Political Discourse Analysis in Translation of Speech Texts on “One Belt One Road (OBOR)”

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Abstract — A Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) is an approach used in this study to analyze China’s political speech on “One Belt One Road (OBOR)”. The speech texts on OBOR as a case study is analyzed through a written interview with the Chinese scholars and mainly is aimed to analyze the translators’ works as well as to find out the discourse’s results. The case study presents the point of views from Mainland China’s scholars in National Taiwan Normal University (NTNU) as the respondents, while content analysis is based on an insider’s perspective, i.e., the Chinese government through its missions’ translators. In this study, data gathered from official websites of the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in UN Mission and Melbourne. There are Chinese thousands of characters and English words of speech texts to be explored. As a result, the study not only describes the relation of scholars’ background with their translation but also analyze their understanding of OBOR’s concepts and their applied components, e.g. strategies/techniques/styles. Finally, the components served as indicative functions to successfully deliver messages in-lined to the discourse. There were five main components applied in the texts translation, e.g., domestication, foreignization, changes in content/structure, metaphor, and omission. It is shown that the translators aim to create a friendly image of China by emphasizing slightly different words but in close meaning to the source texts; thus creating a new meaning in the target texts as well as weakening the words’ weight in the target texts.

Keywords — One Belt One Road (OBOR); speech, translation; political discourse

I. INTRODUCTION

Every leader has their slogan/important policy statement, for instance, China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) by Xi Jinping in 2013; Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum by President Jokowi, as well as other countries’ maritime slogans. The Chinese government has publicized its OBOR policy to the world through many means and media. Public diplomacy (a.k.a. propaganda) is one of the most common methods, generally by using political language that greatly subjective, and particularly through official speeches.

This kind of propaganda speech is aimed at making the domestic and international public understand, accept, support, and implement the slogan. Moreover, it also aims to influence international relations (Qiu “Jack” Linchuan, 2016). Therefore, the slogan has to be clear and concrete in its main content. Every country in the world usually has a crystal clear political policy, due to its national interests as basic considerations. Furthermore, whenever translating/interpreting political texts, the interpreters/translators have to be loyal to the source texts, and may not add/omit any words, in particular since every word has its own explicit or implicit meaning, as well as basic grammatical differences (Cheng Zhenqiu, 2003). This research mainly analyses data obtained in the written interview by the respondents. Surprisingly, the research shows that the results do not support Cheng’s statement.

The Chinese government not only links the OBOR with the UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030 (UN SDGs 2030) in the two speeches that feature as the case study in this research but also in other speeches1. It is the Chinese government’s hope that OBOR and UN SDGs 2030 can be acknowledged equally by the world, thus receive the same support. As of January 2019 when this paper was written, there were about 140 countries and international organizations as OBOR’s participants, of which 68 were OBOR’s member countries.2

OBOR speech texts, as the case study of this research, are an official reflection of the Chinese government’s public relations policy. It is implemented by national institutions/governmental organs (for example the National Development and Reform Commission/NDRC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs/MoFA, et cetera) and full of the institutions/organs’ ideology/culture, including in its interpreting/translating structures, norms, and patterns.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. Political Discourse

This research takes China’s OBOR policy as its case study. Thus the analysis on its translation strategy and structure will be based on Political Discourse. The OBOR policy is delivered to the world through official speeches. Therefore, it will be analysed using Political Discourse. Political Discourse is an approach commonly used for analysing political texts such as policy, interview, news, press release, et cetera. This discourse was invented/ coined by Teun A. van Dijk in 1997.

As a type of discourse, Political Discourse also uses language/texts to deliver their messages. “Politics means Cooperation” is the discourse’s main argument and it will be carried out/implemented through discussions and reviews by all the concerned parties/stakeholders, to achieve a commitment/joint resolution. In short, Political Discourse includes the main argument, the meaning of the interaction that can be analysed using practical structure, and the overall contexts (Wendland Ernst R., 2012).

