Unity of the Conscious Subject in the Space of Socio-Cultural Experience

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Abstract — The article deals with the problem of the unity of the conscious subject in the sphere of socio-cultural experience. The existential nature of human existence is analyzed as the basis of the unity of the conscious subject. There is the revealing of the ontological essence of personal centeredness of consciousness, which not only ensures the transcendental unity of mental acts, but also sets a certain structure of the mental representation space, identifies individual elements of mental experience. These elements interact with each other and determine through this interaction the main forms of the inner life of the perceiving and thinking subject. The author shows that the personal Self as a unity of self-consciousness does not contain any phenomenal content, but it is a necessary condition for the structured mental experience after the totality of unconscious experiences existing in the mode of possible being. This is reduced to the mental experience existing in the mode of actual being, unlike the personal Ego, which has a phenomenal content of both unconscious and conscious nature. There is a traced difference between the assimilated ego and the introjected one. It is proved that in the ontological field, the personal Self is not a fiction, or an illusion, or a way of describing the totality of changing psychic phenomena, but an integral ontological structure of the entire mental being.

Keywords — consciousness, self-consciousness, subject and object, the unity of the subject

I. INTRODUCTION

Consciousness is always someone's consciousness, it necessarily belongs to some particular person, as well as, mental experiences - these are always someone's experiences correlated with the conscious subject. Consciousness necessarily implies self-consciousness as the transcendental unity of a number of mental acts, which, in its turn, indicates the existence of a mental center, i.e. of the personal Self, to which the "lines of force" of the inner subjective life are attached. But what is the personal Self, and how does it differ from other objects of the surrounding world? What makes it a unique entity opposed to things? What essential features distinguish a conscious subject from a complexly constructed cybernetic system, which does not possess consciousness, but demonstrates behavior similar to that of a human being? What ensures the unity of the conscious subject in the space of socio-cultural experience? Answers to these questions are interdisciplinary and must be reviewed using recent advances in the fields of psychology, sociology, neurophysiology, physics and cybernetics.

II. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

First of all, let us note that the personal Self is such an entity that, in terms of its representation, indicates itself, unlike the representation of things, the images of which point to something not identical to them. In other words, when we perceive things, we distinguish things themselves and their perceptual images (or intellectual ideas), and even when we are aware of our own experiences, we distinguish latent experiences hidden in the unconscious sphere of the psyche and their existential symbols manifested in the mental level of being. In contrast, the personal Self of a person is inseparable from his awareness and exists only within him, remaining, nevertheless, ontologically and logically not identical to him. Indeed, on the one hand, a personal Self is inseparable from a self-consciousness because where a personal Self is present there is a self-consciousness. And where a self-consciousness is observed, a personal Self is manifested. Otherwise, it is meaningless to speak of a personal Self as an existential unity of inner subjective life. But, on the other hand, a self-consciousness, in its ontological and logical structure, implies the presence of at least two personal Selves, the first of which is aware, and the second is realized, while the personal Self, being the unity of the inner subjective life, represents something holistic and indivisible. Consequently, the personal Self of a person is not identical with itself, i.e. using the well-known formula of J.-P. Sartre, it is not what it is, and it is what it is not [1]. Exactly the existential formula distinguishes the being of the human self from the being of other entities that are not the subjective center of self-consciousness. At the same time, it should be understood that in this case we are talking about the personal Self as the inner center of self-consciousness, and not just as a collection of the individual’s ideas about his own person. That is, in this case, we are talking about the transcendental unity of mental acts, and not just their empirical center. This provides the external unity of the entire set of behavioral acts of the observed personality. And therefore, using the terminology of I. Kant, we can say that in relation to the existential formula we mean that is not the empirical self of a person (i.e., it is not the external observable unity of behavior), but its transcendental personal Self (i.e., it is the inner experienced unity of awareness) [2].

