Abstract—The article considers the possibility of understanding dialectical thinking and dialectical contradiction through the prism of phenomenological approach. Dialectic describes the transition between the noematic and noetic levels, justifying the need for a transition to a new content. This new content will be that it will not simply link all the previous definitions, because it would lead to a grasp of the same content and an endless repetition of the same definitions and content. The new concept must contain a new level, from which the relationship of definitions and content would be viewed from different points, i.e., introduce something new that was not in the previous concept. This provides explanation of dialectical construction of the new content.

Keywords—dialectics; dialectical concept; dialectical contradiction; phenomenology; the principle of ontological uncertainty

I. INTRODUCTION

Dialectical approach is very often accused of inability or unwillingness to understand absence of the connection of judgments, especially since in many of its conclusions dialectics sharply opposes itself to formal logic, for which the latter criticizes dialectics, they say, in "dialectical logic" violated the basic rules of the of formal thinking — identity, excluded third, contradictions, which leads to the rejection of the dialectical way of thinking. This proves that the dialectical approach is not self-evident; the very understanding of dialectics is a problem.

But on the way to explain the dialectical method, we immediately face certain difficulties: dialectical philosophers belonged to different, often opposite philosophical directions (Hegel and Marx), led dialectical conclusion from completely different primary concepts, understanding under the substrate of dialectical development completely different things: spirit, matter, thinking…

There is an opportunity in the understanding of dialectical thinking to follow the path of formal logic: to abstract from the specific content of thought, to distinguish in it a certain universal formal structure, which can later be attributed to the spirit and matter, and to make it an obligatory law of thinking. This is the way many researchers of the Soviet school went (for example, Orujev [1], [2]). However, it faces great difficulties, since it postulates the fundamental difference between dialectical logic and formal - its content, which affects both its strength and weakness - on the one hand, it is able to link not only the form but also the content; but on the other — it is unstable, as formal logic, and move away from it, to organize into a formalized system, in which with the help of pre-set axioms and rules of conclusion it is possible to obtain any true statement. Trying to form a certain system, separate from the specific content, in which the truth of the statement would be justified by the attitude of the form of this statement in this system, i.e. it is formulating dialectics as a dialectical “logic”, we will create a certain meta gnoseological system, which dialectics itself does not need, because dialectic represents a combination of ontology and epistemology, justifying its method in the course of its work [3].

II. UNDERSTANDING OF DIALECTIC

On the other hand, we come to the impossibility of understanding dialectical concepts and connections from the dialectics itself, because, remaining on a certain field of research, we will not be able to abstract from filling it with a conceptual apparatus, and we will be forced to repeat forever for each specific author the categories revealed in the work of his dialectical thought, without solving the problem with which we approached the dialectics — the possibility of its understanding. On this way it is not possible even recognize dialectical problems, the solution cannot be reached outright.

Thus, the purpose of our study can be formulated as follows: not to build a formal dialectics, and not a meaningless repetition of the thoughts of dialectics, but to clarify the possible way of thinking dialectics. Assigned task – to identify ways of representation of a certain subject-determines the general basic methodology of research-transcendentalism, based on which it is possible to combine two seemingly heterogeneous methods — dialectics and phenomenology. In this case, the task is not so much to conduct a phenomenological study of dialectics, as to discover and explore in dialectics the structures specific for phenomenology, describing the division of meaning and the way of the representation of object.

III. PHENOMENOLOGY OF DIALECTIC

The first task that confronts us is starting phenomenological research — the representation of the studied object as a phenomenon of our consciousness. This requires a transcendental reduction — the elimination of all
kinds of objectifying assumptions of the object of research. In the case of the study of dialectics — this is an essential and necessary point, because, as mentioned earlier, dialectics in their works believe the development of various substrates that leads the study to a dead end; exploring dialectics itself, i.e., its object, the content of the categories in itself, we will not succeed.

First, it is necessary to distinguish the area of research from attempts to enter the objective world, limited to the area of pure thinking, but it itself will try, in accordance with the principle expressed above, to communicate with the content; and here the question arises whether the meaningless thinking is possible — of course not, if it is not a formal logic, but the thinking, the content of which is the thinking itself, is possible. Here we will be able to see clearly, making this distinction quite consistently, where there is a connection of thought with the content, and where it develops within itself.