B. The Interpreters/Translators

The interpreters/translators have no or limited freedom of expression and innovation in interpreting/ translating the speech texts. Their role is to support the institutions’ well-established structure/form. They cannot be subjective in completing their tasks and must comply with the institutions’ subjectivity values as their main reference. (Qiu “Jack” Linchuan, 2016). The interpreters/translators have to be loyal to the source texts, and may not add/omit any words of the texts. Their role is different with other interpreters/translators who handle other kinds of non-political texts, such as literary texts, et cetera, in which personal subjectivity that might bring variations to the target texts is allowed to exist. Moreover, whenever translating/interpreting a political text, a translator/an interpreter has to be not only loyal to the source texts but also have in-depth awareness and understanding of the text’s culture.

Research by Setton and Guo (Setton Robin, 2009) shows that translators and interpreters with Chinese in general are loyal, neutral, low-profile, and also stick to international professionalism norms. However, surprisingly, when handling political texts that can sometimes contain very sensitive material, they have to use a special strategy/technique, namely adding/omitting some words in the translation or interpretation, to give the texts a more neutral/low-profile tone. This strategy/technique is related to their loyalty/subjectivity. Translators/Interpreters tend to change the texts’ tone depending on whether their country is praising/condemning/blaming/criticizing another country, as well as when other countries criticize their own. The strategy of leaving some sentences untranslated also known as “zero translation” is done sometimes due to certain considerations and reasons (Zhang Zhi, 2011).

The main aims of this research are to analyse the translators’ strategies and techniques, as well as to view its success/failure according to China (Mainland) scholars’ point of view. Indeed, the success or failure of a speech is not defined by the actual condition of the speech, but by the speech’s influence following the delivery of its message to the audiences, particularly by using translating strategies and discourse’s structures. This research is not intended to compare any particular characteristics used in public relations and propaganda. Neither will it analyse its success/failure through the number of countries that support the policy.

III. METHOD

The research will use Political Discourse as its approach and Written Interview as well as Data Mining as its methods, in particular to answer two research questions, e.g.: First, what are the strategies/techniques used by the translator in translating the OBOR speech texts; Second, how the China (Mainland) scholars who study at the translation and interpretation program in National Taiwan Normal University (NTNU) view the translation of the speech texts, especially in regards to the success or unsuccessful of the speech’s translators in delivering its message to the audiences.

A. The Source Texts and Translated Texts

This research mainly analyses two Chinese Mandarin speech texts4 (e.g. Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN. 2018. 《常驻联合国代表马朝旭大使在“一带一路”倡议和2030年可持续发展议程”高级别研讨会上的发言》, and The Consulate General of the PRC to Brisbane of Australia, 2015. 《协力共建“一带一路”，促进共同繁荣：驻布里斯班总领事赵永琛在昆士兰大学“海洋视野下的中国与世界”第一届国际丝路论坛上的讲话》, as well as two English speech texts5, 4 (e.g. Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN. 2018. “Remarks by Ambassador Ma Zhaoxu at High-level Symposium on Belt and Road Initiative and 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, and The Consulate General of the PRC to Brisbane of Australia. 2015. “Work Together to Build "the Belt and Road" for Common Prosperity”).

The texts are retrieved from China’s MoFA official websites, in particular from its mission in the UN as the main speech data, and its mission in Brisbane of Australia as the supporting speech data. The two missions were chosen for two reasons. First, China’s OBOR policy was delivered to the world (a. k. a UN member countries) through its mission in the UN; Secondly, due to the reality that although the Government of Australia in its official political stance has not joined China’s OBOR, in October 2018 its federal/state government of Victoria became the country’s one and only federal/state government to participate in OBOR2. Australia (Victoria)’s main reason to participate is basically due to business and employment factors, while China may consider its geopolitics and geo-economics.
The OBOR speech texts were translated from Mandarin Chinese (as a source texts) to English (as target texts) by China’s MoFA translators/interpreters, and not the original author. Overall, the texts are about 6,722 words in English and 3,261 characters in Mandarin Chinese. The translation texts underwent internal Standard Operational Procedure (SOP) implemented by the missions, such as the verification and approval process by the head of the missions, then was delivered to the public through its official websites. Therefore, the texts are the voice of the Government of China.