So what is the meaning of an existential formula that describes the ontological unity of the mental being of a person? And in what way the logical contradiction contained in it can be explained? First of all, let us note the fact that the personal Self is not what it is, and what it is not, and it means that it is not a certain specific thing among other things in the world, since the
inner mental life centered by it possesses characteristics. They are incompatible with the being of things, namely non-materiality, symbolism, subjectivity, evidentiality, privacy, intentionality and spontaneity. Then we can deploy the next course of thought. If I am that which is not identical with myself, then I am not a definite thing, because every definite thing encompasses the moment of self-identity, exactly through its definiteness. Therefore, I am nothing, or non-being. But since I exist as an ontological unity of self-consciousness, we must speak of non-existence as a mode of being, and as a result we come to the conclusion that being, as it self, is manifested either in a positive mode or in a negative one (i.e. in a mode of non-existence). There immediately arises the natural question, connected with the fact in which particular sense one can speak about the existence of non-existence, i.e. about the existence of which does not exist in any of the positive modes of being. Looking at this seemingly contradictory concept, we come to the conclusion that non-existence as something that actually exists as non-existent can only be understood as a boundary of being, which does not belong to being, but it is a necessary condition of its ontic (essential) certainty. After all, any definiteness of being (in its reality or possibility) implies the existence of an ontic border, only through which it can acquire its certain form. The border, in its turn, means the presence of something that borders with the limited entity, but at the same time it is not itself, since otherwise the border merges with the limited entity into an undifferentiated whole. Further, let us note that actually what is differs from being is a non-being, and therefore a non-being turns out to be logically necessary for the ontological certainty of the being (i.e. for the existential distinguishing of one existing object among other existing objects). However, a being can be unlimited, i.e. it may not have an internal border. By analogy the sphere inside its closed surface has no borders defining it as a sphere, but at the same time, it can be identified internally as a sphere and not as any other surface by examining its metric using, for example, measuring the sum of the angles of a triangle or comparing the area of a circle and its radius. This, generally speaking, means that a being with necessity does not need a non-being as the presence of a conscious personal Self that allows keeping materialistic positions and at the same time not losing the subjective sphere of self-consciousness.

Since the border is an ontological gap between what limits and what is limited, then, consequently, the personal Self and the consciousness appear only where ontic discontinuities of being occurred. Thus, in fact, where a being lost its integrity and disintegrates into differentiated structures. Using the terminology of D. Bohm, we can say that the presence of the conscious Self is a necessary and sufficient condition for the translation of the surrounding world from the implicative, non-manifested state that exists in the possibility into the explicative, manifested, which exists in reality. This is consistent with the modern quantum-mechanical picture of the world [3].

The personal centrality of consciousness means its correlation with the subjective center, which ensures the transcendental unity of mental acts, sets a certain structure of the mental representation space. That is, it identifies individual elements of mental experience, interacting with each other and determining through this interaction the main forms of the inner life of the perceiving subject and thinking subject.

The absence of the center, where all the “lines of force” of subjective attention are gravitate, is transforming the psychic experience from its conscious mode into the unconscious, because at the unconscious there are no acts of self-consciousness are realized, and where there is no self-consciousness, there is no personal Self. At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish the subjective center of consciousness from the mental structure of the ego, as it is understood in classical psychoanalysis of S. Freud. Here the human ego, which obeys the principle of reality (the purpose of which is to preserve the organism by delaying the satisfaction of instincts and keep using psycho-energy discharge until the socially appropriate moment is arises), contains an unconscious part. It is given by a set of unacceptable and therefore repressed ideas about oneself [4]. In other words, the personal Self, as a unity of self-consciousness, does not contain any phenomenal content, but is a necessary condition for the structuring of mental experience. Then the complex of unconscious experiences, existing in the mode of possible being, is reduced to the mental experience, existing in the mode of actual being, unlike the personal Ego, which has phenomenal content of both unconscious and conscious nature. The main questions are. What exactly the phenomenal content of the personal Ego is in its mental genesis. Does it arises as a result of assimilation, which processes separate elements of mental experience into the authentic integrity of self-consciousness. Or it is formed as a result of introjection, which leaves elements of mental experience in an unprocessed form and thereby it creates conflicts and moments of tension in the inner mental life of the conscious subject. The difference between an assimilated Ego and an introjected one is in their functionalities, since the defining moment, in this case, is not the content of the experiencing subject's self-views, but their ontological interconnection in its inner mental life.

The phenomenal emptiness of the personal Self makes it an unidentifiable entity, the existence of which, even by the experiencing subject itself, can only be overviewed indirectly, relying on the memory of its own inner subjective life. Therefore, a number of philosophers develop concepts of consciousness, which exclude its transcendental unity and turn it into a Heraclitus flow of phenomena, as it happens, for example, in the Buddhist notion of consciousness, in the theory of massive modularity or in the D. Dennett’s concept of multiple sketches [5].

