Relative Ontology and the Ground of Future Morality

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Abstract—Relative ontology issue from the principle of differentiation: to be means to differ. This brought us to such scenario of global development, which goes from somatic being through anthropological one and finally to theological one. It is striving to the theological being that is the ground of future morality. The first stage in this direction is rejection of man’s orientation towards somatic being, that is relinquishing a significant part of material consumption. The very strategy of the consumer society proves to be immoral. Conversely, man’s strife to minimal consumption will be moral. The man of the future will pursue the strategy of creativity in the field of ideas, without their realization into the economical goods designed for consumption. This is the second stage of human development towards theological being. Art is an intellectual activity that corresponds most to this direction of development.

Keywords—relative ontology; somatic entity; anthropologic entity; theological entity; human being; consumer society; moral

I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout all of human history not only the conditions of human life have been subject to change, but so have human morals. Consequently, we are entitled to expect that this process is still ongoing, which allows raising the problem of the morals of the future. The XX century has demonstrated at least three examples of drastic change in morality: the making of socialist morality in Russia, the emergence of national-socialist (Nazi) morals in Germany and the rise of morality of consumer society in the USA. Such a rapid transformation of morality thoroughly justifies the relevance of modeling the morality of the future.

II. ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL

An ontological approach to the problem in question requires that its solution stems from resolving the problem of being. Indeed, by ontology we mean considering the problem of Being and its consequences as regards the structure and global development of the world as such. In the present case we will suggest an ontological definition of crucial moral concepts such as man and society, while the outline of future morality will result as a consequence of the idea of global development.

Certainly, different ontological theories go with different definitions of man and society as well as options concerning the development of the world. We will proceed from the standpoint of relative ontology by positing the following necessary condition of being of beings: to be means to differ, therefore non-being is expressed by identity. For example the necessary condition of being of a red flower is a background of a different color. If the color of the background is the same as that of the flower, then the flower does not exist. The necessary condition of being should be understood in the sense that difference precedes a being in that the being does not exist before difference. The being appears at the very moment of differentiation. It would be wrong to understand the difference preceding the being as mutual independence of difference and being, for any difference means the being of the being.

The principle of differentiation demands that we proceed from being to co-being. Indeed, differentiation always implies a distinction between one entity and another and vice versa. Consequently, the same act of differentiation is a necessary condition of being for both the first entity and the other. E.g., the green color differs from the red in the same way as the red does from the green. Therefore, this difference is a necessary condition of being both for the green and the red.

The being of one is a necessary condition for the being of the other. Therefore, the being of one always implies the being of the other. Consequently, the being of an absolute one (oneness) is impossible.

Along with the necessary condition of co-being, relative ontology formulates a sufficient condition of being of beings: each difference is possible only in the presence of a common feature (commonness) for both related entities, by which the difference is realized between them. Such commonness is an attribute. Commonness is identity, and identity means being undifferentiated (non-distinction), therefore, this attribute is a mark of non-being. Instead of being, it is with being--nonbeing that relative ontology is concerned.

Distinction in attribute results in an idea (synonyms: definiteness (determination, information, meaning of attribute). For instance, in the previous examples with the flower “color” was an attribute, and “red” and “green” were ideas. At the level of concrete experience the problem of being is always solvable only for a concrete attribute. Thus, one and the same entity could exist (be) with respect to one concrete attribute and not exist (not be) with respect to another. For example, squares different in content but equal in color exist in respect of the attribute of content and do not exist in respect of the attribute of color. For a being (a basic being) to exist means that there exist such beings, from which it differs. The World is an assemblage of such beings.
(elements of the world). Basic beings with a different set of attributes are correlated with distinct worlds.

The principle of differentiation admits a mathematical expression for solving the problem of united being-nonbeing. As such, differentiation and identity could be expressed by the mathematical operation of subtraction, any natural number expressing united being, while zero expresses non-being.

Being: \( m_\alpha - m_\beta = \Delta m_{\alpha\beta} \neq 0 \) \hspace{1cm} (1)

Non-Being: \( m_\alpha - m_\beta = \Delta m_{\alpha\beta} = 0 \) \hspace{1cm} (2)

Where \( \alpha, \beta \) — beings, \( m \) — attribute, \( \Delta m_{\alpha\beta} \) — idea.

Since the problem of united being-nonbeing is articulated in a mathematical form, relative ontology could also be expressed mathematically.