B. The Written Interview’s Respondents
The respondents in the written interview are four China (Mainland) scholars who study at the translation and interpretation program in National Taiwan Normal University (NTNU), e.g. students of Master degree, exchange, and seat-in. The written interview was done anonymously and following written consent provided by all the respondents. There are six open-ended questions that required approximately 15-30 minutes to be completed. The questions are divided into two main analysis parts, namely an analysis of the respondents’ background, as well as an analysis of the content/structure/discourse/language/accuracy/culture/environment of the translation and interpretation.

The research is based on outsiders’ perspective, “Etic”. “Etic” refers to the perspective of the researchers. While “Emic” refers to the perspective of translators/interpreters, the staff of an institution, students as an internal part of the university/subject of the research; thus, the perspective is usually biased. A linguist, Kenneth Pike, said that a language can be analysed from two different perspectives, namely: “Etic” (outsiders’ perspective) and “Emic” (insiders’ perspective) (Liao Boshen, 2017). Since the use of “emic” perspective has many limitations, most research usually uses the “etic” perspective. Some of the limitations are internal secrecy/confidentiality, lack of recommendation, et cetera. Compared to the “emic” perspective, “etic” is an in-depth reflection done by using insiders’ point of view to see their internal status. However, in reality, those two perspectives might not differ in their research subjectivity or objectivity.

IV. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
According to the data given by the China (Mainland) scholars who study at the translation and interpretation program at National Taiwan Normal University (NTNU) and have interest in China’s OBOR speech texts (Chinese Mandarin to English), the respondents’ background, the strategies/techniques applied in its translation, as well as the success or failure of the speech in delivering its messages to the audiences, are as follows:

A. Respondents’ Background

The respondents’ interests in translating and interpreting are because of reasons such as: wanting to be a consultant in translation and interpreting, to get achievement, having special interests in the subject, and as a preparation for TOEFL test. Second, the four respondents’ translating/interpreting experiences are a professional interpreter for five years, freelancer and volunteer in interpreting, translating/interpreting in class, translating as preparation for TOEFL test. Regarding the understanding on the OBOR policy and its concept, three out of four respondents believe that the policy comprehensively includes/covers four aspects, e.g. promoting its economy, improving its image as a part of its public relations, enhancing its political relations with other countries, and strengthening its friendship and diplomacy. Only one respondent considered it to be a form of economic diplomacy.

Furthermore, regarding the function of the OBOR policy can be seen from its missions’ goal to influence/persuade the audiences, who are the ambassadors of the UN member countries, and also the public in Victoria’s federal state of Australia. Two respondents believe that the function is mainly to publicize/propagate the OBOR’s concept and its progress of result; to clear up common suspicions, as well as to assure that China was not aiming to balance or compete geographically with the United States; to attract/invite other countries participate in OBOR projects and through it help the world. Only one respondent thinks that the function is to share its cooperation projects and to jointly implement it with other OBOR countries while another respondent cannot see its function due to the language barrier and lack of translating experience.

B. Translation Strategies/Techniques Applied

The strategies/techniques applied in the texts, e.g. domestication, foreignization, changes to the content and structure/adding meaning, metaphors, omission).

1) Domestication & Foreignization

One of the translation strategies applied in the text is “domestication”, therefore it closely sticks to the source text, hence completely translates almost all of the written information in the source text to the target text. By doing this, the translators intend to reserve/retain the culture of the source text. However, native speakers find difficulties in understanding the translation text, especially due to the so-called “loyalty” to the source text, as found in paragraph 12:
Source Text:
“中国将进口超过10万亿美元的商品和服务，为世界各国企业进入中国大市场提供历史性机遇”

Target Text:
“In the coming five years, China will import more than 10 trillion US dollars of goods and services. That will be a historic opportunity for foreign businesses to access to the Chinese market”

Besides “domestication”, other strategy applied in the translation is “foreignization”. This strategy aims to show multiculturalism and dynamism of English, as found in paragraph 3 in which the source text writes “旨在” for five times. In the target text “旨在” is translated into five kinds of different variations, e.g. “the goal is, it is about, we want to, efforts will be made to, more will be done to”.