In particular, M.K. Mamardashvili and A.M. Pyatigorsky in their work “Symbol and consciousness. Metaphysical reasoning about consciousness, symbolism and language” say that “own Self does not exist as a structure of consciousness, but corresponds to a certain state of consciousness” [6, p. 95]. And therefore consciousness itself does not imply the existence of the own Self structure at all, which allows to speak of the field of consciousness in a certain sense as a mental sphere, which is primary to the “subject-object” dichotomy, i.e. about the field-mode of consciousness unlike the centered mode. The same can be said about the conscious object, which is not a structure of consciousness, but corresponds to a certain state of consciousness. Therefore, there are states of consciousness in
which there is no representative subject. As, for example, in meditative states, for which the statements “I feel this or that,” or “I think about this,” are inappropriate, but “Something feels” or “It is thought of something” are more suitable) or a representable object (for example, in ecstatic states, which are characterized by the merging of the subject and the object into the one conscious whole).

However, consciousness without a personal Self, i.e. without an ontological center, from which it comes and only through which it can exist as an intentional focus on a certain space of the representable material, loses its ontological and phenomenal unity. Using the terminology of Gestalt psychology, it is meaningless to speak about the dynamics of the figure and background without the observing subject, which in this case serves as a necessary reference system for the accounting of one or another gestalt in the distribution of psychical elements.

Following S. Priest, we can still doubt in the existence of the subjective own Self, noting that “there is no need for the mental Self as a subjective center of consciousness, besides the totality of experience, just as there is no such thing as a hole in the soil, besides its sides and bottom” [7, p. 205]. However, the hole does not exist as long as it is not perceived as a gestalt that is built from the sides and the bottom. Continuing this logic, let us note that, generally speaking, sides and bottom do not exist, equally as the hole, which also manifest themselves only in perception as a result of the formation of corresponding gestalts. W. Heisenberg in his book “Physics and Philosophy” wrote: “The modern development of physics has turned from the philosophy of Democritus to the philosophy of Plato. In fact, precisely in accordance with Plato’s beliefs, if we separate matter further and further, we will ultimately reach not the smallest particles, but mathematical objects, determined by symmetry, to the Platonic bodies and their underlying triangles. Particles in modern physics are mathematical abstractions of fundamental symmetries.” [8, p. 103]. Therefore, we can say that, for example, the tree does not exist, but there is only a complex of interacting cells in a certain way. But there are no cells as such, and there is only a complex of interacting molecules in a certain way, which also does not exist in their holistic entity, and there is only a set of interacting subatomic particles in a certain way [9]. As a result, we will move further and further into the depths of the material world, and each time the next gestalt will crumble into a set of constituent elements.

When we finally reach a certain fundamental basis, we find that it is a mathematical abstraction, since there is any attempt to give it a substantive character there will immediately arise the question of its internal structure, and, therefore, about the complex of its constituent elements [10].

The Self-determination of the conscious subject has an existential character, because in the process of conscious self-determination, there are forms of representation, which are identified with the forms of being of the conscious subject. The actualization of representative constructions as ontological forms can have two opposite poles, one of which implies the accepting of a representative construction in an unchanged form. The other pole rigidly embeds in the mental experience of the subject, it is subordinating already existing structures, or escalating the conflict, and the other, on the contrary, comes down only to changes in the representative construction, when it flexibly and harmoniously integrates into the subject’s mental experience, thus forming a consistent whole with already existing structures. In the first case, it is all about the introjection of representative forms, and the second is about their assimilation [11]. There is an accommodation between introjection and assimilation, which consists of the modification of the old experience under the influence of the new and which reconciles the two opposite poles of the identification of the forms of being and the forms of self-knowledge [12]. In the process of introjection of representative forms, accommodation reaches its maximum, when introjected, without being modified, begins to influence on the entire mental experience. For example, the introjection of one belief consists in that if some person is loved, then he is in safe, and if he is not loved, he is in danger. Or the belief that if he is loved, he exists, and if he is not loved, then he does not exist, leads to the situation in which a person begins to look for love in absolutely any situation and wants to be liked by absolutely all people, even by those who are unpleasant to him. The accommodation reaches its minimum; on the contrary, in the process of assimilation of representative forms, when these forms are to be modified, they lose their original essence and are completely reduced to the already known experience [13]. For example, such ultimate assimilation of mythology by means of a scientific worldview leads to the devaluation of the existential constituent of myth and its reduction to simple fables, fairy tales, legends and parables that are not related to a being and are cut off from reality by the symbolic forms of knowledge. The ultimate assimilation of one culture by means of another, provides the destruction of the essence of the first, the loss of its unique representative structures which ensure the identity of being and thinking, which happens, for example, in a dialogue of different religious worldviews, each of which claims to be absolute and indestructible knowledge about the world [14]. The accommodation reconciles two representative extremes, on the one hand, saving the old experience, and, on the other hand, introducing a new one, and as a result, new knowledge is not reduced to the old, and the old is not depreciated and is not completely replaced by the new one. Therefore, accommodation provides a productive dialogue between different ideological views, which are based on incompatible basic principles [15].

