Between Political Identity and Violence at the 2017’s Jakarta Governor Election

Abstract—DKI Jakarta Gubernatorial Election 2017 was characterized by the dimensions of direct violence which included clashes and beatings as well as dimensions of indirect violence which included heat speech, intolerance, manipulative and discrimination. This is different from the conditions in the 2007 and 2012 DKI Jakarta Gubernatorial Election based on rational choice. The concept of Hate Spin Cherian George states that the offense that has an impact on violence is deliberately mobilized by political entrepreneurs, which according to Clifford Geertz that identity factors play a role in the emergence of conflicts that either lead to violence or not. This case study was analyzed using a qualitative approach through the interview process, data collection and analysis. The assumption is that political violence in DKI Jakarta Gubernatorial Election is not only an agenda that is deliberately mobilized by political interests, but also grows as an individual and communal awareness of conditions that occur in DKI Jakarta and regardless of identity factors.

Keywords—identity; political violence; hate spin; election

I. INTRODUCTION

The political strategy used in hate spin is to use or exploit identity [1]. Geertz states that social and religious conflicts occur because of conflicts based on ideological factors which then focus on religion, social class, political power (ethnicity) and community psychology [2].

In the literature of political science, identity politics is sharply distinguished between political identity and political of identity. Political identity is a construction that determines the position of the subject’s interests within the ties of a political community while political of identity refers to the political mechanism of organizing identity (both political identity and social identity) as a source and means of politics [3]. Identity changes become political of identity when it becomes the basis of the struggle for group aspirations [4].

The identity election is basically a common thing as a characteristic of political parties and candidates. However, the use of politicization of identity which is used as a political strategy for elections tends to have an impact on the emergence of a view of majority intolerance towards minorities. In research is explained that among the five stages of elections, the campaign is the most open stage for the occurrence of physical violence [5]. As Fox and Menchik, in his research showed that most (65 percent) of the campaign posters in the Pilkada contained content that emphasized the dimensions of the identity of the candidates in the elections [6].

The Jakarta election 2017 is characterized by religious, social and ethnic issues. As Sirait in Selasar.com, the color of identity politics feels more thick than the struggle of ideas and policies to build Jakarta and improve the welfare of capital city residents and can be factually underlined that religion can be ridden by political elites because it can influence choices in the political process [7]. Even though in the context of DKI Jakarta, it will have its own dimension of political violence. Based on this, it is necessary to analyze the reasons for political violence in the 2017 DKI Jakarta Election. Thus, the extent of the role of identity in generating potential violence in the elections can be known.

George argues that hatred and offense involving acts of violence do not arise from the natural response of society, but are deliberately created and used by political entrepreneurs such as party elites, religion and government leaders and officials as political strategies that exploit group identity to mobilize supporters and suppress opponents in reducing their rights. Furthermore, Geertz categorizes that social and religious conflicts occur because of several factors, including: ideology, social class, political and psychological power.

II. METHOD

The approach used in this study is a qualitative approach. The strategy used in this study is a case study. This research is a study that aims to investigate the events of the 2017 DKI Jakarta gubernatorial elections which are colored by violence that exploits identity. So that the location and time studied are limited.

Based on the preliminary data found, the classified research locations are as follows: Desa Cipinang RW 17 Kec. Pulo Gadung as the location of the next clash which resulted in injuries, Rumah Susun Petamburan RW 11 Jl. Jati. While the time limit studied is from 2016 to 2017 on election day.

The informant retrieval technique in this study was taken by purposive method. Based on this description, the authors determine the informants based on the following criteria: The Front Pembela Islam (FPI) with the consideration that based on interviews with the DKI Jakarta of Bawaslu team there were several violations related to the FPI as the reported
organization. In addition, the FPI once held a convention for the Candidates for Muslim Governors, which was assumed to aim at attracting candidates for the gubernatorial of DKI Jakarta as a form of rejection to Ahok who went back to the DKI Jakarta gubernatorial Election in 2017 where one of the eleven conditions he proposed was Muslim. Furthermore, the "Diversity" group which claims to be anti-radicalization and Anti-SARA affiliated with Ahok-Djarot. The next informant is the reporters like Mr. K.H. Aseli Hasan, Bpk. Bejo, Mr. Handono and the DKI Jakarta community are needed.