On the basis of (1) and (2) one could deduce the notion of number and construct an entire range of natural numbers, including zero. Moreover, one could define primal operations of subtraction and addition. All this allows constructing an ontologically grounded mathematics. Present day mathematics is not so grounded. It is based on logics which itself is not ontologically grounded either. Contemporary logic is anchored only in a limited set of linguistic forms, which restrains the scope of its efficient application.

Moral theory is one of the fields where the capacities of the formal logics are particularly restrained. An apt example of this is provided by Spinoza’s failed attempts at formulating his postulates with logical rigor made in his “Ethics”. In terms of relative ontology one of his errors was admitting infinity [1]. The erroneous character of this postulate is due to the fact that infinity implies absence of bounds, which means indefiniteness which is undifferentiatedness that is nonbeing. Consequently, infinity is another mark of nonbeing. Therefore, it is as nonbeing that the idea of infinity can be legitimately used.

Logics as well as mathematics should be ontologically grounded, i.e. their foundations should result from solutions to the problem of being. Relative ontology permits to accomplish this task to the full. This means that relative ontology is capable of furnishing a theory of morality with an efficient logico-mathematical formalism.

III. THE PLACE OF MAN IN THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORLD

A solution of the problem of united (joint) being-nonbeing defines the structure of beings, for instance man and society, which brings us closer to an ontological understanding of the nature of man and society. According to (1), the basic structure of being comprises two elements, namely the attribute and the idea. The same formula permits to introduce the concept of ontological change as difference between the initial and final states of being. In this case action is a correlation of changes in two beings. Our conception of action is based on the attraction-repulsion of determinations (defining features). It can be justified by appeal to the necessity of attraction between two opposite defining features (ideas).

As for the cause of such a change, there are two substantially different options: 1) the cause is inside, within the being under change; 2) the cause is outside the changing being. In the case of interior cause the following circumstances are of importance: 1. Memory as a capacity of one being to store in its defining features (ideas) or presentants, defining features (ideas) of other beings. 2. Combining as a possibility of defining features emerging as a result of conjoining the contents of memory. 3. Thought as a capacity of correlating the results of uniting with the external world.

Combination of interior and exterior causes defines three kinds of being: somatic (from greek ούμα, a body), which we design as E; anthropological (from greek άνθρωπος, a man), which we designate as EI; theological (from greek θεός, God), named I here.

External causality (E) prevails in somatic being. Objects of natural sciences are an example of somatic being. As regards anthropological being, both internal (I) and external (E) forms of causality take place there. Man and society are so many examples of anthropological being. Internal causality is prevalent in theological being. No doubt, these three kinds of beings mean nothing but a qualitative transition in the continuous global development, where there exist objects with different degrees of efficacy of internal and external causes. In fact the definition of anthropological being defines by the same token its difference both from somatic being and theological one and thereby constitutes a crucial aspect of the ontological definition of man and society.

The order of emergence of the three ontological kinds of being coincides with the global development. It is the global development that determines the trajectory of evolution for man and society in the future. Theoretically (in terms of combinatorics) there are 6 possible options of global development.

1. Somatic (E) \( \triangleright \) Anthropological (EI) \( \triangleright \) Theological (I)
2. Theological (I) \( \triangleright \) Somatic (E) \( \triangleright \) Anthropological (EI)
3. Somatic (E) \( \triangleright \) Theological (I) \( \triangleright \) Anthropological (EI)
4. Theological (I) \( \triangleright \) Anthropological (EI) \( \triangleright \) Somatic (E)
5. Anthropological (EI) \( \triangleright \) Somatic (E) \( \triangleright \) Theological (I)
6. Anthropological (EI) \( \triangleright \) Theological (I) \( \triangleright \) Somatic (E)

Divine creation of the world is an instance of the second kind of development, according to the Bible.

Let us consider the first option of development. Somatic being is the first to emerge, external causality playing a crucial role in its functioning. Increasing significance of internal causality in somatic being gradually leads to the emergence of anthropological being; in which both external and internal causality occur. In turn, increasing significance of internal causality in anthropological being gradually leads
to the emergence of theological being, in whose functioning internal causality plays an essential role.

