Using H. Cohen's Approach to Actualize E. Husserl's Ideas

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Abstract—In the course of research concerning the phenomenology approach, the authors have found out that many of E. Husserl's ideas lost their significance even in the phenomenology framework due to the transition to post-phenomenology. When previously it happened to the ideas of I. Kant, H. Cohen managed to update them for the contemporary philosophy and influence the development of modern philosophy. Based on the H. Cohen's approach, the authors attempted to actualize E. Husserl's ideas and achieved approbated results applying phenomenology to the philosophy of consciousness, education, ethics and linguistic philosophy.

Keywords—actualization of ideas; intentionality; phenomenological reduction; transcendental intersubjectivity

I. INTRODUCTION

Analyzing the phenomenology approach to the philosophy of education and ethics, we faced the problem of diverse interpretation of E. Husserl's ideas and their rejection even inside the phenomenology movement. On the one hand, it is caused by the complicated texts by Husserl with their mutually exclusive content lines, lack of integral research in different fields (epistemology, consciousness, ideal beings, and surrounding world) and his polysemic terms. On the other hand, Husserl wrote in the context of the main philosophy trends of the second part of 19th century – i.e. the philosophy of consciousness, positivism and empiricism, problems of mathematical foundations, metaphysical idealism, etc. Modern challenges are different - globalization, new industrial revolution, relativity of values, identity problems, cross-cultural dialogue, cross-disciplinary research, virtualization of communication, human outsourcing (shifting of human functions to technics and tools). In this regard it is interesting to consider the approach of H. Cohen who saw the opportunity of actualizing the severely criticized and rejected ideas of E. Kant. Now there is a necessity of updating the ideas of Edmund Husserl (i.e. intentionality, transcendental intersubjectivity, phenomenological reduction). Their correlation seems to be relevant for practical application of Husserl's ideas in solving some modern philosophy problems.

II. THING AND SCIENCE

Cohen's main task in interpreting Kant and his pan-methodism involves philosophic insight into human existence using the limitation of reason [1]. Husserl also interprets the crisis of humanity and science as a gap between the rational construct of European culture and science on the one side and the lifeworld on the other side [2]. In due course of time, the term "thing-in-itself" transformed into an out-of-date, metaphysical detail of Kant's doctrine. Cohen disclosed the above term as the unlimited task of understanding, ideal of fullness, correlate of knowledge based on Kant's correlation between the objective function and ideas of reason. Therefore "things-in-themselves" are methodological guarantors of limitation of mathematical natural sciences; they demonstrate the capability of completely different sciences which enter the moral and ethical sphere through the objective concept. Husserl in his phenomenology project of rigorous science calls us back to the "things-themselves": "We have to ask the things and go back to the experience and contemplation which give the meaning and sensible right to our words". [3] Now the "things" of Husserl are in the same situation — they are made equal to the items of daily sense experience, contemplation is confined to perception or visual sense, and phenomenological reduction is regarded as just a construct (J.-P. Sartre, A. Shutz, J. Ortega y Gasset, M. Merleau-Ponty). The claim for the new science rigorousness can be justified by the influence of Modernism striving for totalitarianism.

The experience of Hermann Cohen becomes quite relevant for retaining Husserl's ideas. His "things" are intentional objects belonging to "pure conscience" - the region of direct knowledge, while contemplation is a grasping of senses in the phenomenological attitude. In the same way as it is presented by Cohen, clarification and
actualization of contemplation output have both unlimited and limiting nature. The perceived "things-senses" are invariable for linguistic interpretation; they exist beyond cultures in the lifeworld of conscience experience. Husserl distinguishes them for the first time in paragraph 8 of his "Logical Investigations" through his inner dialogue, where the senses are important, not the words. This distinction is relevant for the discourse analysis, its institutionalization, finding the boundaries and overcoming them not only in the humanities sphere but in the natural sciences as well.

Intentional genesis of meaning made the researches of artificial intellect use the neural model (H. Dreyfus) which still has more development prospects in the given sphere. In the ethical realm, there is a problem of aggressive conscience caused by the intermixture of conceptual experience level and primary experience of differentiation [4], which leads to the ambition for turning the other person's self-contained experience into a non-self-maintained one, desire to enforce his own conscience onto the other person and deform his experiences by conceptual thinking.

