust supports of society.7 Similarly, the Barkarya Party is sure that it passes the threshold by reviving the Soeharto’s values and programs. Soeharto is the former second Indonesian president. Prio Budisantoso, secretary general of Berkarya, said that his party target is one seat in one district (TVMu, 25 April 2018; MNC 104.6 FM Trijaya, 13 May 2018). Nevertheless, Budisantoso stresses that the threshold is still needed to be tested in order to be a fair decision for all parties (Detik, 09 February 2017).

![Picture 1. The Position of Nationalist-Secular Parties](image)

Unlike with other small parties, PSI proposes the threshold of still 3.5 percent and rejects the increase of threshold. If the threshold is increasing, it harms the fate of small parties because they just have begun to fight in the electoral arena. There is no relation between the realization of the parliamentary threshold and a fair election. Thus, PSI proposes the implementation of fractional threshold or what so-called as “effective threshold” (Detik, 14 January 2017; Detik, 09 February 2017). Meanwhile, PKPI is in an ambiguous position. Although this party officially supports the increase of threshold, several its cadres in Yogyakarta reject it. Supri Tapir, the PKPI functionary in Yogyakarta City, rejects the increase of threshold because it is quite hard for his party to achieve it.8 Nevertheless, due to part of the regime coalition where PDIP is an initiator to increase the threshold, there is no right choice for PKPI except to approve it.

Among nationalist-Muslim parties, PAN is similar to PKPI in the ambiguous side while PKB is evident in the approval side to the increase of threshold. The proof is that while PAN elites in the central board concur to such increase, some PAN local cadres intend to reject it. Ahmad Hanafi Rais, the deputy general chairperson of PAN, argues that the presidential system by applying the multiparty is quite difficult to harmonize them so that the increase of

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1 Interviewed on 04 December 2017 and 29 March 2018.
2 Interviewed on 30 November 2017.
3 Radite was interviewed on 04 December 2017 and 22 May 2018 while Hasnanto was on 03 December 2017 and 02 April 2018.
4 Hekseko was interviewed on 28 November 2017 and 28 April 2018 while Mardiusanto was on 28 November 2017 and 26 March 2018.
5 Interviewed on 03 December 2017 and 31 March 2018.
6 Interviewed on 02 December 2017.
threshold is better to realize the moderate multiparty, between eight and ten parties. In the meantime, Nazaruddin, chairperson of PAN in Yogyakarta, believes that four percent is distorting people vote because, in the democratic state, any vote collected by parties should be respected in order to avoid the disappearance of people votes.

Dissimilar with PAN, PKB welcomes the increase of threshold by proposing seven percent. Muhammad Iskandar, the general chairperson of PKB, states that seven percent is an ideal number to simplify the party system and to strengthen the presidential system (Detik, 19 February 2017: Metro TV, 25 January 2018). The Iskandar’s statement is supported by Agus Sulistiyono, Member of National Parliament from PKB, who argues that smaller number of parties in the parliament is more comfortable to negotiate and to take a consensus rather than bigger volume of parties.

The position of PKS is similar to PAN and PKPI namely ambiguous. It can be shown by the different view between central and local cadres. Abdul Hakim and Jazuli Juwaini, central elites of PKS state that the four percent is harming small parties and tucking people right (Merdeka, 27 October 2016). In contrast, M. Darul Falah and Dwi Budi Utomo, PKS cadres in Yogyakarta, testify that the increase of threshold is a moderate path which is aimed to simplify the number of parties in the parliament because managing small number of parties is more manageable rather than more significant volume.

PPP and PBB are nationalist-Islamist parties which reject the parliamentary threshold. According to Asrul Sani, PPP politician, the increase of threshold from 3.5 to 4 percent is not suitable for Indonesian democracy because the party simplification can be executed without increasing the threshold but by limiting the number of fraction in the parliament (Kompas, 13 January 2017). Syukri Fadhohi and Muhammad Yazid, PPP cadres in Yogyakarta, encourage the Sani’s view. They believe that the increase of threshold is stabilizing the regime position and harming small parties.