According to Creswell, the steps of data collection include efforts to limit research, gather information through observation and interviews, whether structured or not, documentation, visual materials, and efforts to design protocols for recording / recording information [8]. While data analysis techniques such as Sugiyono's Miles and Huberman model, suggest that the activities in qualitative data analysis are carried out interactively and take place continuously until complete, so the data is clear. Activities in data analysis, namely: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing / verification [9].

III. DISCUSSION

A. Political Violence in the 2017 DKI Jakarta Election

The implementation of the Jakarta gubernatorial Election in 2017 was marked by violations. A number of reports of violations entered the Election Supervisory Board (Bawaslu) of DKI Jakarta Province. Based on Bawaslu of DKI Jakarta that in the first round of elections there were 64 reports of violations and the second round of 29 reports.

The dimensions of violence that occur in DKI Jakarta can be known through categorization based on Johan Galtung's violent perspective. Galtung stated that violence was categorized in different dimensions, namely direct physical violence and indirect violence which included structure and attitude.

First, direct physical violence that occurs in the first and second rounds, both during campaign and election day. Based on Bawaslu DKI Jakarta that there were several acts of beatings and intimidation in the violation of the Jakarta Election. The following data on these actions:

### TABLE I. DIRECT ACTIONS OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN THE DKI JAKARTA ELECTION 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Reported</th>
<th>Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>Kp. Baru Kec.</td>
<td>Naman S</td>
<td>There was a group of approximately 100 people who were allegedly led by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November 9</td>
<td>Kembangan Utara</td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Ismail, who disrupted, obstructed and disrupted the candidate for vice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Kec. Kembangan</td>
<td></td>
<td>governor no. sequence 2 (Pak Djarot) to campaign using a rejection banner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jakarta Barat</td>
<td></td>
<td>This incident resulted in a sentence of 4 months imprisonment with 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>months probation which in the end was based on a court decision to only stay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 nights in prison.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, in addition to direct violence, the implementation of the DKI Jakarta Election in 2017 also includes indirect violence. Where such indirect violence as Galtung states includes attitude and structure. Violence in the dimensions of attitudes, perceptions, feelings, or values that include hatred, fear, distrust, racism, and intolerance. Some of these forms are described in several attitudes such as emerging hate speech through banners and online social media. Some examples of hate speech based on Juditha's research [10]:

Ahok, for example, for the news titled "Ahok November 4 Demo Issues," posted by Merdeka.com, October 31, 2016, the haters dub Ahok otak korset, kafir, mutil lancing. On the news with the title "Ahok Becomes a Religious Blasphemy Suspect", by liputan6.com, netizens who hated Ahok called it a religious insult, China which was categorized as labeling or offensive words. In the news entitled "Agus Debate, SBY Prays at Home," posted by Kompas.com, January 13, 2017, Agus is called anti-criticism such as his mother (labeling), embarrassment, cowardice, mother child (refinement of meaning), and others. In the comments room for the news "Ahok Comments on Anies' Statement on KIP Questions Denied in Jakarta" posted by Kompas.com, October 31, 2016, Anis is referred to as a person who has no brain, omdo, mingling, former minister oon (labeling), unwise, can not be fair (euphemism), act smart, and others [11].

In addition, the results of a Populi Center survey on BBC Indonesia, March 24, 2017 found that "after the first round of the DKI Jakarta Pilkada, the issue of SARA was used, namely with the emergence of an appeal not to elect Muslim candidates and the problem of not carrying out bodies."

Another form of attitude violence, namely the existence of intolerance that arises in DKI Jakarta. This is evidenced by the Tolerant City Index Report (IKT) and the democracy index report reported by Setara Institute, when viewed from the most intolerant region index in 2017 regarding 10 intolerant regions, DKI Jakarta ranks first as the most intolerant. While previously in 2015 the DKI Jakarta did not enter at all into 10 regions that had an intolerant index. In addition, the Democracy Index (2016) report, DKI Jakarta experienced the largest decline in the democracy index to reach 14.4 percent compared to other
In 2015 the democracy index reached 85.32 percent, but in 2016 it reached 70.85 percent [12].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Not Tolerant City Level (From 10 Province)</th>
<th>years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ke-0</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ke-1</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Setara Institute [13]

Ahnaf, Maarif, Asyhari, and Afidilla state that it is not always apprelection and intolerance, but not a few cases show the importance of election moments in giving importance to religious intolerance sentiment for electoral mobilization. This mobilization does not always directly lead to physical violence, but at least contributes to strengthening intolerance in some circles [13].

