Happiness as a Material Substance and the Role of Institutions in Forming it

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Abstract—This article shows a study on economic foundations of happiness, creation of a family, marriage market. Also we investigate the "partnership effect" and conditions of the future specialization of family members and the emergence of happiness on this basis. The approaches to its measurement are defined. Distinction of household and family is given and the influence of institutions to the category of happiness is considered.

Keywords—Happiness, Marriage market, Nuclear family, Institutions.

I. HAPPINESS AND ADDITIONAL PRODUCT IN THE INSTITUTION OF FAMILY

It is known that in the process of interaction of people in the production process, the effect of comparative advantages constantly appears. This is due to significant differences in the abilities of people, caused by both natural and acquired properties. The presence of such competitive advantages, which require specialization and cooperation between economic agents, becomes this partner. Partnership can be voluntary or forced. A scientific analysis of the economic aspects of the family as an institution should be conducted in the direction of researching the benefits that marriages and family life bring to partners. The authors proceed from the nuclear family, which is a married couple with children who are not married. Other variants of families, including extended ones, also two or more generations, are considered by the authors only as households, and not as families. Only by finding out the economic fundamentals and the essence of nuclear family, we can draw some conclusions referring to other forms of family. So the analysis of this "elementary cell" of family institution is the starting point of all our further reasoning. For clarity, consider the following example. Suppose that work is to be done in the garden. It is necessary, first, to plant a tree, and, secondly, to water this tree. Husband (H) spends on planting one tree for 4 minutes, and for irrigation - 1 minute. Wife (W), respectively, spends 6 and 4 minutes. Working separately, in one hour they can process only 18 trees - H: 60 min: (4min + 1 min) = 12 trees and W: 60 min: (6min + 4min) = 6 trees. If, using its comparative advantage, W will specialize in digging, and H - in irrigation, then we will get another result - 20 trees. For 1 hour digging (60 min: 6 min) 10 trees. To water them, H will need (10 trees x 1 min) 10 minutes. For the remaining 50 minutes he can plant and water another 10 trees (50 min: (4min + 1 min). As you can see, the cooperation gives 2 more trees. A significant increase of 11% will not be left without partners' attention, making their joint activities mutually beneficial. Such additional product always arises when at least two partners cooperate. Despite the slowness of one of the partners, cooperation with him brings an additional product. Very often it is not possible to feel or measure it, but attentive economic agents can not fail to notice this effect. Here arises one problem. It is difficult to define clearly because of whom this additional result turned out. It is clear that this requires trusting relationship from future partners. Each of them must agree with fixing this specialization after him, no matter how "flawed" it may be for his "self-esteem". Here the general rule is the need for a "narrow" specialization of the partner, who has no absolute advantage for any of the works performed. A partner who has an absolute advantage, performs both types of work. In family life, it seems that he must "help" the other side to fulfill part of his duties. The voluntary agreement of "slow" partner to a narrow specialization is rewarded with an additional product, which appears as if from nothing, as a free product of cooperation. This causes a feeling of happiness. Since this additional product arises only in the case of voluntary cooperation, this feeling is associated with a marriage partner. There must be clear realization that another redistribution will inevitably lead to the disappearance of an additional product. Laziness from the part of one of the partners or refusal to do his/her part of work also leads to a similar result.

To avoid possible opportunistic behavior of partners, a wedding ritual is provided, in which formal and informal foundations of the marriage contract are laid down. In accordance with this contract, the partners are "obliged" to behave properly in the future family life. Here lies the fundamental difference between marriage and cohabitation. Cohabitation does not imply such an agreement and can then be easily "ripped off." This unique "partnership effect", in turn, is not unchanged, because the capabilities of the partners undergo constant changes. An important role is played by the relationship of partners: their mutual cooperation by developing their capabilities can lead to an even greater growth of the additional product, and vice versa, the confrontation between them can lead to diminishing of it and even its disappearance. Even the temporary absence of one of the partners is perceived by family members as a loss, and this loss is more than the loss of only one person. Conversely, his presence or return is perceived by them on a psychological level as a physical sense of happiness. And for this reason an illness, death of one of the family members, or divorce is perceived by the rest as an irreparable loss. (There are cases when the incursion of one of these events, estimated by the partner as grief, even led to his death).
Awareness of this causes each member of the family to take care of each other, to provide mutual support.