III. INTENTIONALITY

Critique of Husserl's intentionality correlates with Kant's division of the sensual and ideal. Cogen actualizes Kant's idea of the involvement of sensible experience in the ideal sphere: "Only along with this partial admission of sensibility, the idealism can become fruitful for the ethical issue and especially for understanding the concept of science" [5]. Thereafter comes the acceptance of the material, and the cognition is no longer autocratic. Forms of sensibility do not act without a link with the categories of mind. In Husserle's phenomenology the intentional region penetrates all the other regions of conscience. However, inspite of the interpretations of neo-husserlianism and social constructivism, the world is not created by conscience. The world exists and fills the contents of conscience structures, which manifest itself in institutionalization of lifeworld. The conscience experience also has typological differences corresponding to the lifeworld experience structures. For example noesis, as an active meaning synthesis, can be given as a recollection, clear perception, dream, reflection, and fantasy. Noema, as a passive meaning synthesis, can be given as an object or another transcendental subject. Different types of embodiment, kinesthesia, and psycho-physiological aspects can be also correlated with the experience structure of the lifeworld. The intentional analysis overcomes the subject-object division and it is directed to the region of credible knowledge hidden in spontaneous conscience experience: in the lifeworld as objectification of transcendental subjectivity and transcendental subjectivity as subjectivation of the lifeworld. The given insight is vitally important in the context of non-division of theoretical and empirical aspects of scientific experiment.

IV. PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION

Cohen's idea solving the problem of Kant's psychologism is relevant for actualization of phenomenological reduction and transcendental subject. Cohen considers the unity of conscience to be purely transcendental: "Self-consciousness is a common transcendental condition, and according to it we perform our pure intellectual activity in contemplation variety. Therefore self-consciousness is released from individuality and designated as the "common self-consciousness"[6]. Husserl's transcendental ego is also free from psychologism and other mediated identifications due to the procedure of phenomenological reduction. It exists before "any scientific — physiological, psychological, sociological, or any other verification" [7]. Phenomenological reduction allows to reflexively looking at our experience "in order to see the difference between a quasi-reality of transcendental object and absolute reality of a phenomenon itself" [8]. By means of the given procedure, Husserl denotes the main distinction between his approach and other interpretations of conscience, which involves the differentiation of immanent (reliable) and transcendental (problematic) regions of conscience. The above difference is significant in analyzing a challenging conscience problem — differentiation of mind and consciousness [9]. Also, while overcoming the subjectivity by means of "radical subjectivity" — i.e. radical phenomenological reduction, the region of universal intentional meanings is revealed. The given difference is a key to analyzing the problems of comprehension, translation, cross-cultural dialogue and interdisciplinarity. However, there are phenomenology divisions which deny phenomenological assumptions and transcendental ego (realistic, sociological, existential trends). D. Zahavi considers similar trends in phenomenology as a problem of regional phenomenologies neglecting the principles of transcendentalism [10].

V. INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Transcendental subjectivity becomes a foothold for Husserl's intersubjectivity. It is widely assumed that Husserl turns to transcendental intersubjectivity to overcome the phenomenological solipsism. However, as we demonstrated in paragraph 3, the problem in question is a misconception. Based on the analysis of Introduction to the "Cartesian meditations" and the first paragraphs of this main work devoted to the theme of intersubjectivity, we can come to a conclusion that Husserl's inner interest involves describing the credible knowledge acquisition as a foundation for the rigorous science. The transcendental intersubjectivity concept holds that a phenomenologist engaged in phenomenological reduction can observe in his lifeworld that another body is given to him as animated, similar to his own one, i.e. containing another transcendental subject with his own lifeworld in which I am given to him in the same way. Therefore, intersubjectivity is transcendental, inherent to the conscience experience structures. The given approach to intersubjectivity was both widely spread and criticized. As a result of this criticism the phenomenonology movement rejected transcendental intersubjectivity. Though, it is a target concept for transcendental phenomenology and Husserl's idea needs to be actualized. It can be done by using the approach of H. Cohen, who actualized as existential Kant's substantial characteristic of subject using the ideas of ethics and dialogism [11].
A. Schutz declares as pointless using the second full phenomenological reduction, which in his opinion leads to a solipsistic position [12]. He suggests addressing at once the immediate daily experience in which we already perceive other people. Nevertheless, Husserl's heritage helps us to see that using the radical phenomenological reduction is vital for disclosing the universal conditions of experience opportunities given in direct conscience experience. Therefore it creates a fundamental platform for understanding other, which is essential in the era of globalization and post-modernism [13]. Husserl writes in his analysis of psychological approach to intersubjectivity: "The methodism was violated, it was wrong to immediately jump into transcendental intersubjectivity overlooking the original I (Ur-Ich), ego of my epohe, that is always unique and uninflected" [14]. Daily experience is not immediate since it is loaded with common cultural typifications.