2) Changes to the Content and Structure (adding meaning)
Translation technique of “changes to the content and structure (adding meaning) can be found in paragraph 5. In the source text, the written information is only about UN SDGs 2030 as well as countries’ sovereignty and right of development. However, in the target text, it is translated as “BRI is aligned with the 2030 Agenda which emphasizes voluntarism and respect for countries’ sovereignty and right of development”. By applying this technique, the translator not only intends to emphasize OBOR/BRI is aligned with the 2030 Agenda in terms of values, e.g. “voluntarism and respect for sovereignty”, but also to underline “respect for countries’ sovereignty and right of development”.

Source Text:
“2030年议程强调各国坚持自主自愿原则，2030年议程和“一带一路”均强调各国主权和发展权”

Target Text:
“(BRI is aligned with) the 2030 Agenda which emphasizes voluntarism and respect for countries’ sovereignty and right of development.”

3) Metaphors
Another translation technique applied in the text is metaphors, which can be found in paragraph 7. This technique is aimed at sounding high tone in the source text, as well as to signalling low tone of the “important words” in the target text.

Source Text:
“为非洲大陆腾飞插上翅膀”

Target Text:
“Giving a strong boost to the development of the African continent”

According to the native translator, the equivalent metaphors is “adding more fuels to the African continent”.

4) Omission
Last but not least, the translators mostly (50%) applied an omission technique in the target text. This technique is mainly applied in order to create a friendly image of China by omitting few words, such as: “to complement each other” (many times), “mutually beneficial/ win-win relation” (twice), “efforts to draw a friendly feeling among the people”. This technique can be found in sequence in paragraph 2, 3, 5, 13, as follows:

(1) “实现优势互补” / “Bring out the best in each other/to complement each other”
(2) “拉近民众感情” / “Efforts to draw a close/friendly feeling among the peoples”
(3) “互利共赢” / “Mutually beneficial/ win-win relation”
(4) “开放包容的国际平台”， “好事大家商量着办”， “实现互利共赢” / “Implement mutually beneficial/ win-win relation”

Overall, the strategies/techniques applied in the texts are domestication (1 out of 8 examples or 12.5%), foreignization (1 out of 8 examples or 12.5%), changes to the content and structure/adding meaning (1 out of 8 examples or 12.5%), metaphors (1 out of 8 examples or 12.5%), and omission (4 out of 8 examples or 50%). The details are presented in the Fig. 1 below:
Fig. 1. Strategies/techniques used in the form of diagrams