Comparable with PPP, PBB also rejects the increase of threshold as stated by Yusri Iskandar in multiple chances. Local elites of PBB in Yogyakarta such as Ray Sitoresmi Prabungrat and Harry Yustisianto support the Mahendra’s statements. They argue that this increase is an advantage merely for major parties but harming small parties. For them, the party simplification like what occurred in the New Order regime is contradicting with the 1945 Constitution which utters that state protects the right to gather and organize.

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Considering the above discussion, the study’s finding is three distinctive positions of Indonesia’s parties in responding to the increase of parliamentary threshold. First is the approval position which supported by eight parties: PDIP, Golkar, Democrat, PKB, Nasdem, Perindo, Berkarya, and Garuda. Second is the refusal position which encouraged by five parties: Gerindra, Hanura, PPP, PBB, and PSI. Third is the ambiguous position which consisting of three parties: PAN, PKS, and PKPI.

Thus, this paper implies that the ideology is submerged where the approval side encompasses nationalist-secular and nationalist-Muslim parties or major, middle, and small parties. In the refusal side, it consists of nationalist-secular and nationalist-Islamist parties or major, middle, and small parties. Similarly, the ambiguous side contains three different colors of ideology: nationalist-Muslim, nationalist-Islamist, and nationalist-secular.

B. Party Belief in Reaching the Parliamentary Threshold

14 of 16 political parties are optimistic that they reach the parliamentary threshold in the 2019 election due to previous electoral experiences. Two parties are not solid to cope with the election, namely PPP and PKPI, which means that they do not believe in passing the threshold.

All nationalist-secular parties are optimistic about passing the threshold. As one of the ideological parties, PDIP, believes that it passes the threshold due four times of previous electoral experiences. It reached 33.74 percent in 1999, 18.53 percent in 2004, 14.01 percent in 2009, and 19.95 percent in 2014. Most PDIP cadres argue that it is not possible to their party to reach the threshold under four percent although tiny conflicts occurred inside this party. In the meantime, the emergence of Jokowi as the presidential candidate at least contributes to the popularity of PDIP. Therefore, Idham Samawi, senior politician of PDIP, states that if a party performs hardly and fights truly for people, four percent is easy to be reached.19

Furthermore, Golkar is optimistic about exceeding the threshold because it always reaches the top three rank of the election. Airlangga Hartarto, the general chairperson of Golkar, targets that his party has to achieve 101 seats or equal to 18 percent. Hartarto stresses that he strengthens to campaign in Java and the eastern of Indonesia as the base of Golkar (CNN Indonesia, 15 Maret 2018). According to John S. Keban, Golkar politician in Yogyakarta, Golkar’s optimism is based on two considerations: first, the party has a reliable and stable institutionalization and, second, the party has competent resources of cader.19

Likewise, Gerindra does not doubt that it goes beyond the threshold although the party just participated three times in the election, 2009, 2014, and 2019. Dharma Setiawan, Gerindra’s politician in Yogyakarta, states that gaining more than 11 percent and the third rank in the 2014 election is a substantial capital for his party to leave behind the threshold. The existence of Prabowo Subianto as the presidential candidate indeed contributes significantly to the popularity of Gerindra.20 Moreover, the Democrat’s belief that it overtakes the threshold is considering three previous elections where it gained 7.45 percent in 2004, more than 20 percent in 2009, and approximately 10 percent in 2014. In the case of Democrat, the role of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is extremely noteworthy mainly when he conducted himself as the Indonesian president for two periods, 2004-2014.

Hanura and Nasdem are also confident to bypass the threshold. Sutrisno Iwantono, the vice general chairperson of Hanura, targets that his party should obtain 75 seats or 13 percent so that it reaches the big five (Republika, 12 May 2018). Although the survey predicted that Hanura could not reach the threshold in 2014, this party can bypass the threshold by achieving 5.26 percent. Nasdem is the merely new party in the 2014 election which reached 6.90 percent. Jonny G. Plate, secretary general of Nasdem, considers the previous election as a proper modal for his party to surpass the threshold (Detik, 13 Oktober 2017). By offering the concept of restoration of Indonesia, Nasdem is sure that it earns the big three and a minimum 15 percent.