The semantic content of cultures and worldviews, that provides interpersonal communication, being collective in its nature, does not have an individual centeredness and therefore represents a field of possible experience that is available to every conscious subject and establishes the intersubjective basis for mutual understanding between people, which belong to different socio-cultural contexts. According to the ideas of C. Jung and S. Grof, from the very beginning of a humans’ birth, he is included in the field of the collective unconscious, when his individuality has not yet formed in terms of psychology and in terms of self-consciousness. S. Grof in his book “Beyond the Brain” writes, “Certain aspects of the symbolism of dreams cannot be explained on the basis of the person’s life experience; presumably, they reflect the archaic language of the psyche” [16, p. 162].
The growth of self-consciousness begins in the opposition of individuality against collective attitudes, i.e. in opposition to the individual and society. On this occasion, C. Jung, in his work “The Psychology of the Unconscious”, said: “If, due to the assimilation of the unconscious, we mistakenly include the collective psyche in the register of personal mental functions, then the personality dissolves in its opposite” [17, p. 82]. According to C. Jung, the process of disassociation with the content of the collective psyche is a necessary stage of assimilation, since what is alien for human and what he makes an integral part of its individuality, inscribing the assimilated material into the integrity of his personal experience. This is confirmed by the following words of C. Jung, “The strict delimitation from the collective psyche is an absolute requirement for development of a person, since any insufficient delimitation causes an immediate spreading of the individual inside the collective” [17, p. 84].

The symbolic attitudes of the collective unconscious possess the qualities of the general significance, the universality, since a person who is under the influence of the collective sphere of being believes that his opinion, views, attitudes and principles are of universal value and should be shared by each health-minded individual. Identifying with the collective psyche, according to C. Jung, “A person will continuously try to impose on others the claims of his unconscious, because the identifying with the collective psyche carries with it a sense of universal significance (“the God-likeness”), which simply does not want to pay any attention to an alien, personal psyche of the neighbor” [17, p. 127]. Such person is unshakably confident that he possesses “great knowledge”, which is an unconditional benefit for the whole humanity or for the family in particular, which is especially well seen by the example of representatives of certain religious denominations who are absolutely convinced of the truth of their worldview in comparison with other religious groups. However, the foundations of such knowledge, being borrowed in an unchanged and stereotyped form from the sphere of the collective psyche, accommodate the representation of the environment, subordinate its basic meanings and remain authoritatively believed without appropriate assimilation and creative, individual processing.

Submission to the symbol destroys the individuality of a person and limits his being to certain symbolic frames, and about that, in particular, V. Bibikhin writes, “Trying to live a dogma (for example, Jesus prayer) is a feat, that turns a person into a dogma symbol” [18, p. 347].

On the contrary, the assimilation of the symbolic content of myths leads to the creative affirmation of the true being of man. On the other hand, it contributes to the formation of the existential foundation of human life, its ultimate basis, through which man justifies his existence in the world and gives its life a deep meaning. Assimilation allows the cognitive subject to retain its individuality and not to dissolve in the collective, overcome the “matrix of the archaic mentality that rejects the individual and retains only the exemplary” [19, p. 71]. Since self-identification is individual's knowledge of himself, his place in the world, when the forms of the being of this individual coincide with the forms of his self-knowledge, then, following the logic, it is necessary to accept that the meaning of human life is fully revealed only in the symbolic space of the myth. Only a myth is able to implant a certain conviction, a certain attitude, an idea or a certain faith in the existential being of man so deeply that it captures him completely and becomes the leading unshakable motive of being. It should be considered that the introjected symbol subordinates the personality to itself, causes it to blindly manifest the attitudes and values contained in it, whereas the assimilated symbol, on the contrary, becomes itself a means of expressing attitudes and values of the self-conscious personality.