On the other hand M. Scheler questions using the reduction for substantiation of intersubjectivity. He mentions the priority of perception of other compared to self-perception [15]. As a proof he gives a psychological description of the childhood. A child does no know himself but knows his mother's warmth, her face, smell, voice, etc. The answer to this criticism was given by Husserl himself: "There is a need only to indicate that what we said about the psychological problems of origin on the lower storeys applies here as well: "for the first time, the problem of empathy has been given its true sense, and the true method for its solution has been furnished by constitutional phenomenology. Precisely on that account all previous theories (including Max Scheler's) have failed to give an actual solution" [16], here there is a substitution of transcendental subjectivity for psychological self-consciousness, self-identification.

Schutz also indicates another problem - how can another body be given to me in the same way as mine if I see my own body differently? The animal bodies also look differently. E. Fink, J. Ortega y Gasset and P. Riker also denote the problem of gender bodily differences in this regard. The arguments of M. Merleau-Ponty can be mentioned concerning a human body as a subject of vision shaping bodily interrelations and culture. As a counter argument we can mention an uncritical supposition equating the givenness of another body compared to your own can be a givenness and vision of another body as a perception act.

The givenness of another body compared to your own can be interpreted as imposing your (transcendental ego) conscience experience of the body on another ego. Husserl's analysis including the other bodily forms can be given for its support: "In the sense of a community of men and in that of a man who, even as solitary, has the sense of a community member (and this carries over to the sociality of brute animals), there is an implicit mutual being for one another... Openly endless Nature itself then becomes a Nature that includes an open plurality of men (conceived more generally as animalia) distributed one knows not how in the infinite space as subjects of possible intercommunion" [17].

Scheler and Schutz emphasize a necessity of bodily presence for initiating Husserl's intersubjectivity. This request of Husserl contradicts the transition of knowledge over generations. In his "Ideas II" he specifies this point and tells about the need for keeping the horizon of empathy through the chain of others for preserving intersubjectivity. However, the above condition is a long way from Schutz reasoning about a possibility of feeling empathy for Socrates [18]. It contains an essential detail concerning the formation of the rigorous science. The processes of clarifying the "things-senses" and institutionalizing the common intentional lifeworld of science becomes possible by understanding the transcendental intersubjectivity and acts of conscience experience correction following the last works of Husserl. It demonstrates a necessity of entering the obligation sphere for the rigorous science formation, the sphere of ethics perceived in the foundation of transcendental intersubjectivity [19].

VI. CONCLUSION

Actualization of above mentioned Husserl's ideas based on Cohen's approach is particularly important with regard to phenomenological approach to the modern philosophy of education and ethics. The methodology of creating the intentional lifeworld in a university environment demands revealing the sphere of reliable knowledge permanently depending on the sphere of obligation due to its intersubjective nature. Actualization of Husserl's idea in the framework of phenomenological approach to education can result in developing new ethical epistemological competences: 1) creating innovations and entering the interdisciplinarity by actualizing the idea of returning to "things-themselves" and overcoming the boundaries of scientific discourse; 2) achieving the fullness and integrity of perception, capability of solving the problems on the other level, finding the axis of role-based self-identification by means of phenomenological reduction; 3) developing eco-centric attitude by way of self-nonself recognition and existence in the live nature; 4) realizing the natural conformity of human conscience development as a basis for the individual educational program and labor division according to peculiarities of physical and psychological embodiment; 5) upbringing and developing social qualities by discerning the resentiment of aggressive consciousness; 6) developing the communication skills and qualities needed for organizing the social environment by disclosing the transcendental intersubjectivity and mutual correction; 7) developing cross-cultural dialogue by distinguishing the lifeworld implications; 8) disclosing the reflexion by differentiation of experience and interpretation; 9) developing national identity, patriotism by recognizing a physical embodiment in a social context; 10) fostering democratic consciousness by exposing the naive attitude preconceptions and mutual correction; 11) Building up the platform for intersubjective community lifeworld through the language ideological deconstruction and initiating the direct conscience experience; 12) developing the atmosphere of creative insight and spirituality by discerning intangible ontological aspects [20].
REFERENCES


