Searching for the Lost Security in Latin America
Impact of Violence and Insecurity in the Development

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Abstract—Michel Foucault concept of Biopolitics helps us to understand the logic of governmentalinity, wish manage criminality as a problem in the normal life of the people in urban sphere. The rises of the criminality in Latin America is one of the causes of the new concern. Understood in a general view as the economic valuation of damages or threats to a person group or community. They put the efforts of Development in Latin America in a serious problem and threaten the advances in different aspects of the security in the region.

Keywords-component: biopolitics, development, Latin America, citizen security

I. INTRODUCTION

This work analysis the problem of criminality in the development on Latin America, which by their reiterative and progressive character and due to the impact on traditional economic activities, incur in expenses for national government and a loss of opportunity in the country’s development. The background of this proposal take into account the Foucault concept of Bio-politics. Analyzing these problem is an important task, because it could be helps to evaluate public policies leading to fight crime and it can also be used as a guide for the opinion climate to valuate and align with these policies to achieve better results in the fight against criminality.

II. THE PROBLEM OF CRIMINALITY IN LATIN AMERICA

A. The rise of a new problem in Latin America

The increase of criminality, reported in May of this year by the Latin-barometer Corporation, as the main concern in Latin America and the Caribbean, evidences an issue that has not been covered either by the democratic political systems, lacking leadership towards public opinion, or by the research progress that does not show any light about the deficit in citizen perception in the majority of the region’s countries. In relation to the document referring to the Latin-barometer it is said: “Applies to public policies then or just leading societies to have fewer victims, but also to generate the social and political leadership that enable to lead those opinion climates in accordance to its evolution. Opinion climates are the ones to yield to leadership or in this case to the absence of it. Without leadership “Public Opinion” cannot be “lead”, but rather it is adrift of the informative agenda. This is why the media is “blamed” as the generator of opinion climates, when in truth what the media does is to fill a leadership void. They, the media, are the consequence of a problem, a phenomenon, not the cause. We live in a world where in the absence of leadership, the media “lead” opinion with no one articulating it. This makes media more powerful and the persons whose interests are represented in them, but far from being the media’s responsibility, it is responsibility of the political system that creates those leadership voids. The region’s successful presidents have shown how they have led public opinion, and have not left voids in agendas for media to fill them with negative content”. The problem is not solved simply by criticizing or controlling the information by the communication media, to process more ’disguised’ information and avoid the sensation of tremor. The opinion climate status requires, on the contrary, handling its concerns in standardization and analyzing the origin of a problem, as well as constructing an analytical background to understand the sensation of insecurity, involving new ways to lead public policies for leadership over the opinion climate.

B. The meaning of criminality.

Criminality in all its dimensions – in its form of delinquency, violence and outlaw groups -, is the main concern of the Latin American and Caribbean opinion climate as this problematic has displaced other concerning matters that can generate more injuries to the region’s social-economic system. The harmful actions can be understood as the ones that search for redistribution or destruction of wealth. The direct economic costs produced by criminality are represented in loss of human and material resources, as well as producing uncertainty in the market; thus, generating indirect costs. In this case, aspects such as trust and credibility levels by entrepreneurs of institutions of the justice administration can be understood as uncertainty. Thus, a larger degree of uncertainty is reflected in higher transaction costs of the economy (Rubio 1996). The effects of this uncertainty are translated in investment discouragement, inefficient designation of resources, because these have to be used to fight crime and protect citizens against it. In this manner, criminality affects the economy diminishing its productivity and stopping growth.

In this context, it can be affirmed that criminality affects daily life of all inhabitants of a country, specially the most vulnerable, deteriorating their quality of life, increasing perception of fear and distrust among citizens that hinders the effective enjoyment of fundamental human rights, as well as
increasing the direct and indirect costs assumed by the State and citizens to generate a climate with higher security.

In many States of Latin America (Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil) the government’s are implementing strategies to control the territories and the citizens against crime and illegal groups through different institutions such as the National Police, restoring social order legal (constitutional). Specifically, the "national community policing plans by quadrants" is the most extensive and ambitious strategy for the "fulfillment of organizational goals aligned with national security policy."