C. Table of Translation Strategies/Techniques Applied

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>序号 No.</th>
<th>策略/内容/结构</th>
<th>Table of Translation Strategies/Techniques Applied</th>
<th>例子 Examples</th>
<th>改变或拆分的理由 Reasons behind the Changing Pattern</th>
<th>使用比率 Percentage of Usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>归化 Domestication</td>
<td>- 从文法结构引用词语都很贴近原文，传达出了原文的所有信息。但，这种忠实对于读者来说，有时候可能会不太容易接受。例如，第十二段“中国将进口超过 10 万亿美元的商品和服务。为世界各国企业进入中国市场提供历史性机遇”。原文第三段中用了五个“旨在”，但译文中用了五种不同的句型来表达，即：Paragraph 12 “In the coming five years, China will import more than 10 trillion US dollars of goods and services. That will be a historic opportunity for foreign businesses to access to the Chinese market”.</td>
<td>文法结构引用词语都很贴近原文（为了保留原地文化因素）</td>
<td>1 example (12.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>改变原文内容和结构（加入其他意义） Changes to the Content and Structure (adding meaning)</td>
<td>- 原文第五段结尾处的那句话，“2030 年议程强调各国坚持自主自愿原则，2030 年议程和“一带一路”均强调各国主权和发展权”中，中国和美国将不会将其视为“明示的义务和责任”，但最后这段话在英文中被简化为“BRI is aligned with the 2030 Agenda in terms of values e.g. &quot;voluntarism and respect for countries’ sovereignty and right of development&quot;”.</td>
<td>- 为了强调“一带一路”是与 2030 年议程同样有自主自愿原则； - 为了强调“尊重各国主权和发展权”</td>
<td>1 example (12.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>隐喻与比喻 Metaphors</td>
<td>- 第七段末“为非洲大陆腾飞插上翅膀”没有照翻（giving a strong boost to the development of the African continent）</td>
<td>- 原文的高调</td>
<td>1 example (12.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>省略 Omission</td>
<td>- 一些省略 several omissions : 为了把中国的形象塑造得更温和友善将</td>
<td>- 原文的高调</td>
<td>4 examples (50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D. The Success or Unsuccessful of the Speech

In regards to the success or failure of the speech in delivering its messages to the audiences, three out of four respondents/scholars considered it a success, since it delivers/communicates the messages well by applying the translating strategies/techniques, in particular to publicize/propagate and to share it with the audiences. Moreover, one of the three respondents also thinks that it is a success in general, yet pointed out the successful and unsuccessful parts in the translation. Another respondent considered it to be a half-success, and thinks that it still needed improvement, particularly due to the close meaning with the source texts in translation, e.g. in its grammar/structure/words, et cetera. Although it can deliver the message, this kind of loyalty to the source texts is considered to be wordy and rather difficult to understand for the English listeners/audiences.

Three out of four respondents (75%) consider that the translator has successfully delivered its messages to the audiences. Another respondent (25%) thinks that it is a “half success”. None of the respondents consider the translations as unsuccessful works, and all of them believe that the translators have successfully fulfilled the aims of the China’s OBOR political speech texts. The details are presented in Figure 2 below:

E. OBOR Speeches and Its Aim

The author recognizes that not all of the readers have the same basic understanding on OBOR. Based on its history, every Chinese leader/Chairman has their own slogan/important policy statement, for instance: Mao Zedong’s “实事求是、工作作风、群众路线、独立自足的一些原则” (seeking truth from facts, work style, mass line, independence and self-sufficiency); Deng Xiaoping’s “改革开放” (reform and opening up); Jiang Zemin’s “三个代表” (three represents); Hu Jintao’s “和谐社会、科学发展观” (harmonious society, scientific outlook development); as well as Xi Jinping’s “中国梦、新常态、四个全面性、人类命运共同体” (Chinese dream, new normal, four comprehensives, community of shared future for mankind)6.
Since it was officially published by Xi Jinping in 2013 up to the point of writing, OBOR has undergone several name changes, such as Silk Road Economic Belt, 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). OBOR has 5 (five) main cooperation areas, that are: 设施联通、贸易畅通、资金融通、政策沟通、民心相通 (infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, policy communication, and people-to-people bonds). Until the moment of writing (as of the beginning of January 2019), there are about 68 (sixty-eight) countries that have been participating in OBOR’s projects, which are divided into six cooperation corridors around the globe.

According to China’s 19th National Congress of the Communist Party in October 17th 2017, China is the initiator of OBOR and the world is its participants/supporters/actors of implementation (参与国、使动国、实行国) (赵永祥与邱素法津, 2018). Although its members include developed countries, the main participants of OBOR are developing countries that are trying to escape from the “middle income trap” by reforming their economic structure and attracting foreign investors. The BRF/OBOR Summit was held in Beijing in May 2017. At that time, Xi Jinping stated the aims of OBOR in implementing a “community of shared future for mankind” that was based on principles of common development and win-win relations, as well as on creating harmonious co-existence among the countries as one big family of the world. In order to achieve the aims, the Chinese government in every of its official statements always publicized the advantages of OBOR for the world, including in strengthening the South-South cooperation among the developing countries as its main driving force, so as to make the world more balanced, fair, and equal.