The first transition of the first option is the one that corresponds most to the scientific worldview:

- Somatic (E) \(\Rightarrow\) Anthropological (EI) …

Indeed, in modern science all the world objects are divided into the following kinds: physical objects, chemical objects, biological objects, society and man. According to relative ontology, physical objects correspond to the somatic being. Chemical and biological objects are situated between somatic being and anthropological one. Society and man correspond to anthropological being. Within the interval from somatic to anthropological being relative ontology is quite consonant with modern science.

Difference of relative ontology from scientific worldview is related to the transition from the anthropological to the theological beings.

- Anthropological (EI) \(\Rightarrow\) Theological (I)

As a matter of fact modern science rejects the existence of objects between anthropological and theological beings. In particular, man is considered to be the only creature to have a mind which, in its turn, can be reduced to physical laws. David Gross, Nobel winner in physics in 2004, says that atomic physics and chemistry, biochemistry and biology based on it, as well as life and mind are explained by quantum mechanics, theory of electricity and magnetism. This is an example of an incredibly powerful theory which in principle, although possibly not in practice, does not contain arbitral premises and free parameters except for one, namely the force of electric interaction. All the rest, according to him, can be computed [2]. It can be supposed that moral laws can be as easily reduced to physics by David J. Gross.

If we take the principle of verification as a basis, which is what David J. Gross states in the end of his interview, then we are not entitled to state as D. J. Gross does that mind can be in principle explained by quantum mechanics, electricity and magnetism, since such statements themselves do not meet the criterion of verification.

They are as justified as Plato’s Thimaeus’ attempts to explain in principle the states of human soul based on the conception of four regular polyhedrons. We have mentioned D. J. Gross’ standpoint because we think that his statements express the very essence of contemporary scientific worldview. Unfortunately, physicists have not learnt the lesson of their own history.

Moreover, some scientists come to understand the actually non-scientific character of such a “scientific” attitude. E.g. in 1943 the term out-of-body experiences (OBE) [3. P. 149] was introduced into scientific use. However, it should be noted that extensive studies in this field did not start until 1968 [4]. At present the number of scientific articles on this theme approaches to 150, which is a sign of high interest in this topic. Almost in all of these articles out-of-body experiences (OBE) are considered to be an illusion – suffice it to quote the title of one of such papers [5]. Yet, if this experience was illusory, there hardly would be a need to stress this fact in so many papers. One gets the impression that researchers are afraid to acknowledge that out-of-body experiences (OBE) are not an illusion. This is why they go at lengths in order to prove to themselves the illusory character of OBE. However, some of them come to understand that this is not true. Pim van Lommel [6] is one of those who advanced most in this direction. Certainly, such a standpoint is put to severe criticism; but could it be otherwise? However, criticism is often ill-posed. As a matter of fact, the arguments of proponents of the non-illusory character of OBE are based on the information approach to analyzing the phenomena of consciousness. The main difficulty in applying this approach consists in the meaning of information remaining not formalized, which does not permit to quantitatively assess the correlation of meanings of two pieces of information. Amazing as it is, this very issue was resolved within relative ontology [7]. This solution is immediately connected with the mathematical representation of the problem of united being-nonbeing. The principle of being as differentiation (1) concerns any determination. Information is nothing but determination (definiteness), while (1) is a definition of information in terms of its meaning. Contemporary sciences of information only deal with information from the viewpoint of its symbol, whereas (1) permits to formalize any meaning of information and ultimately to express this meaning numerically. This will make possible for a computer to grasp the meaning of information. For example, this will make possible the procedure of ordering meanings of information and to proceed from search for information to mathematically calculating information that is comparing its meanings by quantity.

We think that contemporary science has no reason to deny beings situated between anthropologic and theological entities. Relative ontology justifies the necessity of scientific theology. Note: precisely scientific ontology, implying studying its object of research by means of scientific methods, based on verification and quantitative analysis.

IV. MORAL OF THE FUTURE

Global development defines the prospect of development for every kind of beings: 1 anthropological being is a prospect of development for somatic being, 2 theological being is a prospect of development for anthropological being. Accordingly, the prospect of human development is the aspiration of man to become similar to some degree to the theological being. In order to evaluate this prospect one should define the place occupied by man on the world scale of development.