R. Barthes notes that if a language broadcasts knowledge, transmits information from one subject to another, then the myth ingrains some idea of the world around us and of the knowing subject itself. According to R. Barthes, the myth steals the language, and therefore a very important point in the self-identification of the individual is that the myth is adjusted to the values and needs of a person, or, conversely, the values and needs of a person are adjusted to certain mythological attitudes. R. Barthes points out that the myth must be created artificially like a myth, and then, on the one hand, it will not lead to mental inflation, but, on the other hand, will form the basis of the ontopsychological integrity of the personality. R. Barthes in his work “The Myth Today” writes, “It is extremely difficult to overcome the myth from within, because even the very desire to get rid of it immediately becomes in turn his victim; in the end, myth always means nothing but the resistance to it. In truth, the best weapon against the myth, perhaps, is the mythologization of itself, the creation of an artificial myth, and this secondary myth will represent the most real mythology. If a myth steals a language, why not kidnap a myth. To do this, it is enough to make it the starting point of the third semiological system, to transform its value into the first element of the secondary myth” [20, p. 103]. According to R. Barthes, non-mythological knowledge arises in creativity, when the form of the being of a constructed object initially coincides with the form of its representation. And this means that if one takes into account the fact that creation is symbolic, so in that a myth overcomes itself, allowing the person to be free to a self-determination, and not to obey some archetypical patterns. R. Barthes writes about this, “So, there is at least one type of non-mythical speech, this is the speech of a human producer. Wherever a person speaks in order to transform reality, and not to preserve it in the form of an image, wherever his speech is related to the production of things, the metalinguage coincides with the language-object, and the origin of myth becomes impossible. That is why a truly revolutionary language cannot be mythical” [20, p. 116].

The assimilation of a symbol or myth implies a certain mental work, in the process of which they are analyzed, took apart into its component parts, interpreted by other symbols and on the basis of other myths, and then reassembled into a single whole. This, on the one hand, is the same symbol or the same myth, but, on the other hand, already a somehow modified symbol and a somehow modified myth. Without transformation, there is no assimilation, and both the assimilated symbol or myth itself and some part of the surrounding reality under the influence of the representing symbol or myth. Thus, the assimilation of a symbol or myth, on the one hand, inserts a symbol or myth into the integrity of the
subject’s self-consciousness, and, on the other hand, brings into
the subject’s self-determination some new semantic content
corresponding to the associative fields of the given symbol or
this myth. Therefore, the assimilation of a symbol or myth is
carried out through three serial psychological mechanisms: 1) de
structuring, 2) transformation, and 3) incorporation. Through
destructuring one can observe the decomposition of a symbolic
construction or mythological representation into “elementary”
meanings, feelings and images, which can be interpreted in an
already formed ideological model of the cognizing subject.
Transformation is a process following destructuring, when from
the “elementary” meanings, feelings and images it is
reassembled into a single whole as a symbolic construction or
mythological representation in their transformed form suitable
for further assimilation. And finally, due to the incorporation,
the modified symbolic construction or the modified
mythological representation is embedded into the
ontopsychological integrity of the person as an inherent
harmoniously functioning structure of existence.

It is possible to speak about the true freedom of a conscious
subject only when his behavior at some point is neither
physically deterministic (i.e. predictable as a result of necessary
physical processes), nor physically indeterministic (i.e.
unpredictable as a result of random physical processes). But it
turns out to be self-deterministic (i.e. existing as a result of its
internal mental activity, which indicates that it acts as the cause
of its own actions), otherwise, freedom becomes fiction or, at
the best, a way of describing deterministic or indeterministic
human behavior. For example, we can say that personal
behavior is free if only motivating beliefs and values, that have
ontological basis, are not introjected, but assimilated, i.e. they
are not imposed from the outside, but embedded in the mental
integrity of a self-conscious personality. However, if we ask
ourselves about the mechanisms of assimilation, which allow a
person to have not introjected, but assimilated feelings, desires
and thoughts. As opposed to pseudo-feelings, pseudo-wishes
and pseudo-thoughts, these are not due to the conscious activity
of the subject, but imposed from outside by stereotypes. We
conclude that they must act from the immanent sphere of
consciousness, otherwise (i.e. in case of their unconscious
nature), the functional boundary between assimilated and
introjected motivation evanesced.

The immanent sphere of consciousness is determined by the
activity of the personal Self, which in the process of self-
consciousness provides the existential unity of a human mental
life. Therefore, the question of a human freedom ultimately
comes down to the question of the being of a personal Self, as
the source and generator of one’s own actions. And here, first
of all, it should be noted that with regard to the essence and
existence of the personal Self, there are four main points: 1)
mythological, 2) naturalistic, 3) psychoanalytic, and 4)
existential.