Afterward, all new parties believe that they surpass the parliamentary threshold although they never participate in the election. Perindo offers various advantage programs to society and supported by the most extensive media network of MNC Group. Nanang Sri Roekmadi, Perindo’s politician in Yogyakarta, is optimistic that his party reaches the big three in the 2019 election.21 PSI which claims as the millenial representative targets to obtain 20 percent by offering issues of diversity, solidarity, and the limitation of the old generation in its party (BBC News Indonesia, 19 October 2017). Thus, PSI recruits young legislator candidates selected by the credible team (Republika, 27 August 2017).

Berkarya is confident reaching 14 percent by involving senior politicians in the legislative election (BBC News Indonesia, 19 October 2017) and offering the politics of nostalgia. The nostalgia in this context is back to the struggle of Soeharto under the New Order regime. According to Maryono, Berkarya’s politician in Yogyakarta, his party should reach the big five by targeting each district is one seat.22 Garuda is also sure that it bypasses the threshold because the fact demonstrates that the new party can gain the parliamentary seat like Nasdem, but the old party failed such as PBB and PKPI. Ahmad Ridha Sabahan, the general chairperson of Garuda, argues that his party focuses on approaching young voters (Metro TV, 12 May 2018; BBC News Indonesia, 19 October 2017).

Two nationalist-Muslim parties, PAN and PKB, are confident that they surpass the parliamentary threshold. PAN as the modernist-Muslim party believes that it goes beyond the four percent due to previous experiences in the election where it gained 7.12 in 1999, 6.44 in 2004, 6.03 in 2009, and 7.59 percent in 2014. Ahmad Hanafi Rais, the vice general chairperson of PAN, targets that his party reaches the minimum one district has one seat so that the party has at least 80 seats at the national parliament.23

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18 Interviewed on 08 April 2018.
19 Interviewed on 04 December 2017 and 29 March 2018.
20 Interviewed on 06 December 2017 and 28 May 2018.
As the traditionalist-Muslim party, PKB has a target to reach roughly 100 seats. According to Daniel Johan, vice general secretary and legislative candidates work hard to multiply from the existing 47 seats as the result of 2014 to 100 seats in 2019 (Netralnews, 18 February 2018). Agus Sulistiyo, Member of National Parliament originated from PKB, stresses that his optimism is also supported by the survey which positions PKB in the fourth rank after PDIP, Golkar, and Gerindra. It is also caused by the unity of supporters and members of Nahdlatul Ulama who fight for the triumph of PKB.

TABLE II. Parties’ Optimism in Reaching the Parliamentary Threshold

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Explanations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist-Muslim</td>
<td>Major Parties: PDIP, Golkar, Gerindra, Democrat</td>
<td>PAN always reaches more than 6 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small Parties: Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, Garuda</td>
<td>PKB has a spectacular performance mainly in 1999 and 2014 due to the support of Nahdhatul Ulama.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist-Secular</td>
<td>Major Parties: PDIP, Golkar, Gerindra, Democrat</td>
<td>Gerindra had a spectacular performance mainly in 2014. It has Prabowo Subianto who has coattail effects to this party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle Parties: Hanura, Nasdem</td>
<td>Hanura and Nasdem obtained more than 3 percent in 2014. It is the right modal for them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist-Islamist</td>
<td>Middle Parties: PKS, PBB</td>
<td>The 212 Movement hopefully affects the Political Muslim resurgence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two nationalist-Islamist parties, PKS and PBB, believe that they exceed the threshold while PPP is in a dilemma situation. Although PKS gained 1.36 percent in 1999, it, in turn, reached 7.34 percent in 2004, 7.89 in 2009, and 6.79 percent in 2014. According to M. Darul Falah, chairperson of PKS in Yogyakarta, 6.79 percent is a solid vote of PKS so that he projects that his party obtains more than 10 percent in the 2019 election. Similarly, PBB has optimism that it bypasses the threshold. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, the general chairperson of PBB, predicts that his party can reach nine percent (CNN Indonesia, 23 Maret 2018). Joining the coalition of Jokowi-Ma’ruf is the strategy Yusril finally takes to increase the popularity of PBB. Nevertheless, several PBB cadres in regional boards declared their resignation from PBB due to the political attitude of Yusril who joins the Jokowi coalition.