Based on the data obtained based on the perspective of Galtung violence, it shows that the elections in DKI Jakarta in 2017 are accompanied by acts of violence. However, the form of violence that occurs tends not to be a major concern. This is because the SARA issue used in the DKI Jakarta election is more framed by the media and more dominant.

B. Identity and Violence in the DKI Jakarta Pilkada in 2017

The division of the two camps strengthened with the action of "Defending Islam" due to the case of "blasphemy". This case was carried out by the Governor of DKI Jakarta for the period 2012-2017, namely Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), who at the same time ran for the 2017 elections. This incident triggered increasingly widespread acts of violence in DKI Jakarta.

Religious factors are basically still the basis for forming a society's voting behavior. Regardless of the condition of the people who have advanced or not. It was proven that the basis of the religion was spread from the candidate's symbol, the support of political parties, mass organizations and the culture of the people themselves. As Liphart found that religious factors, compared to language or class factors, played a more important role in shaping party vote choices in Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland [14]. Moreover, the 2017 DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election case has raised awareness and strength of the Muslim community when Ahok was accused of being blasphemous as one of the candidates.

Although the use of religion in the implementation of the DKI Jakarta election in 2017 is more dominant, the economic program offered by the candidate pairs of gubernatorial of DKI Jakarta is part of other contestations. Indicators of social stratification can be analyzed from: first, land issues and settlements, especially negative impacts on incumbent couples Ahok-Djarot. This is because the incumbent policy in managing the DKI Jakarta Spatial and Territory and the Ciliwung normalization program requires evictions in several places, such as in the Bukit Duri area of South Jakarta, North Jakarta Fish Market, some residents of Kali Jodo, West and North Jakarta borders, Rusun Jatinegara West of East Jakarta and the side of the rail in Petamburan, and others. The negative impact of the eviction policy was described in the vote acquisition in the DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election

Second, the problem of poverty is considered to be the trigger for violence. The vote in the North Jakarta region which based on BPS data is the region with the most poor people actually won by the Ahok-Djarot pair in the first round reaching 48.4% followed by Anies-Sandi with 35.1% of the next votes Agus-Silvy 16.5%. This shows that the condition of poverty in North Jakarta did not lead to protests against the incumbent government. In fact, support for incumbents still dominates people's choices in North Jakarta. Likewise in the list of reports that go to the Election Supervisory Body regarding the violations of the 2017 DKI Jakarta Election, North Jakarta only included two cases of reports of administrative problems at polling stations in two cases. While the forms of rejection, clashes, denos, speeches of hatred were not represented in the area. So that the conception of who is in power to realize their aspirations by not being able to realize their aspirations is not reflected in this context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>TPS</th>
<th>Vote Acquisition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Rawa Bebek | 140 | 46  
| Kp. Pulo Kp Melayu | 08 | 195  

Source: m.bionix.com and Reported writer in 2019.

In addition to religion and the stratification of the socio-economic class, the struggle for political power is also a part of sharpening the emergence of sentiments that lead to violence. Political power is related to the use of ethnicity. The basis for choosing based on ethnicity is still part of the contestation, but the form of rejection that has taken place in DKI Jakarta against Ahok-Djarot's campaigns is assumed not because of the issue of ethnicity. This was evidenced by the absence of refusal to clash in the area around reclamation which became the basis of the issue of ethnicity and concerns over ethnic Chinese control. In addition, the results of interviews with several speakers who were witnesses and reported in the Election Supervisory Body stated that the basis for refusing was despite ethnic differences.

IV. CONCLUSION

The form of violence directly or indirectly is directly attached to the sentiment of identity. Exploitation of identity is assumed to be a factor that contributes to violence. However, forms of violence such as feelings of hatred, intolerance and campaign rejection in DKI Jakarta are not the result of mobilizing political entrepreneurs, will remain pure as a form of individual and communal awareness of the existence of
blasphehmy. As the findings in the field result from interviews with FPI, the reported parties and the surrounding community.

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REFERENCES