II. PARTNERSHIP EFFECT

"Partnership effect" is a constant companion of human society since its genesis. Primitive community itself historically has become the first form of such partnership. Then, as it grew, control costs increased, which gradually led to the emergence of the institution of the family in its various forms, like polygamy, monogamy, extended family, etc. Because our H & W partnership is economically profitable, we can assume that they will certainly take this opportunity. As G. Becker writes that a married couple will get maximum benefit from a clear division of labor, when husband specializes in certain activities, and wife - on the other. Given such large benefits from family specialization, a small discrimination of women and minor biological differences would be enough to cause a stable link between the division of labor (for housework and the production of subsistence food) and sex (2, p. 689-699). It is also important to draw attention to the following interesting observation by Becker: men and women postpone marriage until the complementarity between them and differences in their comparative advantages in upbringing children and production of other benefits in the household will not be significant enough to they could receive a gain from creating a family. The reason for the early marriage of women is that, compared to men, their biological characteristics, experience and other investments in human capital have so far been more specialized in the upbringing of children and the production of other benefits requiring marriage or its equivalent [1, p. 396-397]. Arguing about the role of love in the formation and development of family institution, he stipulates that the influence of love on the equilibrium sorting is a special case of the influence of differences in preferences [1, p. 402]. It seems to us that the role of love here is much higher. Partnership of our H and W will be more stable and effective if there is a sympathy relationship between them. So love becomes an important factor in the family economy, contributing to the creation of an additional product. It should be noted that only the presence of love without any creation of an additional product is not sufficient ground for a strong family. Most likely, without this product such love will be short-lived. Conversely, the existence of an additional product, in turn, becomes a factor that strengthens and reinforces this feeling.

In family, the "partnership effect" leads to the fact that "one plus one does not give two," but it gives more. Indeed, a family in its harmonious development acquires additional value, exceeding the simple arithmetic sum of the prices of the two partners. This added value, acquired by each partner only within the framework of this family, gives each member of the family a sense of happiness arising from the phenomenon of the family. And the family begins to act as a separate organism, functioning independently, having its own laws of development and dictating its members special rules of conduct. Everyone in the family loses its independent being, becoming an inseparable part of this organism: its entire existence begins to be determined by the interests not of himself/herself, but of the whole family as a whole.

Partnership effect and the resulting additional product is just only a condition for the emergence of family institution. It is necessary that partners with their qualities could fit together. Here arises the problem of the marriage market, which is a mechanism for "sorting" men and women to create a family. According to G. Becker, marriage market evaluates all its participants, giving them a kind of "price" that reflects the expectations of market participants regarding their ability to produce certain family goods. In this market, he distinguishes two basic models: the choice of a partner based on the principle of similarity (the basic model) and the principle of difference. Becker believes that men and women of higher quality marry men or women of similar quality. They do not select partners of lower quality when these qualities are complementary: the best woman raises the productivity of the best man, and vice versa. The choice by similarity is optimal when the characteristics are complementary, and the choice by difference - when they are interchangeable, as partners of a higher quality in the first case reinforce each other. And in the second, they duplicate the characteristics of each other [1, p. 390]. The choice in favor of a partner of equal quality is optimal in the case when these qualities are complementary (that is, mutually strengthen each other). On the contrary, the choice of difference occurs when the qualities are interchangeable (a high level of this quality of one partner compensates its lack of the other partner).

It should be noted that in the marital market, partners that have both attractive and negative qualities are forced to "share" this "package" in the aggregate. Here, possible asymmetric information can lead to future disagreements in the family. Therefore, different nations have different institutions to prevent such undesirable transactions. Sometimes the parties prefer not to sell the whole package, but their individual most attractive characteristics at the moment, for example, beautiful appearance, youth, etc. Total benefit at the same time may exceed the benefit from the sale of the package. Here lies one of the causes of prostitution, both male and female. Therefore, it would be necessary to seek its reason only in the field of promiscuity, its roots lie in the economic area. It would not be rational not to take advantage of this.

REFERENCES