TABLE III. The Ambiguous Position of Parties in Reaching the Parliamentary Threshold

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Explanations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist-Islamist</td>
<td>Middle Parties: PPP</td>
<td>Although the central board believes that their party surpasses the threshold, local cadres do not believe that due to the internal conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist-Secular</td>
<td>Small Parties: PKPI</td>
<td>Although the central board believes that their party surpasses the threshold, local cadres do not believe that because the central board did not supervise the regional boards.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the Author.

Two other parties, PKPI and PPP, are not confident that they succeed in the parliamentary threshold. PKPI generally is optimistic about reaching the threshold by targetting five percent. Diaz Hendropriyono, the general chairperson of PKPI, stated that his party concerns to campaign in Central Java, East Java, Jakarta, and Kepulauan Aru (Detik, 20 June 2018). It is supported by the party mission in maintaining the unity of Indonesia and Pancasila (Tribunnews, 14 January 2018). Nevertheless, some local cadres of PKPI are not optimistic because of the internal situation of the party where the party functionaries in various cities and regencies are inactive. An instance is a situation in Yogyakarta City where Supri Tapir and Rahma, chairperson and treasury of PKPI in Yogyakarta City, are going to submit their resignation immediately from their position in the party. It seems that the central board did not supervise regional boards.

Due to long-term internal conflict, PPP is in a dilemma situation where some elites still believe that their party surpasses the threshold, but the rest is not confident. M. Romahurmuzi, the general chairperson of PPP, states that his party targets to reach the big three. This target is reasonable because PPP ever obtained the third rank in 1999 with 12.55 after PDIP and Golkar. To gain this target, PPP carries out some strategies such as recruiting potential legislators and preparing the party structure until the sub-district level (Tirto, 29 January 2018; Kompas, 12 December 2017). Although Romahurmuzi is confident, some local PPP cadres are not sure that their party surpasses the threshold such as Muhammad Yazid and Syuki Fadholi, PPP cadres in Yogyakarta. Fadholi argues that Romahurmuzy’s position to support Basuki Tjahaja Purnama in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election and Jokowi in the 2019 presidential election is betraying Muslim aspirations. In Fadholi’s view, both Basuki and Jokowi are the hazardous leaders for Muslim communities.

In other side, the allocation of budgeting in area joining in election needs to comparison between income and outcome an area, the good financial distribution an area was guarantee in implementation of election an area (Habibi & Suswanta, 2019).

This paper is going to argue that most parties including new parties are confident of surpassing the four percent of parliamentary threshold. Merely two parties have no solid institutionalization, namely PPP and PKPI which means that some of their cadres do not believe that their party can exceed that threshold.

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25 Tapir and Rahma were interviewed on 02 December 2017.
26 Fadholi was interviewed on 13 December 2017 and 26 May 2018 while Yazid was on 20 November 2017.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Three different positions among parties in responding the increase of parliamentary threshold and two distinctive beliefs among of them eventually demonstrate that the ideological spectrum and the organizational status are not driving factors which influence the party policymaking in coping with the parliamentary threshold.

Ideologically speaking, if those parties are consistent, PDIP and PKS are not in the same position due to having a contradicting ideology. Likewise, in the context of organizational status, all small parties should do not concur with the increase of parliamentary threshold which indeed makes them problematical to reach it. Nevertheless, some of them forcefully concur with the increase and are ready to fight in surpassing it.

From a theoretical standpoint, the paper finding calls into question the hypothesis of Budge (1994) and Freedon (2013) which posits that the political ideology can frequently be reflected in the parties’ programmes; this is frankly not entirely accurate in contemporary Indonesia. This indicates that the ideological contestation is waning and subsumed, as there are no notable differences among platforms of those parties.

This paper also rejects Mietzner’s (2013: 239) view which argued that Indonesian parties have an ideological foundation. In contrast, this is supporting Ufen’s (2009) thesis who posited that the political ideology is feeble. Hence, the ideology is not applicable when parties address issues related to power arena such as the parliamentary threshold. Instead, the ideology is reviving when parties cope with issues related to religion and ethnicity.

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