However, up to the point of writing, the aims of OBOR are still not clear enough. Several perspectives from international and China’s domestic scholars are quite differing, e.g. some are suspicious/doubtful (Xiaoyu Pu, 2016), some are quite neutral and positive, while some others have no particular view on the OBOR. Scholars with a suspicious/doubtful perspective assume that China might aim to balance or to compete with the United States by using OBOR as its “Marshall Plan”. Moreover, as a country with an overcapacity of steel, flat glass, photovoltaic sheet, chemical product, et cetera, China might aim to dominate the world by exporting its products all over the globe. Through OBOR, China might also be determined/eager to internationalize its Renminbi/RMB currency, to develop its western part which is a more backward area, as well as to make the world heavily dependent on China, et cetera.

Meanwhile, scholars/internal experts from China (Mainland) clearly state and predict that China’s OBOR is China’s version of the “Marshall Plan” that will connect six provinces and six ports, and bring advantages for China’s five big industries; as well as bringing advantages to the world. This is similar to what the Marshall Plan did at the time when China was starting to implement its reform and opening up policy in 1978 during which it needed a huge amount of cash/loan from Japan, et cetera. Moreover, OBOR is significant in three important areas, namely: maintaining China’s maritime rights, publicizing/propagating China (Mainland)’s values, as well as reflecting regional recognition of “the Great Asia Pacific”. Furthermore, regarding the internationalization of Renminbi/RMB, a study by the Financial Research Center of the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) advises that this process can begin from Asia region since this process will face challenges and uncertainties, as well as the US Dollar as the current main currency in Asia. Other advantages for China to implement the OBOR are: reducing domestic supply and demand structure through construction of basic infrastructure abroad, reforming China’s domestic industry through innovation as well as Research & Development (R&D). Furthermore, other advantages are improving technical capacity and accumulating capital, strengthening export competitiveness that will positively affect its trade settlement using RMB, and at the end, will form China’s new economic model that is “deficit in its capital account, but surplus in its trade account”. Thus, the trade account will support the capital account (资本项目下输出，经常项目/经常发生的交易项目下回流). Regarding the development of China’s western region which is an underdeveloped area, as well as the OBOR to be China’s main economic driving force, two China (Mainland)’s scholars and one Chinese government official offer two perspectives.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the written interview, several conclusions are as follows: First, the respondents’ background in translating and interpreting equals to their competencies in reading the strategies/techniques applied by the translators (namely: their backgrounds/experiences/understanding, as aforementioned, are a professional interpreter for five years, freelancer and volunteer in interpreting, translator/interpreter in class, translator only for TOEFL test preparation respectively). Scholar whose experiences and understanding are very limited even declared openly that the language barrier is the reason that makes him/her insensitive/insensible in analysing the differences between the OBOR texts and other news/reports, as quoted: “不好意思呀，我的英语语感并不强，觉得和读普通的英文报纸新闻没有任何区别，没感觉什么特别的呀，正常翻译而已”。Second, three out of four respondents (75%) think that the OBOR policy comprehensively includes/coveres four aspects, e.g. promoting its economy, improving its image as a part of its public relations, enhancing its political relations with other countries, strengthening its friendship and diplomacy. Only one respondent (25%) considered it as a form of economic diplomacy. Third, two respondents (50%) think that the speech’s function is mainly to publicize/propagate, whilst one respondent (25%) considers the function to be sharing its cooperation projects and to jointly implement it with other OBOR countries.
Assuming that most of the audiences/listeners of the OBOR speeches pay attention only to the English version of the texts, and as the subject of this research, the translators’ strategies/techniques are domestication (12.5%), foreignization (12.5%), changes to the content and structure/adding meaning (12.5%), metaphors (12.5%), and omission (50%). In every speech’s texts, a word/character has its own explicit or implicit meaning. Therefore, if the translators use different a word/character, then it will be different in meaning. This is also a part of the research. Although Cheng Zhenqiu in 2003 stated that “every country in the world usually has a crystal clear political policy, due to its own national interests as basic considerations”, this study surprisingly shows that the Political Discourse applied by China does not support Cheng’s statement. China’s translators in general use several strategies/techniques, in order to give the target texts a slightly different meaning compared with the real meaning, and these are the so-called “additional parts” of the source texts.