A.F. Losev studies dialectics from the same position, he writes: aim of dialectics is to find out if there is an object, then how it is thinkable; dialectics — the semantic skeleton of things, which determines itself and does not depend on any empirical content [4]. Thus, we got rid of substances, and now we do not care about the origin of dialectical thinking — whether it repeats the objective development or comes from itself — we deal only with the very fact of such thinking.

But there are certain problems in the field of pure thinking. Each concept that arises on the way of dialectical development, at the stage of penetration into its content, will try, according to its definitions, to postulate its existence again outside of us: thus, the concept of "table" assumes the existence of a completely real, having certain functions table. Therefore, in addition to the primary epoch, we will have to avoid very carefully at every step, with each newly emerging concept, the assumption of existence in the existence of this concept in itself, to reduce it, returning from its objectivity to its subjectivity.

Thus, we found ourselves in the field of pure thinking and need to determine somehow the subject of further research, that is, to highlight in dialectical thought those essential and necessary features that will be theme of subsequently phenomenological consideration. Of course, here we do not set the task to give a strict definition of dialectics (such a definition cannot be given until we have fulfilled the plan of our work — the understanding of dialectics), but such a definition will allow us to identify the most problematic concepts essential for the clarification of dialectics, to focus on those features of dialectics that cause the most perplexity, and, accordingly, to move as far as possible in the understanding of dialectics. This definition will be: dialectic is the development of the content of the concept; where development comes from abstract to concrete concepts through the identification of their inconsistency; development includes moments of transition, purposefulness, consistency.

The concept, like any other given of our consciousness, includes two aspects: noematically-intentional, the meaning of the concept, and noetic — the way the concept is given, the way it appears in our consciousness, the definition of the concept. Therefore, by dividing these two levels, we are able to distinguish between two ways of giving the concept, which previously seemed to be one and indivisible. Thus, the concept manifests the possibility of preserving the certainty of its meaning — noem, and the possibility of changing those definitions that form integrity of the concept, but still separated from it, because they are at the noetic level. Thus, although the definition will also have its noematic correlate, but insofar as they remain definitions, i.e., the ways of representation of the concept to the subject, they will be the noetic level concepts. Thus, we are able to see how in any concept presented to our consciousness combines identity and difference: the reality of the concept, i.e. the intentional grasp of its content represents the concept as something identical [5]. However, further we begin the analysis of how this concept is revealed to us; we investigate a way of grasping its integrity, passing to analysis of its definitions. Thus, in this analysis, the definitions are separated from those defined and are examined by the rules of reason. This is the moment of difference: after such analysis definitions change, but do not lose their essence — they do not cease to be definitions. As soon as this analysis comes to a certain point, the mind tries to re-associate them with the defined, to carry out the intention to a single concept, but cannot use the old concept and he has to look for a new one. Consequently, these two concepts are in some sense identical (the unity of their definitions), and in some-different, because their intentional correlates will be different. Thus, having separated two levels in the concept-the intuitive integral datum of its content and the logical form of its certainty, relevance to the cognizing consciousness, we introduced the possibility of transition between them, and, accordingly, the possibility of transition and communication between different concepts.

IV. Conclusion

So, the transition of the concept is carried out when grasping the new content, which, in fact, makes the dialectical logic of the logic of content, i.e. linking the content of concepts. The formal logic connects the forms — those structures that are superimposed on the content of the object to represent it to the subject, in the context of the above distinction, these forms will be the definitions of the subject ("object" and "subject" are understood, of course, in a phenomenologically reduced sense). Therefore, formal logic will work when we examine the definitions of a concept, at the noetic level; dialectic describes the transition between the noematic and noetic levels, justifying the need for a transition to a new content. The peculiarity of this new content will be that it will not simply link all the previous definitions, because it would lead to a grasp of the same content and an endless repetition of the same definitions and content. In order to combine these definitions and content, the new concept must, in addition to them, contain a new level from which the relationship of definitions and content would be viewed from a different points, i.e., introduce something new that was not in the previous concept. Hence the dialectical construction of the new content is explained.
In addition, the understanding of the noemo-noetic structure of the dialectical concept makes it possible to establish a correlation with the principle of ontological uncertainty in relation to the subject of knowledge and, thereby, to clarify the possibility of thinking of the subject of evolutionary science [6].

REFERENCES