Man emerges as a result of development of a biological species; therefore on this stage man conducts an activity which is aimed at providing the conditions of existence of man’s biological body. Further human development is related with the improvement of thought (interior causality). However, in virtue of biological nature man applies the capacities of his thought first of all to providing the conditions of his biological body.
Science, politics (in particular religion in so far as it is tied to politics) and even art are aimed first and foremost at human corporeality. This is the stage of contemporary man who is oriented in his activity to somatic, and not to theological being as his prospect. Yet man has already crossed the line of sufficient material provision of bodily needs. In pursuing his previous strategy man came to consume above measure. By the same token contemporary man contradicts with the teleological perspective of his development.

Relative ontology demonstrates that human future lies in man’s orientation towards theological being. This strategy is at the basis of future morality. The first stage in this direction is rejection of man’s orientation towards somatic being, that is relinquishing a significant part (95% — these and subsequent qualitative evaluations are provisional; rather than resulting from exact mathematical calculation they are metaphors. However, we do think that such a calculation is possible and its results won’t differ substantially from the values adduced in the present paper) of material consumption. The very strategy of the consumer society proves to be immoral. Conversely, man’s strive to minimal consumption will be moral. The man of the future will pursue the strategy of creativity in the field of ideas, without their realization into the economical goods designed for consumption. This is the second stage of human development towards theological being.

Art is an intellectual activity that corresponds most to this direction of development. The essential difference between the art of future and present art would consist in rejecting the secondary character of the work of art and in admitting its primary character. Here a work of art being secondary means that its value and essence are based on its reflecting something; therefore the “something” in question is primary and the work of art is its secondary image and reflection. Insofar as future art is primary works of art are not so much reflections of something else as values in themselves, on a par with numerous things of our ordinary life. For example we build a house not in virtue of its being a reflection of something, but for the simple reason that we need it as a dwelling. This is why a work of future art would have an intrinsic value, not tied to its mirroring anything. Whereas everyday life is now connected with our corporeality (somatic being), future everyday life would be related to our thought (theological being), where creating art will constitute the essence of our life.

Global development shows that it is only an insignificant part of elements of a previous stage that is transformed into elements of a subsequent stage of the development of the world. Thus, only an insignificant part of elementary particles assembled into chemical elements, thereby initiating the chemical basis of the world. Further on only an insignificant part of chemical elements were transformed into biological organisms, constituting the biological stage of world development. Afterwards only some of biological elements came to constitute man and society, establishing the anthropological stage of the world. Likewise, probably, only an insignificant segment of society will develop into something substantially different, which would constitute one of theological stages of world development. Supposedly, the prospect of minimal material consumption is not attractive for everybody. However one should respect the choice of people dissatisfied with the present level of consumption. This is why the new morality will be fit for a relatively small number of people (the future man). Perhaps, one should use a special term, for example “livoli”.

If so, then future man would partake of two sets of moral rules:

- Moral norms regulating the relation between present man and future man (external morality).
- Moral norms guiding relation between future men (internal morality).

The requirement of external morality is due to the necessity for future man to satisfy their bodily needs. For this purpose future man would interact with the man of the present. On the one hand, given the rate of modern technical and social progress, future man’s activity aimed at providing the necessary conditions for his bodily needs at the minimum will hardly exceed 5 % of his overall activity. On the other hand, the results of the rest of future man’s activity (95 %) will most probably be useless for the man of the present, since they will not be involved in relations of economical exchange. This will make future man inconspicuous for the man of the present.

In much the same way as animals perceive humans as another animal kind, not experiencing any qualitative difference between them, the present man considers future man as an equal, not seeing any qualitative difference.

Future man’s strategy of an invisible being is also due to the fact that much as primitive man is interested in preserving the environment, future man would be interested in maintaining the present level of technological and social progress of modernity. Therefore future man would not strive to change modern world. These considerations form the basis of his external morality. As for internal morality, any speculations to this effect are problematic from the standpoint of present man.

V. CONCLUSION

To conclude, we started our meditation from the issue of united being-nonbeing as tackled by relative ontology: to be means to differ. This brought us to the two-element structure of being composed of attribute and idea. The principle of differentiation made it possible to define the principal options of global development, the two crucial factors being internal and external causes. Based on contemporary research data we justified the option of global development which goes from somatic being through anthropological one and finally to theological one. It is striving to the theological being that is the ground of future morality. A community of people of the future might already somehow exist, and may well be open to new members. The choice is always up to us: either to remain in one’s own present condition or to make a step forward and to get closer to the theological being.
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