According to the mythological point of view, a personal Self
as a real element of the psyche does not exist. It is a myth in
which we believe, and a concept that we use to represent our
own behavior, but in reality nothing corresponds to it,
regardless of the level of human being (physical, biological,
psychological or social). Therefore, the mythological
interpretation of a personal Self means that we do not recognize
the existence of an existential source of conscious actions, and
at the same time we deny the existence of free will.

According to the naturalistic point of view, a personal Self
comes down to some characteristics of the physical world, for
example:

- to the emergent properties of neural processes occurring
  in the brain (which corresponds to the concept of
  emergentism);
- functional interrelationships between the neuronal
  structures of the brain (which corresponds to the concept
  of functionalism);
- the behavior of the biological organism as a whole
  (which corresponds to the concept of behaviorism).

However, in all these variants, just as in the case of the
mythological interpretation of a personal Self, there is no place
for free will, because the activity of consciousness is totally
reduced to the activity of physical structures, that are not
controlled by consciousness.

According to the psychoanalytic point of view, a personal Self,
unlike the naturalistic view, takes root not in physical
processes, but in processes of a psychological nature,
proceeding at the unconscious level of the psyche. In other
words, all actions caused by the activity of a personal Self are
causally dependent on experience that is not controlled by
consciousness, since everything that is manifested on the
mental level of being, in origin exists in the form of unconscious
experiences. According to the fact that the process of awareness
has an unconscious basis, it can be argued that:

1) the mental does not have independent activity, which is
   physical in nature and causally reduced to neural activity of the
   brain;

2) the mental has independent activity that is unconscious
   and having a phenomenal content, causally is not reduced to the
   neural activity of the brain.

In the first case, we come to the eliminativist understanding of
the phenomenon of freedom, i.e. to its elimination as a self-
determining factor of a person’s mental life. In the second case,
we also lose the phenomenon of freedom because we claim that
consciousness itself does not control anything and does not
participate in making conscious decisions. Consequently, all
our mental experiences are determined by the unconscious
psyche, and at the conscious level of the being we only trace
post factum events that already have occurred at the level of the
unconscious psyche without the direct participation of the
mental subject. Therefore, free will turns out to be an illusion,
and we make a mistake when we take the decisions generated
at the unconscious level of mental being as a conscious choice.

According to the existential point of view, a personal Self
possesses its own ontological activity, which is not completely
reduced either to physical processes, occurring in the human
brain, or to mental processes which have an unconscious nature.
Thus, self-determination is inherent to consciousness, which is
a necessary condition for freedom of human being. But then
there arises a question related to how the free (self-determined)
being of the mental subject becomes possible in frames of the
causally closed physical world. The answer to it, without loss of materialistic positions, is given by the theory of quantum-information correlation, according to which in the process of evolutionary complication of physical structures, the corresponding structures of informational order also evolve. Awareness that incarnates unconscious experiences on the mental level of being is determined by the amount of information accumulated in interaction with other mental subjects, just as the implementation of the classical state of the physical system depends on the amount of information accumulated in interaction with other physical systems. Therefore, the sense of responsibility associated with freedom, takes roots in the social being of a person, which determines the degree of awareness of his mental life. At the same time, the correlative correspondence between physical and mental events is ambiguous, as a result of which the same mental event can be accompanied by different physical processes, and many states of the unconscious can exist over the same physical processes. As a result, we conclude that the same conscious event can be experienced by different conscious subjects or the same conscious subject at different times, which, in particular, provides the possibility of intersubjective experience. On the other hand, the identity of the physical state of the brain in different conscious subjects still does not necessarily points at the identity of mental experiences that outgoes from the superposition of unconscious states, which, in turn, ensures the uniqueness of the subjective ontology and self-consciousness non-duplicability of a personal Self.

III. Conclusion

The whole world, as it seems to us, exists only in our minds, as I. Kant says that we cannot imagine a world that no one imagines. However, our ideas about the world around us has an ontological basis, which is the objective being of the world itself. Therefore, our self-consciousness in the form of the subjective own Self also has an ontological basis, which corresponds to the transcendental unity of mental experience. Indeed, all of the experience has the unity of mental acts that reveal a particular substantive content, for otherwise the complex of mental experiences will not represent anything, and, therefore, it will not be a mental experience itself. Exacty as such unity of mental acts, the subjective own Self takes place, without which there is no representative experience. Experimental data are experienced only in the unity of the experiencing own Self. And here it can be concluded with all certainty that own Self is not a fiction, an illusion or a way of describing a complex of changing mental phenomena, but it is an integral ontological structure of the entire mental being.

References