For instances, for the purpose of emphasizing a country’s voluntary/sovereignty to develop (as an additional part in the target texts), then the translators highlight the similarities of the voluntary principle that can be found both in the “OBOR” and the “UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030”. Besides, in order to stress the source texts and to lighten the meaning in the target texts, the translators therefore use light/weak metaphors (uneven metaphors) to describe the real, strong meaning in the source texts. Moreover, in the aim of representing a friendly image of China, thus the translators use omission of words/characters, for example in the words/characters of “实现优势互补” (to complement each other), “拉近民众感情” (to draw a friendly feeling among the people), and “互利共赢” (mutually beneficial/win-win relation).

In regards to the success or unsuccessful of the speech’s translators in delivering its messages to the audiences, three out of four respondents (75%) consider that the translator has successfully delivered its messages to the audiences. Another respondent (25%) thinks that it is a “half success”, and that it still needs improvement, particularly due to the close meaning with the source texts in translation, e.g. in its grammar/structure/words, et cetera. Although it can deliver the message, this kind of loyalty to the source texts is considered to be wordy and rather difficult to understand for the English listeners/audiences. None of the respondents considers the translations to be unsuccessful, and all of them consider that the translators have successfully fulfilled the aims of the China’s OBOR political speech texts. However, the author thinks that all of the respondents tend to only consider the texts’ translations, yet neglect the Political Discourse aspect that in China’s realm has its basic standards on “loyalty to the source texts” as well as “foreignization and redundancy as the genre of the source texts’ translation” (Tao Li and Fang Xu, 2018).

Regarding OBOR, although its real objective is not clear yet, however, from its five main cooperative areas, namely: infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, policy communication, and people-to-people bonds (设施联通、贸易畅通、资金融通、政策沟通、民心相通), it is clear that the first three aspects are related to economy, whilst the fourth and fifth aspects are related to politic and socio-culture. The first three aspects touch upon basic infrastructure, energy, trade, new market, logistics, etc. Regarding its geo-economic strategy, the Chinese government will utilize the OBOR policy to support geopolitical policies that will be advantageous to its national interests.

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NOTE:
6. OBOR is part of Xi Jinping’s policy statement on “community of shared future for mankind” (人类命运共同体)


13. Regarding the study of OBOR’s function from domestic and international point of view, see research by a lecture in Faculty of Social Science and Research Center on Economic Diplomacy of Tsinghua University. (2015). an Analysis of International Strategy: towards the OBOR’s Economic Corridor, as well as a research by the Head of Central Asia Research Center of China Institute of Contemporary International Relations/CICIR. (2015). A Practical and Strategical Analysis on OBOR’s Economic Corridor. In the People’s Tribune 人民论坛. (2015). The Belt and Road: The Great Idea Geared to the 21st Century “一带一路”：面向21世纪的伟大构想， the People’s Publishing Company 人民出版社

14. See the speech on OBOR entitled China and the World: Maritime Vision delivered by the Consul General of PRC in Brisbane of Australia at a public seminar in Queensland University on October 7th, 2015. Retrieved from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/dszljt_673036/zs/673040/t1307954.shtml. The official standpoint stated that OBOR is the driving force of China’s economic progress. This is also in-line with Sun Shengyong’s 孙圣勇. (2015). OBOR: National Strategy on the Translation/Interpretation Rules of English-Chinese Mandarin that mentioned and predicted that China’s OBOR is a China’s version of Marshall Plan that will connect six provinces and six ports, and bring advantages for China’s five big industries.

References