This strategy aims to identify ways micro-territorial control in order to ensure control of the population and the territory lost or disputed with non-state actors (common and organized crime) that build social orders parallel to the detriment of institutional legitimacy of the center of state power. It is relevant here that an analysis of these control mechanisms, effectiveness of monitoring systems and its junction with the security policy focused on behavioral patterns defined by the unconstitutional legal establishment.

Taking the biopolitics as a conceptual framework for analysis, this paper seeks to explain and describe the tensions present between the implementation and application of micro-control strategies such as territorial and population in urban spaces, in which the absence or weak state presence have allowed the establishment of powers that based on the strength disputed the state, the monopoly of arms, tribute and social order.

The concepts of Foucault's Biopolitics and Biopower can serve as a toolbox for analysis of disciplinary mechanisms and security devices applied to social groups. (Foucault 1976, 7-9 and 1981, 101) "... the interesting thing about this approach is that it opens up possibilities to develop various forms of government analysis of current in terms of technology. These concepts access biopolitics and biopower in Foucault to go beyond Foucault himself, to new analysis of the forms of government in our societies. In this vein, the first thing to say is that these concepts are part of what Foucault himself calls a historical ontology of ourselves. This ontology is understood as a work that, through various historical materials, question evidence from which it has become the way we conceive of ourselves as subjects. Put another way, it is strange turn, through a confrontation with other ways of thinking which are accessed through these historical materials, not domesticated conciliatory interpretation which seeks the presence of the Same beyond all differences, our evidence to the point that they are presented as anomalies that we have made and with which we are familiar. Foucault will give this work of estrangement with regard to our own beliefs and political a critical role. This means that thought make a way forward that does not have the legitimacy of power function but attention to their excesses." (Sanchez 2007)

III. IMPACTS OF THE CITIZENS SECURITY PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA

The different programs aims to combat these phenomena with a comprehensive strategy for "the improvement of the police service, making his missionary spirit and harmonious civil nature is inherent, and to facilitate community outreach, to respond timely and effective manner to the real needs of society has coexistence". Under the terms of biopolitical analysis is aimed at the recovery and consolidation of three strategic components: the territory as geographical space, social as a source of human and political support as a generator of legitimacy. From this perspective it is necessary to analyze the impact of this policy on the recovery of state power-legitimacy in peripheral and marginalized those who have been under the control of non-state actors and criminal ways.

A. Constructing an Index of Risk Insecurity Level (IRIL)

To answer the third objective, information from the previous point will be used, to build an Index of Insecurity Risk Level (IRIL). This index includes a group of ten factors associated to security expenses, from the State as well as from individuals, costs derived from actions of violence and crime, availability to pay for a safer environment and perception of insecurity, among others. The IRIL will give a general punctuation from 1 to 10, where one is very safe and ten is very unsafe; and each factor would have an equal percentage valuation. In the case of factors that have costs and expenses values, values will be taken to the scale of 1 to 10, with the objective of unifying the measurement.

\[
\text{factor value} = \frac{\text{Max. Value} - \text{Dept. Value} \ast 10.0}{\text{Max. Value} - \text{Min. Value}}
\]

Methodology for IRIL calculation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>FACTOR</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tangible Costs</td>
<td>Crime and violence acts/State’s security expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average security expense per family * Number of families</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic loss average from criminal actions per family * Number of families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Willingness average to pay for a safer environment per family * Number of families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical costs attention to victims of violence/Inhabitant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cost of opportunty of people dedicated to violence/Inhabitant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criminal actions estimated costs at market prices/Inhabitant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intangible Costs</td>
<td>Perception of criminality threat impact (Rating scale from 1 to 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived insecurity</td>
<td>Perception of criminality threat probability (Rating scale from 1 to 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level of individual’s insecurity perception (Rating scale from 1 to 10)</td>
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This index is calculated for the most important cities in Latin America, and from crime typology starting from the
average of the ten factors. This will generate a measurement over citizens’ perceptions to insecurity risk, given their vulnerabilities and interpretation of the world, where socialization and communication spaces can be generated from the community in such way that citizens-institutions trust and co-responsibility mechanisms are generated.

The need to apply this index answers to the gap between citizen perception and institutional performance, as well as the effort made by state’s agents in search of safety. It is intended not only to influence through thorough analyses in the climate of opinion, but also to promote an effective strategy of communication in such way that the insecurity risk can be moved to the acceptable range and can be manageable for citizens as well as institutions.

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REFERENCES